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TRANSFORMATION OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM
Mireya Dávila
INTRODUCTION
This chapter deals with the main transformations of the Chilean 
political system during the transition from dictatorship to de-
mocracy at the beginning of the 1990s. The military dictatorship 
that ruled Chile for 17 years (1973–1990) introduced deep trans-
formations in Chilean society that impacted on the transition 
process itself, as well as on the political system inaugurated in 
March 1990. The main changes introduced by the dictatorship 
included a new political Constitution and the introduction of 
pro-market reforms in the economic sphere, a change in the ter-
ritorial organization of the country (with the creation of new ad-
ministrative), a new binominal electoral system, reduced powers 
for Congress and therefore, a hyper-presidential system. These 
changes constituted the framework within which the political 
system has had to process subsequent political dynamics and 
conflicts over social, economic, and political change.
INITIAL CONDITIONS
The initial conditions of the transition process in Chile were in-
fluenced by the particular characteristics of the Chilean military 
dictatorship, including the nature of military rule, its long dura-
tion, and the transformations it introduced.
The Chilean military dictatorship began on September 11, 
1973 with a coup. All three branches of the Armed Forces, plus 
the Carabineros (uniformed police) participated in the coup. 
The ensuing dictatorship, led by the Army, and its Commander-
in-Chief, General Augusto Pinochet, was characterized by mas-
sive political and social repression. This included violation of 
the human rights of the population in general, and members of 
left-wing political parties in particular.1 Anew political order was 
centered on Pinochet, and founded on deep neo-liberal econom-
ic reforms.2 Although the first military junta had four members 
(the heads of each of the three Armed Forces, plus the uniformed 
police) de facto powers of government soon came to be concen-
trated in the hands of Pinochet and the Army High Command. 
Economic management was meanwhile delegated to neo-liberal 
civilians (Varas, 2017). Pinochet simultaneously served as Presi-
dent of the Republic, President of the Government Junta (until 
1980) and Commander-in-Chief of the Army. The Military Junta 
became the legislative branch of government.
The coup of September 1973 also meant the end of the insti-
tutions and organizations typical of a democracy. Congress was 
closed; the political parties that had made up the overthrown pre-
vious governments were banned,3 and other parties were obliged 
to go into recess; the electoral rolls were burned; press freedom 
was restricted and censorship was established; and public uni-
versities were intervened and radically modified. The trade union 
movement was persecuted.
During the 1970s, the dictatorship developed a strategy for 
political legitimization that sought to embed the authoritarian 
regime on a basis other than the previous one of fear. This strategy 
embraced attempts to create historical legitimacy by deploying 
anti-Marxist and anti-Communist discourse to condemn the de-
posed socialist government of Salvador Allende (1970–73).4 It 
also sought legal and constitutional legitimization by imposing 
a vision of an authoritarian and protected democracy, and pur-
sued economic legitimization based on the success of a new, 
neo-liberal, economic model.5
New rules of the political game were a fundamental part of 
the changes introduced during the dictatorship. The new insti-
tutional design was enshrined in the new, 1980, Constitution, 
which began to be implemented in 1981.6
A set of institutions established in this 1980 Constitution gave 
the Armed Forces an important role in the political order, and 
placed them in a privileged situation relative to other state or-
ganizations. Dispositions included dissolving civilian authorities’ 
power to remove commanders-in-chief of the Armed Forces or 
internal security agencies; plus the creation of a National Security 
Council, an advisory body of the President of the Republic on 
national security matters, in whose decisionmaking the Armed 
Forces were to play an important role. In addition, the Consti-
tution established a set of rules that favored a concept of so-
called “protected democracy”. This involved the creation of non-
elected (designated) Senators, whose number was to include 
former commanders-in-chief of the armed forces and security 
services.7 Other aspects included the introduction of high quo-
rums, designed to make any future reform of this Constitution 
and associated constitutional organic laws more difficult. A new, 
binominal, electoral system was also introduced. This tended, at 
least in the early years of its operation, to favor the political Right, 
who were political allies of the military and the dictatorship. 
1 The Dictatorship had two agencies responsible for repression: the National 
Intelligence Directorate (Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia, DINA), cre-
ated de facto in 1973 but formalized in 1974, and the National Information 
Center (Centro Nacional de Información, CNI), created in 1977 to replace 
the DINA.
2 Carlos Huneeus, Carlos Huneeus, The Pinochet Regime. Boulder: Lynne 
Reinner, 2007.
3 Outgoing parties that had formed part of the deposed Popular Unity govern-
ment (Unidad Popular) were banned: Decree Law 77 of the Military Junta 
banned the Communist and Socialist parties, the Popular Socialist Union 
(Unión Socialista Popular), the Unitary Popular Action Movement (Mov-
imiento de Acción Popular Unitario, MAPU), the Radical and Christian Left 
parties, Independent Popular Action, and “all organizations that promoted 
Marxism”.
4 For more details see: Carlos Huneeus, The Pinochet Regime. Boulder: Lynne 
Reinner, 2007; Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, Chile entre el Neoliberalismo y el Cre-
cimiento con Equidad. Reformas y Políticas Económicas desde 1973, Santia-
go: J-C.Sáez Editor, 2008.
5 The exception was the national copper company, CODELCO, which con-
tinued in the hands of the State.
6 It was ratified in a plebiscite in September 1980.
7 The Constitution of 1980 established the figure of designated senators, ap-
pointed by the President of the Republic. The categories of person eligible 
for these senatorships were: former presidents of the Republic; two former 
Supreme Court judges; a former comptroller-general of the Republic; former 
commanders-in-chief of the Armed Forces; a former rector of a state uni-
versity; and a former Minister f State.
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The design of the new political system also included new laws 
governing political parties and the electoral roll.
One of the singular features of the Chilean Dictatorship is un-
doubtedly the fact that it came to an end as a result of following 
its own institutional standards, as established in the Constitution 
of 1980. This set down regulations for a long transition period, 
with Article 25, for example, stipulating that, as of March 11, 1981, 
General Pinochet was to continue in office as President for at least 
eight more years, i.e. until March 1990. The transitory provisions 
established that the commanders-in-chief of the Armed Forces, 
plus the General Director of the Carabineros (i.e. the members 
of the military Junta) would then propose a new candidate, to 
be ratified or otherwise via a citizen plebiscite. This candidate, if 
ratified by the plebiscite, would occupy the position of President 
of the Republic in the subsequent presidential period, which was 
to run between March 1990 and March 1997. On August 30, 1988, 
the Governing Junta nominated Augusto Pinochet as their can-
didate for the plebiscite.
The plebiscite was duly held on October 5, 1988, after cam-
paigns involving the regime and a now-tolerated political op-
position. Against all odds, the “NO” vote won,8 with 55.99 % of 
the votes, to the 44.01 % obtained by the “YES” vote that would 
have confirmed Pinochet in the presidency for seven more years.9 
Accordingly, Pinochet would continue only for another year, at 
which point – in 1989 – open presidential and parliamentary elec-
tions would be called.10
The plebiscite and subsequent electoral process were notable 
for the large size of voter turnout, are despite the years of dictator-
ship, fear and repression. For example, 7,435,913 citizens regis-
tered to vote in the plebiscite, a figure that represented 97.5 % of 
all citizens theoretically eligible to vote that year. This represented 
a first in the country’s history: never before had such a large per-
centage of eligible citizen actively registered to vote.11
THE TRANSITION PROCESS
The Chilean Transition was an orderly process that occurred ac-
cording to a timetable laid down by the dictatorship. The Army, and 
especially General Pinochet, retained control of the process due 
to the institutional power that was vested in them by the Constitu-
tion, combined with Pinochet’s by then unquestioned authority 
over the other branches of the Armed Forces and security services.
Despite the abundance of scholarship on the process of transi-
tions from authoritarian to democratic regimes, there is no single 
agreed definition of “transition”.12 In the case of Chile, the concept 
of transition (defined as the change from one political regime to 
another) is often applied to the period between October 5, 1988 
and March  11, 1990, with the  latter constituting the  date on 
which the first democratically-elected government took power 
after 17 years of dictatorship. Following a similar logic, one might 
instead argue that Chilean electoral democracy fully restarted in 
March 1994, the date on which the second President elected in 
this new democratic cycle took power. Others feel, however, that 
the democratization process cannot yet be considered fully com-
plete, as there has not yet – as of 2019 – been a process of creation 
of a new constitution, one that fully meets democratic standards 
and has been debated and approved by the country’s citizens.
However, we could date Chile’s transition as a process that was 
at least begun with the October 1988 plebiscite, and whose first 
stage lasted until March 1990, when Patricio Aylwin, leader of 
the opposition, took office at the head of this first democratically-
elected government since 1970.
The creation of a political opposition to the Chilean dictator-
ship had in itself nbeen a lengthy and contested process. As far 
back as the early 1980s, a range of political groups attempted 
to constitute a  cohesive opposition, capable of confronting 
Pinochet and recovering democratic rule. The opposition ten-
dency that finally gained the ascendant was one that proposed 
accepting the rules of Pinochet’s game, i.e. the Constitution of 
1980, and the schedule set down in it for a return to electoral 
democracy schedule. Other alternatives, including outright re-
jection of the 1980 Constitution and a strategy of taking up arms 
against the regime, did not in the end attract majority support. 
The political coalition that became the main official opposition 
to the dictatorship, demanding free elections, was mainly formed 
along an axis taking in Christian Democrats and a renewed group 
of Socialists Broad international political support was decisive 
for strengthening this opposition movement. The role played 
towards the end of the regime by the US13 also helped in allow-
ing the emergence of an effective political opposition, avoiding 
the danger of counter-reaction by regime forces seeking an ex-
cuse to cancel the plebiscite.
Once it became clear that the opposition had triumphed in 
the 1988 plebiscite, opposition parties began preparing to com-
pete in the presidential and parliamentary elections of December 
1989. A broad coalition was formed, the Concertación de Partidos 
por la Democracia, known as the Concertación. This coalition 
brought together Christian Democrats and Socialists,14 plus oth-
er groupings including the Radical Party (Partido Radical, PR), 
the newly-formed Party for Democracy (Partido por la Democ-
racia, PPD) and 13 other parties.
The political right-wing, which had supported and defended 
the dictatorship, organized itself into two political parties for 
the 1989 presidential and parliamentary electoral campaign: 
the Independent Democratic Union (Unión Demócrata Indepen-
diente, UDI) and National Renewal (Renovación Nacional, RN).
Meanwhile, the military government devoted the time be-
tween October 1988 and March 1990 to creating a set of legal 
8 “Estudio Nacional de Opinión Pública, Septiembre 1988”, Documento de 
Trabajo 1, Santiago: Centro de Estudios Públicos, 1988; Felipe González, 
Mounu Prem, “¿Por qué ganó el NO? La historia detrás de la historia”, San-
tiago: CIPER Chile, 2019, www.ciper.cl
9 In 1985, the Electoral Registration Tribunal (Tribunal Calificador de Elec-
ciones, TRICEL) had been put into operation, and in 1986 the electoral 
register had been reopened.
10 Had the Yes (Sí) option triumphed in the plebiscite, the existing President 
of the Republic, i.e., Pinochet, would have taken office once more, with 
an additional eight year mandate.
11 “Plebiscito de 1988 marca el  fin del régimen military”, www.bcn.cl At 
the time, Chile’s electoral system was based on voluntary registration.
12 Juan J. Linz, Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Con-
solidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-communist Europe, 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.
13 See: Report of the US Senate Investigation Commission on undercover 
actions in Chile, 1963–1973; Peter Kornbluh, “Desclasifican nuevas conv-
ersaciones entre Nixon y Kissinger para derrocar a Allende”, CIPER-Chile, 
2008, https://ciperchile.cl/2008/09/10/desclasifican-nuevas-conversa-
ciones-entre-nixon-y-kissinger-para-derrocar-a-allende/
14 During the dictatorship, Chilean socialism experienced a difficult process 
of division focused, among other things, on disputes about strategies to 
deal with the dictatorship. One important current underwent a process of 
ideological renewal that involved reconciling socialism with a commit-
ment to liberal democracy. This was the tendency around which the Con-
certación was founded.
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provisions that granted privileged positions to those who had 
been in power for seventeen years. Examples include the binomi-
nal electoral system, and a decree preventing 35,000 civil servants 
from subsequent dismissal. In addition, constitutional reforms 
carried out in 1989 boosted the autonomy of the Armed Forces 
by investing laws and regulations on issues such as military ca-
reer structure, and the military budget, with constitutional rank. 
This protected existing favourable arrangements, by increasing 
the legislative quorum necessary for any subsequent reform.15 In 
the December 1989 elections, the opposition candidate, Patricio 
Aylwin, won with 55.7 % of the vote (against 29.4 % for the pro-
military government candidate, Hernán Büchi). A second right-
wing candidate, Francisco Javier Erráruriz, obtained 15.4 % of 
the vote).
The Congress that came into session in 1990 did so according 
to the new regulations established by the 1980 Constitution. Un-
der these provisions, 120 lower house deputies and 38 senators 
were elected. The former would all serve for four years. Senato-
rial terms meanwhile differed according to the district that was 
represented: half would serve an eight year term, half, only four 
years. Nine designated (non-elected) Senators made up the full 
strength of the upper house. Ninety-five per cent of the country’s 
7,557,537 eligible citizens emitted a valid vote in the 1989 elec-
tions: a total of 7,158,422 votes. Overall, the Concertación ob-
tained 51.49 % of the votes in the legislature, compared to 34.18 % 
of the right-wing. Considering the non-elected senators, the right 
nonetheless controlled 50 % of the upper house. The Christian 
Democratic Party was the major political force, with the Concert-
ación overall obtaining 69 (of 120) elected deputies and 22 (of 38) 
elected Senate seats.16
The first administration of this first transition period lasted 
for four years (1990–1994), and was a transitional government 
in many senses of the term, including the need for careful han-
dling of countervailing political tendencies in Chilean society 
if economic, political and social stability were to be achieved. 
The government promoted a set of socioeconomic policies aimed 
at increasing public resources for social policy targeting educa-
tion, health, and the reduction of poverty.
In the sphere of human rights, Patricio Aylwin’s government 
introduced a set of State policies in truth, memory, reparations, 
and justice. During his first term, President Aylwin created 
a truth commission, despite resistance not only from the right-
wing and the Armed Forces, but also from some within his own 
coalition. The National Commission on Truth and Reconcili-
ation – known as the Rettig Commission after its chairman, 
lawyer Raúl Rettig, was charged with establishing the histori-
cal truth about human rights violations, including the num-
ber of victims killed and forcibly disappeared during the Dic-
tatorship. In 1991, President Aylwin informed the country of 
the Commission’s results, apologizing to the country on behalf 
of the Chilean State and setting in motion the drawing up of 
reparations policies. Right-wing sectors and the Armed Forces 
sectors nonetheless rejected the report’s conclusions. General 
Pinochet, who was to continue in his post as Commander-in-
Chief of the Chilean Army between 1990 and March 1998, stated 
that: “The Chilean Army certainly sees no reason to apologize 
for having participated in this patriotic work.” [i.e. the military 
regime] … “[The Army solemnly declares that it will not accept 
being placed in the dock for having saved the  freedom and 
sovereignty of the country, in compliance with the repeated 
requests of citizens.”17
Military civil relations during these first years of transitional 
government could be described as a “tense calm”. There were, 
however, two episodes that increased tension, making headlines 
and grabbing public attention. In the first episode, which became 
known as the “Pinocheques” case, Pinochet had the Army called 
to battle stations, in December 1990. The move was intended to 
send a signal to the government that a corruption case, in which 
one of Pinochet’s sons was involved,18 should not be reopened 
before the courts. The second case, which occurred in 1993, came 
to be called “el Boinazo” (named for the black berets, or boinas, 
worn by troops). In May 1993, the newspaper La Nación report-
ed that the case related to Pinochet’s son, involving fraudulent 
checks, would be reopened. In response, Pinochet again pres-
sured the government to ensure his son was not investigated. This 
time, Pinochet called other military officials to the Armed Forces 
headquarters – symbolically located directly in front of the Presi-
dential palace – escorted by armed soldiers in combat dress.
The  democratic electoral process was deepened, under 
the first transitional government, by the holding of mayoral 
elections (during the dictatorship, mayors had been directly 
appointed by Pinochet). The elections returned 334 municipal 
mayors and their respective town councils, made up of 6, 8 or 
10  councillors, depending on the  number of voters in each 
district. In these elections the Concertación again obtained 
a majority of votes cast, with the highest vote for a single party 
going to the Christian Democrats, who obtained almost 29 % 
of the votes.
March 1994, saw the  accession of the  second democratic 
administration elected since the Dictatorship, after scheduled 
elections in December 1993 saw Christian Democrat candidate 
Eduardo Frei Ruiz Tagle elected with 57.98 % of the votes, de-
feating both the the right-wing, and alternative, more left-wing, 
candidates fielded by other parties of the Concertación.
This first democratic election since transition marked the pro-
cess of democratic consolidation in Chile. Although important 
areas of Chile’s institutional and de facto power structure still 
remained unchanged since the dictatorship, democratic elec-
tions finally became the only possible way to formally gain power.
THE PRESENT-DAY POLITICAL SYSTEM
From the point of view of stability, the Chilean political system is 
secure. One requirement of democracy is successful alternation 
in power. The Concertación ruled for 20 years, between 1990 and 
2010. In 2010, right-wing candidate Sebastián Piñera, was elected 
president. In 2014, a new version of the Concertación coalition 
took back government, this time with the inclusion of the Com-
munist Party in the ruling coalition. In 2018, Sebastián Piñera 
was elected once again.
Although democracy is consolidated, some democratization 
processes remain pending. These include a new Constitution, 
and mechanisms allowing greater citizen participation in public 
15 Claudio Fuentes, “Mirando el pasado, definiendo el futuro: Diseño Con-
stitucional en Chile 1980 – 2005”, Paper presented at the 28th Congress of 
the Latin American Studies Association, LASA, Rio de Janeiro, June 11–14, 
2009.
16 www.bcn.cl
17 Minutes of a session of the National Security Council, held on March 21, 
1991, www.latercera.com
18 Augusto Pinochet Hiriart
[ 6 ] MEMORY OF NATIONS: DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION GUIDE – ThE ChIlEAN ExpERIENCE
policy formation.19 As elsewhere, Chilean democracy has also 
had to contend with dwindling political participation, and a crisis 
of legitimacy of essential institutions of the democratic system, 
such as political parties and the legislature.
Between 1994 – the year in which the second democratically-
elected government took office – and the present (2019), a range 
of important changes have affected issues that remained pend-
ing at and after transition. As has already been stated, Pinochet 
remained as Army Commander-in-Chief until March 1998. Upon 
retiring from that post he became a designated Senator, as laid 
down in the 1980 Constitution. However, his arrest in the UK in 
1998 became a turning point for the balance of power, in terms of 
the transition and the sway that the Armed Forces and Pinochet 
continued to hold in Chilean society. The arrest, over allegations 
of human rights violations being investigated by a Spanish judge, 
led to extradition wrangling that was to lasted for a year and a half. 
While the incident at first generated an intense and polarized 
reaction in Chilean society, it ended up removing Pinochet from 
the political scene, and amplifying legal proceedings already 
open against him in domestic courts. Finally, the 2004 discovery 
that the General had a large personal fortune hidden in the US 
Riggs Bank weakened Pinochet’s domestic image.
In addition, in 2005, an important set of reforms to the Con-
stitution put an end to the designated senator system, restored 
the power of the president to remove Commanders-in-Chief of 
the Armed Forces, and modified the composition of the National 
Security Council.
Chile’s political party system is consolidated. New parties have 
emerged alongside the two, center-left and center-right, coali-
tions that emerged during the dictatorship. The new movements 
and parties include, on the right-wing, a movement known as 
Political Evolution (Evópoli). On the left-wing, a group of parties 
created a grouping called Frente Amplio, (“Broad Front”). This 
coalition, similar to others in the region, such as Uruguay’s Frente 
Amplio, brings together left-wing parties and movements that 
propose deeper reforms to the neo-liberal development model. 
On Chile’s extreme right-wing, meanwhile, José Antonio Kast was 
(in 2019) in the process of creating the Republican Party.
In electoral terms there have been two major changes. The first 
was the replacement of the previous system of voluntary regis-
tration and mandatory voting. The new system features auto-
matic registration, combined with voluntary voting. The change 
has however led to a large decrease in electoral participation. 
The second change is a new, proportional, electoral system. In 
the most recent round of parliamentary elections, this system al-
lowed for a greater representation of citizen diversity in Congress. 
Since the system also incorporates gender quotas, the number of 
female legislators also increased.
One problem facing the Chilean political system – one which 
it shares with many other countries – is a decrease in citizens’ he 
electoral participation. For example, 51.02 % of those authorized 
to vote in the second round of the 2017 presidential elections 
did not do so. The percentage of abstentionism is even higher 
among the younger population. In fact, more than 62 % of people 
between 20 and 29 years of age who were eligible to vote, did not 
do so.20 This tendency toward decreasing political participation 
has been a steady trend since since the return to democracy.21
Other political system issues that have been on the agenda in 
recent years include scandals linked to illegal financing of politi-
cal parties. In response, there have been important changes to 
as campaign financing, and moves to improve transparency in 
the use of public resources for political representation. Corrup-
tion scandals linked to political financing also led to the creation 
of a special commission: in 2015, the second presidential ad-
ministration of Michelle Bachelet (2006–10; 2014–18) established 
the Presidential Advisory Council against Conflicts of Interest. 
This Commission, colloquially called the Engel Commission after 
its chairman, economist Eduardo Engel, was to propose regula-
tion of the relationship between money and politics.
Despite this decrease in electoral participation, Chilean soci-
ety is however still active in mobilization around particular de-
mands or issues that attract public attention. Concerns around 
education, and over the environment, for instance, have created 
sustained periods of citizen mobilization over the past decade 
(since 2010). There is also a noticeable organized civil society 
around issues such as sexual and gender diversity.
LESSONS LEARNT
Like any complex political and social process, the Chilean transi-
tion and its impact on the political system contains areas of light 
and shade. We might highlight, for instance:
 ■ The democratic political system was installed and consoli-
dated in Chile against a backdrop of economic, political and 
social stability, and with very little violence. On the other hand, 
the political costs of this stability included reduced levels of 
participation on the part of the civil society groupings that 
fought for the return of democracy, with a concomitant growth 
in the domination of politics by an elite political class .
 ■ The prioritization of stability, and the particular public policies 
implemented in economic matters, allowed for a reduction in 
poverty and the generation of greater well-being for Chilean 
society. However, objectives and principles such as stability 
were prioritised while others, such as reforms to the economic 
model, the deepening of political participation, or greater jus-
tice regarding human rights, were left aside.
 ■ The balance of power in the dictatorship and during transition 
was clearly tipped in favor of the military and its political allies, 
who did not want human rights violations to be addressed. 
Nonetheless, the  first transitional administration chose to 
move forward with the National Commission on Truth and 
Reconciliation, which at least established a first step for hu-
man rights policies.
 ■ One warning note, or negative learning point, should be struck 
as regards the institutional and de facto power preserved by 
Chile’s Armed Forces – especially by the Army, and General 
Pinochet. While this was perhaps unavoidable during the first 
transition government, subsequent administrations failed to 
generate greater civilian control of the Armed Forces. This failure 
19 To this day there is a discussion in Chile about whether the reforms of 2005 
were sufficient for the post-2005 Constitution to be considered qualita-
tively distinct from the one imposed in 1980. Then-President Ricardo Lagos 
chose to replace the existing signature in the preface of the text – that of 
General Pinochet – with his own, a symbolic attempt to mark a distinction. 
Nonetheless, the post-2005 text still contains dispositions that are at odds 
with a fully democratic Constitution, for example in relation to the Armed 
Forces and the concept of National Security.
20 www.servel.cl
21 “Diagnóstico sobre la participación electoral en Chile”, Project Promoting 
Electoral Participation in Chile, Santiago: United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP), October 2017.
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encompassed not only human rights, but also defense-related 
matters including the military budget, education, and weaponry.
 ■ The incoming authorities faced a tension between political 
and economic stability, versus pressure for transformation 
of the economic model, since the latter had been an initial 
component of social and political opposition to Pinochet. In 
the end, a subsidiary State model was imposed. Neo-liberal re-
forms introduced in the dictatorship, such as the privatization 
of basic services including water and electricity, were main-
tained. Tax changes that might have increased the tax base, or 
tax revenues, were not implemented.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the experience of the Chilean case, the following rec-
ommendations can be made:
 ■ Transitional coalitions that achieve a  social majority are 
needed. It is important to build spaces of cooperation be-
tween the groups that demand democratization. This implies 
generating strategies for cooperation strategies, and compli-
ance mechanisms for any agreements that are reached.
 ■ Representative democracy needs to be valued, as a fundamen-
tal tool for resolving conflicts.
 ■ Human rights should be addressed and defended. Transitional 
justice policies should be designed in a way that takes politi-
cal and social viability into account, without compromising 
on essentials. Policy design requires information-gathering 
and analysis, which will require state capacity and financing.
 ■ It should be understood that transition processes are multi-
dimensional, involving political and socioeconomic aspects. 
This should be taken into account when governance strategies 
and public policy are drawn up.
 ■ There is a need for those who take charge of government in 
transition contexts to have technical and political knowhow.
 ■ For effective administration, priorities need to be established 
within the government agenda. Governing is always difficult: 
it is doubly so, in transitional contexts.
 ■ The participation of civil society and citizen movements in 
policy design should be encouraged and institutionalized.
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DISMANTLING THE STATE SECURITY APPARATUS
ClauDio Fuentes s.
INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the process of adaptation and reform of 
the armed forces and public order following the political transi-
tion in Chile in 1990. The case is particularly noteworthy because 
the Chilean political transition is usually considered to be “suc-
cessful” in terms of the peaceful process by which the transfer of 
power from military to civilian authorities occurred, in addition 
to the way in which the armed forces were accommodated into 
the democratic process. In the case of Chile, it was an agreed 
transition, in which the military regime imposed the rules of 
the constitutional game and established a series of privileges for 
the armed forces, and where minimum conditions were negoti-
ated by the opponents of the regime.1
This chapter analyzes the political and institutional conditions 
that favoured such an outcome. It will be argued that the tran-
sition process involved the acceptance by the civilian political 
elite of a number of conditions for military autonomy. In addi-
tion, a gradual process of institutional-legal reform was initi-
ated, which gradually reduced the room for military autonomy. 
Usually these changes occurred due to corruption scandals that 
weakened the negotiating capacity of the military and police with 
respect to civilian authority.
POLITICAL-INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
OF THE MILITARY REGIME
The military dictatorship in Chile (1973–1990) was established 
by a coup d’état against the constitutionally elected regime of 
Salvador Allende (1970–1973). The three branches of the armed 
forces and the  uniformed police, the  Carabineros,2 assumed 
total control of the country by establishing a military govern-
ment junta. Early on, Army General Augusto Pinochet took over 
the leadership of this military junta, establishing a mechanism 
to concentrate the executive actions of the regime in Pinochet 
and the function of issuing regulations and decrees in the mili-
tary junta composed of the military heads of the three armed 
branches and the director of the Carabineros. The regime estab-
lished a commission that proposed a new constitution, which 
was promulgated in 1980. The Constitution itself established 
an itinerary that considered a plebiscite to ratify the permanence 
of the regime, which took place in October 1988.
Unlike other countries in Latin America, the Chilean military 
regime was characterized by: (a) single-member power concen-
trated in the figure of General Pinochet with respect to the re-
gime; (b) the institutionalization of the regime on the basis of 
a series of constitutional norms and other bodies of law and order 
that would endure over time after the political transition; and (c) 
the establishment of alliances with civilian political and econom-
ic groups-mainly right-wing political parties and businessmen-
who supported the regime from the beginning until the handover 
of power in March 1990.3 In addition, (d), from the point of view of 
public opinion, from March 1990 onwards, there was increasing 
support for the professional role of the armed forces in addition 
to an increasing rejection of the figure of General Pinochet and 
the violation of human rights.
The  military regime maintained its political itinerary for 
the holding of a plebiscite in 1988, where civil society would be 
consulted on whether or not to accept the continuity of the re-
gime for another eight years. The opposition agreed to participate 
in this plebiscite but requested some conditions, such as the ex-
istence of electoral rolls, the possibility for the opposition to use 
the media and allowing the presence of international observers.4
Pinochet’s narrow defeat at the  polls in 1988 opened up 
the possibility of negotiating some constitutional reforms. Al-
though the opposition rejected the 1980 Constitution, it agreed 
to abide by it and called for a series of reforms to the regime. 
Some of these proposals were submitted to a new plebiscite in 
July 1989. The reforms affected some minimal, though relevant, 
aspects of the Constitution. For example, the original version of 
the 1980 Constitution established a National Security Council 
that had broad powers and was composed of four uniformed 
members and only three civilian members. The proposal ap-
proved in the 1989 plebiscite incorporated another civilian, leav-
ing a composition of 4 to 4. In addition, an article was removed 
from the Constitution that excluded the Communist Party from 
participating in the political system.
Subsequently, in December 1989, presidential and congres-
sional elections were held, and Patricio Aylwin (55.2 %) was 
elected, representing a coalition of moderate centre-left parties. 
Consequently, before the transfer of power, the military regime 
approved, within the military junta, a series of laws of a consti-
tutionally organic nature (with a qualified quorum of 4/7 for their 
approval), with the aim of protecting some of the legal preroga-
tives, and room for military autonomy, including military justice 
and what it says about military careers.
The military regime designed a new framework for the inser-
tion of the armed forces into the state apparatus, combining high 
political-institutional interference with a high level of autonomy 
in their own management. These regulations were not affected 
by the process of the transition to democracy or by the reforms 
of 1989. Therefore, the Chilean transition had this particular 
condition for the transfer of power from the military regime to 
the civilian authority, while they remained relevant actors from 
1 Cristóbal Rovira, “Chile: transición pactada y  débil autodeterminación 
colectiva de la sociedad”, in Revista Mexicana de Sociología, 2007, Vol. 69, 
No. 2, 243–372.
2 In the case of Chile, the armed forces are considered to be the Army, Navy 
and Air Force. The forces of law and order are considered to be the uni-
formed police, which has the structure of a military nature (Carabineros), 
and the investigative or civilian police (Investigaciones). We usually talk 
about the armed forces and security.
3 Carlos Huneeus, The Pinochet Regime, Santiago: Editorial Sudamericana, 
2001.
4 The plebiscite was held on October 5, 1988 and the option “Yes” for Pinochet 
lost against the “No” vote (44 % vs. 56 % respectively). The foregoing com-
promised the holding of free elections the following year, which were held 
in December 1989.
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the institutional and, as we will see later, the political point of 
view. The legal framework at the beginning of the transition es-
tablished the following conditions:5
a/ High political-institutional interference. The armed and 
security forces participated through the  National Security 
Council in the designation of authorities; they could bring 
to the attention of the civil authority their concerns on any 
subject that in their opinion affected or constituted a risk to 
the institutions, since they were, according to the Constitution, 
“guarantors of the institutions”. This council was composed 
of 4 uniformed and 4 civilian members and participated in 
the appointment of some members of the Constitutional Court 
and the members of the Senate. There were 9 senators in total, 
representing 19 % of the upper house, of which 4 were to be 
former members of the armed forces and law enforcement 
agencies, and the rest were appointed by the regime.
In addition, a provision was established in the Constitution 
that former presidents could serve as senators for life, thus 
allowing General Pinochet to serve for eight years as Com-
mander in Chief of the Army (until 1998) and later as a senator 
for life.
b/ Civilian control of appointments and removals. The civil-
ian authorities would have limited control over the appoint-
ment and recommendation of uniformed personnel, since 
the Constitution established that the Commander-in-Chief of 
the Armed Forces and the General Director of the Carabineros 
were irremovable. In addition, promotions and retirements 
of officers were to be proposed by the military authority to 
the civilian authority, with no possibility for civilians to remove 
them.
c/ Civilian control over institutional management. The armed 
and police institutions were linked through the Ministry of De-
fence to the presidential authority. The Ministry of Defence did 
not have the capacity to control the institutional management 
of arms, since it only exercised administrative control.
d/ Control over the intelligence apparatus. Autonomy also ex-
tended to the intelligence services that depended directly on 
the military chiefs and there was no capacity for civilian legal 
control by either the executive or the legislative branch. Nor 
was there a civilian intelligence agency to coordinate intel-
ligence efforts.
e/ Control over the military budget. In the case of the military 
budget, a minimum floor was established for the regular ex-
penditure of the armed forces and of internal security agen-
cies, which was set at the equivalent of the year 1989, with 
a mechanism for updating it according to inflation; the same 
equivalent was established for a minimum floor for reserved 
resources that were transferred to the commanders in chief of 
the armed forces and to the heads of the police for expenses 
that did not require accountability; and it was established that 
10 % of the foreign sales of the state-owned copper company 
CODELCO would be allocated annually to the armed forces 
for the acquisition of armaments. This fund also had a mini-
mum floor equivalent to US$ 180 million per year. Legal and 
operational capacities for civilian control over military spend-
ing were non-existent at the beginning of the transition.
f/ Control over education systems. Legally, the armed forces 
and the Carabineros had full autonomy to define their educa-
tional plans and programs. It was also established by law that 
armed institutions could issue professional titles within their 
armed institutes.
g/ Control over social protection systems. The  armed and 
security forces have their own social security system, which 
includes a social welfare system for their members, where 
the State is responsible for the pension costs of its members, 
and a health system is also defined for the armed institutions 
themselves.
h/ Control over military justice. Finally, the armed institutions 
have a military justice system that allows for any violation of 
the law committed by a member of the military to be tried 
by military courts, regardless of whether the violation occurs 
during the exercise of military duties or whether the incident 
is of a civilian nature.
ACCOMMODATION AND INTERACTION 
AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TRANSITION
From a political point of view, the first and second governments 
of the transition (Aylwin 1990–1994 and Frei 1994–2000) did not 
advance any institutional reforms in relation to the armed forces. 
These governments decided not to open up an area of conflict with 
the armed forces or security agencies since they favoured other 
reforms associated with the economy, social policies and the re-
establishment of cooperative relations at an international level.
The main tensions in the relationship to the armed forces and 
internal security agencies occurred in relation to General Au-
gusto Pinochet, who was in charge of the Army. The Chamber of 
Deputies in the first year of government began a parliamentary 
investigation into possible irregularities in the sale of weapons 
by the Army. In December 1990, General Pinochet pressured 
the government into hastily closing this investigation by call-
ing for a quartering to barracks of the armed forces. There was 
an agreement between the government and the Army that ended 
up closing the case in the Chamber of Deputies without clarifying 
responsibilities. A new quartering to barracks took place in 1993 
when the same case started to be investigated by an independ-
ent state body (the Comptroller General’s Office), which began 
the study of the irregular sale of arms in which General Pinochet’s 
son was involved.6
Subsequently, in 1995, a new incident occurred when the Jus-
tice Department decided to prosecute the retired Army General 
Manuel Contreras, who was in charge of the National Intelligence 
Directorate of the  military regime (DINA). On this occasion, 
the Army negotiated with the government the establishment of 
a special prison for those military personnel who were eventually 
prosecuted and sentenced for human rights violations.
The centre-left governments did not have a legislative majority 
in the Senate. The military regime appointed senators for 8 years 
(1990–1998) which meant there was a right-wing majority. In ad-
dition, in the future, at least 3 appointments had to be former 
military personnel. Added to which, General Pinochet could be 
appointed for life as a senator and the National Security Council, 
where the armed forces represented 50 % of the council, could 
appoint 3 other senators. Therefore, the governments of the rul-
ing coalition (Concertación) opted for the pragmatic policy of 
using the  few mechanisms it had to reduce the  influence of 
the military and contain conflicts with the military.
5 Claudio Fuentes, El Pacto, Santiago: Universidad Diego Portales, 2012
6 Claudio Fuentes, La Transición de los Militares, Santiago: LOM ediciones, 
2006
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Another issue that caused great tension was the new govern-
ment’s approach to human rights. The first government’s political 
decision to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission that 
would compile a report (1991) on human rights violations that 
had occurred in Chile between 1973 and 1990 provoked strong 
tensions with the military, who publicly questioned the results 
and submitted an alternative report. The government also had 
a relatively limited policy in this area (see Cath Collins’ chapter 
on human rights).
INITIAL REFORMS (1990–2000)
The main changes in the first decade after the transition were 
linked to increased staffing and resources for the police, reform 
of the intelligence structure and some changes associated with 
the operational dimensions of the armed forces.
The democratic government progressively increased the num-
ber of Carabineros and Investigative Police. During the military 
regime, priority was given to increasing the size of the armed 
forces, while from 1990 onwards the resources and facilities of 
the police were increased. In addition, citizen security plans were 
established that sought to rationalize resources, establish insti-
tutional objectives, and link the Carabineros to the communities 
in which the police stations operated.7 It should be mentioned 
that the police institution in Chile is centralized and depends 
directly on the central government. There are no police forces 
dependent on regional authority, so all public security activities 
are organized centrally.
As for the intelligence system, as a result of the assassination 
of the right-wing Senator Jaime Guzmán8 by extreme left-wing 
groups at the beginning of the political transition, the govern-
ment established (1991) a Public Security Coordination Council. 
It was an entity dependent on the Ministry of the Interior whose 
objective was to propose policies associated with public secu-
rity. Criticism of this body by human rights organizations for its 
infiltration of left-wing groups led to its replacement by a Pub-
lic Security and Information Directorate (1993). This new body 
sought to coordinate intelligence measures and propose plans 
and programs for the government in matters of internal public 
security. An Advisory Committee on Intelligence was also set up 
with representatives from the Ministry of the Interior, the Min-
istry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the armed 
forces and the Carabineros. This body only fulfilled the function 
of seeking to coordinate efforts, but not of establishing a national 
intelligence system.
In relation to defence policies, the most relevant policies re-
ferred to promoting measures for the strengthening of mutual 
trust with Argentina, encouraging the participation of the armed 
forces in United Nations peace operations, and promoting poli-
cies of transparency of defence definitions through defence white 
papers. The first of these was published in 1997 and since then, 
this tradition has been maintained by publishing them relatively 
regularly.9
SECOND CYCLE OF REFORMS (2000–2018).
In 1999, the third presidential election since the return of democ-
racy took place, and again the centre-left coalition, this time led 
by Ricardo Lagos (2000–2006) of the Socialist Party (PS), won. 
A very significant fact affected the political scene and said rela-
tionship with the armed forces. In October 1998, the then Sena-
tor for life Augusto Pinochet, who had recently left the army’s 
command, was arrested in London during a private visit he was 
making. Pinochet was arrested on a warrant issued by a judge in 
Spain to Interpol. The Spanish justice system argued that the con-
ditions were not in place in Chile to prosecute General Pinochet 
for the execution of Spanish citizens killed by the dictatorship 
in Chile. Pinochet would be returned to Chile in March 2000, 
after being held under house arrest in London for 18 months. As 
a result, between August 1999 and June 2000, the civil authorities 
convened a dialogue table for dialogue between the police and 
the military in order to find out the whereabouts of the bodies 
of those who had been detained and consequently disappeared.
The case had three direct effects on civil-military relations in 
Chile: 1) General Pinochet would lose popular and right-wing 
political party support, particularly after allegations of corruption 
became known, 2) there was an increase in the number of com-
plaints filed against him for human rights violations that kept him 
under house arrest until the day of his death in December 2006, 
and 3) the Lagos government would initiate a political dialogue 
with the opposition to carry out reforms to the Constitution to 
eliminate various clauses granting autonomy to the armed forces.
Three relevant institutional reforms were introduced during 
the government of Ricardo Lagos. In 2004, a new regulation was 
approved (Law 19.987), relating to the Investigative Police, which 
established, among other things, the obligation for the director 
of this police force to be an officer of that institution and not 
designated from outside it, as used to be the case. In addition, 
internal regulations were approved that established development 
goals and an institutional development plan. A few years earlier, 
the government had approved a reform to Chile’s justice system, 
which established a public prosecutor’s office, which would take 
over the investigative function in judicial proceedings. In the pre-
vious model, the judge had investigative and punitive functions. 
This reform involved modernizing the functioning of the Inves-
tigative Police to adapt it to a more demanding and professional 
system of judicial investigation. As a result, the training plan for 
this police force was modernized and institutional facilities and 
resources were increased.
That same year, 2004, a law was passed establishing the Na-
tional Intelligence Agency (ANI), which attempts to coordinate 
the action of military and police intelligence within a democratic 
framework. This institution was created to process information 
and produce intelligence, generate reports, propose standards 
and procedures for the country’s information systems, and re-
quest information from the country’s police and military agencies 
regarding the actions of possible terrorist and/or transnational 
criminal groups. It is a relatively small institution with less than 
7 Lucía Dammert, De la seguridad nacional a la seguridad ciudadana. Chile 
1973–2003, in Lucía Dammert, John Bailey, Seguridad y reforma policial en 
las Américas, Santiago: FLACSO Chile y Siglo Veintiuno editores, 2005. In 
1998, the number of Carabineros reached 34,000, and by 2018 it had reached 
52,000, which represents a rate of one police officer per 339 inhabitants, 
ranking 37th from 148 countries. See: https://www.pauta.cl/cronica/la-
duda-resuelta-cuantos-carabineros-hay-en-chile.
8 Jaime Guzmán was a lawyer who participated in the creation of the 1980 
Constitution and is considered one of the political ideologues of the regime. 
He was killed in broad daylight after leaving classes at a university campus.
9 Claudio Fuentes, Militares en Chile: ni completa autonomía ni total subor-
dinación, in Chile 96. Analisis y Opiniones, Santiago: Nueva Serie FLACSO, 
1997.
[ 11 ]MEMORY OF NATIONS: DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION GUIDE – ThE ChIlEAN ExpERIENCE
150 staff members who perform analytical but not operational 
duties (Law 19.974)
The most relevant change at this stage occurred in 2005 when 
a political agreement was reached between the government and 
the opposition to reform the Constitution. Among other things, 
the functions of the National Security Council were reduced, 
leaving it as an advisory body to the President. Its functions as-
sociated with appointing members of the Senate and the Con-
stitutional Court were eliminated, and another civilian authority 
was added to give it civilian supremacy over the military, and it 
was established that it could be convened only by the President of 
the Republic and not at the request of the military, as had previ-
ously been the case. In addition, it was established that the Presi-
dent could remove the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces 
from their duties by informing Congress of the decision. In ad-
dition, appointed senators and senators for life were eliminated, 
allowing all representatives in Congress to be democratically 
elected by the citizens.
From the point of view of the institutional structure, the two 
most relevant reforms carried out to date have been the reform 
of the Ministry of Defence (2010) and the reform of the Ministry 
of the Interior (2011). In the first case, it was a relevant reform 
because since its consolidation in 1932, the Ministry of Defence 
had not undergone very significant changes. Before the reform, 
it was organized around five under-secretaries (Army, Navy, 
Aviation, Carabineros, Investigations), who played an essentially 
bureaucratic-administrative role in the link between the armed 
institutions and the State. The defence and public security forces 
depended administratively on the same Minister of Defence. 
There was no planning or policy making capacity.10
In 2010, a  new organizational chart was established for 
the Ministry of Defence (Law 20.424). It was structured around 
a minister who had two undersecretaries (of Defence and of 
the Armed Forces), a joint general staff, and a board of com-
manders in chief who assumed an  advisory role to the  min-
ister. The Undersecretary of Defence is in charge of preparing 
defence policy, military policy, international defence relations, 
proposals on acquisitions of the armed forces, and participat-
ing in the preparation of the annual budget of the ministry and 
its evaluation. The divisions of plans and policies, pre-project 
evaluation, international relations and technological develop-
ment and industry were structured in this sub-secretariat. For its 
part, the Undersecretariat for the Armed Forces is the body that 
manages the administrative affairs of the armed institutions, in 
addition to its functions of coordinating sectoral policies, propos-
ing recruitment policies, and participating in the financial and 
budgetary programming of the sector. This undersecretariat has 
the divisions of institutional affairs, administrative, legal, budget 
and finance, and audit. Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the ad-
visory body to the minister in charge of issues associated with 
the preparation and joint employment of the armed forces.
A few months later, the Ministry of the Interior was reformed 
(Law 20.502), defining that the forces of public order (Carabi-
neros and the Investigative Police) will depend on this ministry 
and not on the Ministry of Defence, as used to be the case. In 
addition, the Undersecretariat for Crime Prevention was estab-
lished to develop and coordinate public policies aimed at pre-
venting crime and rehabilitating offenders. Finally, the obliga-
tion to define a National Public Safety Policy was established at 
the regional, provincial and municipal levels, which is executed 
in coordination with each city council.
TOPICS UNDER DISCUSSION
A number of issues are part of the current political discussion in 
Chile and are related to the security sector. The main issues under 
discussion are as follows:
 ■ The role of the armed forces: professional vs. multipurpose. 
The large amount of resources invested in national defence, 
the fact of having a relatively stable neighbourhood, and with 
the resolution of border conflicts through diplomatic channels, 
has raised a debate on the use of the armed forces. The current 
right-wing government authorities (Piñera, 2018–2022), have 
maintained that the armed institutions should contribute to 
solving emergencies or natural disasters, and help in times of 
peace in terms of social policies and control of drug trafficking. 
A particularly sensitive issue for the public and politicians is 
the participation of the armed forces in public security op-
erations (anti-drug policies, social protest control) which has 
been raised by some political actors.
 ■ Professional career of the armed forces and the Carabi-
neros. Another issue concerns the modernization of careers 
in the military and Carabineros. As careers in the military and 
Carabineros last approximately 25 years, retirement of person-
nel occurs when they are just over 50 years of age. To this, we 
must add the high cost to the State of the pension system since 
uniformed personnel receive a pension, which is similar to 
their last salary, something that does not happen in the civil 
sector. Thus, the political system has become concerned. A bill 
is currently being discussed to extend the length of a military 
career, and to seek more flexible mechanisms to allow for 
the hiring of professionals for more limited time spans. The de-
bate on promotion on merit (by virtue of their achievements 
within their career) vs. on seniority (by virtue of their time in 
the institution) has also arisen.
 ■ Women’s involvement in military careers and the preven-
tion of abuse. The inclusion of women in armed institutions 
has also been considered. Although the armed forces and 
public security forces have progressively incorporated women 
into their institutions over the last few decades. Pending is-
sues in this area relate to their incorporation into functions 
beyond administrative matters, their greater incorporation 
into the line of command and the development of policies 
associated with the prevention of abuse and gender violence.
 ■ Abuses in the recruitment system. Another relevant issue 
relates to the reporting of abuse by officers and non-commis-
sioned officers with respect to conscripts, which has led to 
some allegations being made public.
 ■ Corruption control mechanisms in the armed forces and 
public security. In recent years, judicial investigations have 
been initiated in relation to the misuse of public resources. 
Corruption scandals have mainly affected the  Army and 
Carabineros. The modus operandi is of a pyramidal structure 
of operation involving generals, colonels and lower-ranking 
personnel. This has encouraged the revision of rules associ-
ated with the control of fiscal resources, the establishment of 
external and internal audits and the reformulation of some 
divisions within the armed and law enforcement institutions.
 ■ Reform of the financing of the armed forces. The most sig-
nificant change being discussed by the National Congress is 
10 Report on the Security Sector in Latin America and the Caribbean, Santiago: 
FLACSO-Chile, 2007
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the revision of the armed forces financing system. The insti-
tutional conditions for financing the armed forces were de-
fined on the basis of the following conditions, which have not 
changed to date:11
i/ General activities budget floor. It was established that for 
the expenditure of the armed forces, which would be con-
sidered in the budget law to be approved annually, “a con-
tribution in national and foreign currency not less than 
that assigned in the budget law approved and executed 
for the year 1989, corrected by the factor resulting from di-
viding the value of the average consumer price index for 
the year in which the budget law applies and the average 
for the year 1989” (art. 96, Law 18.948). This floor is only 
granted to the armed forces, making the budget of the entire 
public apparatus in Chile exceptional.
ii/ Reserved copper grade for military procurement. It was es-
tablished that 10 % of the income in foreign currency from 
the sale of copper production abroad, including the by-
products of the state-owned company CODELCO, should 
be transferred to an account to be used for the purchase of 
weapons, which will be supervised by the Superior Council 
of National Defence.12 This contribution also has a mini-
mum contribution floor of US$ 180 million per year.13
Since the return to democracy, cases of economic corruption 
have been revealed. The cases with the greatest impact were those 
discovered in 2015 where a media outlet revealed the existence 
of a network of members of the Army who used funds derived 
from the reserved Copper Law for the purchase of weapons for 
their own benefit, amounting to millions. The purchase of war 
materials was falsified, and the money was used for personal pur-
poses in an ongoing investigation, although it is estimated that 
the amount defrauded exceeded US$ 8 million.
Since 2009, several governments have presented proposals 
to reform the financing of the armed forces. The National Con-
gress is currently discussing a project that aims to: (a) eliminate 
the reserved copper law, (b) establish a multi-year fund for mili-
tary procurement, (c) establish a multi-annual fund for military 
acquisitions, (d) improve the control systems of the Ministry of 
Defence, the National Congress and the Comptroller General’s 
Office to authorize and control military purchases, and (e) es-
tablish another contingency fund for possible damage resulting 
from natural disasters.
OUTSTANDING ISSUES IN THE FIELD 
OF DEFENCE AND PUBLIC SECURITY.
A number of issues have not been addressed or are pending on 
the institutional reform agenda in relation to the security sector 
(see Varas, Fuentes and Agüero 2017). These include:
 ■ Civilian professionalization of the Ministry of Defence and 
Public Security. Neither in the defence sector nor in the pub-
lic security sector has a professional capacity been generated 
to establish civilian human resources capable of designing, 
evaluating and leading these sectors. In general, civilian train-
ing programs have been sporadic, based on short courses, and 
existing programs have been associated with the military insti-
tutions themselves, which propose excessively conventional 
programs with a traditional security perspective.
 ■ Institutional capacities of the Ministry of Defence. One prob-
lem with the institutionalization of the Ministry of Defence 
is that divisions are understaffed, and military or ex-military 
personnel are usually called upon to perform these functions. 
No technical civilian staff has been created to lead the defence 
sector by the management of the Ministry of Defence, nor is 
there any capacity to generate information to contribute to 
decision making.
 ■ Institutional capacities of the Ministry of the Interior. No 
institutional capacity has been developed to address the is-
sue of public security in the Ministry of the Interior, either in 
terms of human resources or with respect to the gathering of 
information for decision-making. These two aspects are fun-
damental for providing guidance and generating sectoral poli-
cies. The weakness at the central level generates a dependence 
on public security institutions in terms of the incidence and 
trend of crime in policy definitions.
 ■ Joint Staff of the  armed forces. Although in the  reform of 
the Ministry of Defence, a strengthening of the Joint Staff was 
considered, in practice today a relatively independent scheme of 
institutional development of the three branches is maintained.
 ■ Purchasing and accountability system. Although the Minis-
try of Defence has made progress in controlling what should be 
authorized for purchase, the procedure for managing purchas-
es continues to be the responsibility of the armed institutions 
and the Carabineros, which implies a serious vulnerability to 
possible cases of corruption due to illegal commissions that 
could become evident in the process of linking up with sup-
pliers and developing tenders and contracts.
 ■ Coordination of defence and foreign policy. Another area 
requiring attention concerns the need to establish more effec-
tive coordination between defence policy and foreign policy. 
Institutional definitions have tended to evolve in isolation, 
without much effective coordination. To solve this problem, 
some governments established the  practice of appointing 
an official from the Foreign Ministry on a permanent basis in 
the Ministry of Defence. However, this is clearly not enough.
 ■ Education and training programs. At present, the design and 
implementation of training and education programs are, by 
law, exclusively the responsibility of the armed institutions 
and the police. The programs developed in the democratic 
period have had a limited scope. This means that the State, 
through the Ministry of Education, cannot influence the cur-
riculum taught in the training schools of these institutions. 
This is a pending issue since it is essential to develop a new 
curriculum that responds to the needs of the 21st century and 
that also meets the requirements of a democratic state.
 ■ Social security system. As we indicated above, the social secu-
rity system of the armed forces and the Carabineros (pensions 
and health system) burdens the State with a high expenditure 
because the early retirement conditions of the members of 
the armed institutions increase these costs, but also because 
the resources received once retired are favourable for them, in 
relation to what the rest of the society, who enroll in a different 
social security system, receives.
 ■ Militarization of social conflicts. The  strong militariza-
tion of social conflicts has been criticized, particularly in 
11 Claudio Fuentes, Un enclave duro de eliminar: reforma al financiamiento 
de las fuerzas armadas, in Piñera II. ¿Una segunda transición?. Barómetro 
de política y Equidad, Santiago: Ediciones Sur, 2018, 47–64.
12 In February 2010, the institution was eliminated and replaced by the Min-
istry of National Defence
13 Mauricio Weibel, Traición a la Patria, Santiago: Aguilar, 2006
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the Araucanía region where indigenous Mapuche commu-
nity members have held protests seeking to recover their ter-
ritory. The response of the political authorities has been to 
increase the police presence, which has used military tactics to 
deal with these protests, exacerbating the confrontation with 
the indigenous groups.
LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A/ CORPORATE RESISTANCE 
TO CHANGING THE STATUS QUO
One of the characteristics of the Chilean case has been the cor-
porate resistance of the armed forces and public order forces to 
changes that would involve reducing their powers and authority. 
At the beginning of the transition, such resistance was openly 
expressed through public demonstrations of force and insub-
ordination to political authority. However, as they lost political 
support as a result of Pinochet’s arrest and also as a result of more 
recent corruption scandals, expressions of resistance to change 
have been less forthcoming.
In this regard, the armed forces in particular have used more 
informal channels of advocacy in the political process to make 
their views known. Usually, expressions of institutional discon-
tent have been targeted at the issue of human rights and through, 
for example, the association of former generals of the armed 
forces. Recently an informal space was established for former 
commanders in chief of the armed forces who have made their 
apprehensions known on some issues-particularly those related 
to human rights.
In the case of the uniformed police of the Carabineros, no 
explicit expressions of insubordination have been generated. 
Usually the demands of the Carabineros have been targeted di-
rectly through the higher command. As the Carabineros exercise 
a crucial crime control function, civil authorities have tended to 
act very cautiously in their dealings with this police institution, 
anticipating that a conflict with the Carabineros could have very 
serious consequences for crime control.14 Hence, institutional 
changes in civil control have not been as significant.
Thus, the generation of a broad political consensus on the di-
rection of a reform reduces the ability of the armed institutions 
to oppose changes that reduce their power.
B/ INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS LIMIT BUT DO NOT 
INHIBIT ACTION BY DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS
The case of Chile is peculiar in Latin America because the rules 
of the game established under the dictatorship tended to en-
dure for many years after the reestablishment of democracy. 
These institutional restrictions or limitations did not inhibit 
the action of the democratic governments. The first two post-
transition governments opted to establish policies and programs 
aimed at setting career development goals for the forces. While 
legally the armed institutions and the police continued to enjoy 
high levels of autonomy, operationally the civilian authorities 
sought to encourage schemes that would help foster a greater 
control over them. The political authorities also encouraged 
symbolic manifestations of civilian control to reinforce their 
power in the face of possible military manifestations (subjec-
tive subordination).
C/ MAKE REFORMS WITH ARMED 
INSTITUTIONS, NOT AGAINST THEM
The level of legal autonomy of the armed forces and the Carabi-
neros in Chile is extremely high compared to other Latin Ameri-
can countries.15 For the same reason, any initiative for change 
could hardly be imposed by the civil authority. The materializa-
tion of reforms such as the new Ministry of Defence, the new 
intelligence system or the new Undersecretary of Public Security 
and Crime could not have been done through imposition. In all 
these projects, the opinion of the armed branches themselves 
was included so that they felt that their requirements were heard 
and addressed. The option of seeking allies in the armed forces 
and Carabineros themselves to design and generate relevant 
transformations is vital.
D/ GRADUALISM. IDENTIFY PRIORITY AREAS
In the case of Chile, power balance conditions made it difficult 
to establish significant structural reform at the  beginning of 
the transition. Therefore, when such a limitation became evi-
dent, a gradual strategy of reforms was chosen that took advan-
tage of any windows of opportunity that presented themselves. 
Even, with a favourable balance to the pro-status quo political 
forces, the change of context helped to install important reforms 
regarding civilian supremacy over the military. This implied hav-
ing a clear objective and the availability of policy proposals or 
alternatives.
E/ WHAT TO REFORM? LEVELS OF REFORM
There are three levels of reform in both the armed forces and 
the police:
 ■ Those reforms that are related to civilian supremacy over 
the armed forces and police and that include regulations on 
the subordination of the armed forces and the Carabineros at 
the constitutional level, the appointment and removal of mili-
tary and police chiefs, and regulations on Security Advisory 
Councils, among others.
 ■ Those reforms that are related to institutional manage-
ment and planning and that consider the  structure of 
the Ministry of Defence and Ministries of the Interior or 
Public Security, definitions of strategic objectives in white 
papers, definitions that clearly distinguish and separate 
military functions from public security functions, among 
others.
 ■ Those referring to process controls that consider definitions 
of process control mechanisms, internal and external control 
and accountability, among others.
Although it will be very complex and unlikely to establish si-
multaneous changes in all these areas, the important thing is 
to draw up a vision that one wants to have of the armed forces 
and the forces of law and order in terms of adequate civilian su-
premacy, the institutional design that stems from this principle, 
and the process control mechanisms that will guarantee that such 
supremacy materializes.
14 Claudio Fuentes, Contesting the Iron Fist. Advocacy Networks and Police 
violence in Argentina and Chile, New York & London: Routlegde, 2004
15 Report on the Security Sector in Latin America and the Caribbean, Santiago: 
FLACSO-Chile, 2007
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F/ PRIORITY AREAS FOR REFORM
Although in each case an agenda of priorities must be structured 
that is contingent on the specific needs of each country, there 
are certain central critical nodes that are obvious in the case of 
Chile. We will mention those that are vital in our opinion (not in 
order of preference):
 ■ Civilian supremacy over the armed institutions and the police. 
This is a key area. In the case of Chile, the legal-institutional start-
ing point allowed for very high levels of autonomy of the armed 
institutions and the police with respect to civil authority. Restor-
ing levels of effective supremacy (in legal and practical terms) 
has been a central issue and one that even, almost 30 years after 
the return of democracy, has not been fully achieved.
 ■ The reform of the intelligence apparatus is a critical element 
that needs to be addressed by civil authorities. A second cen-
tral area or critical element concerns the regulation, reform 
or structuring under civilian authority of a democratic intel-
ligence system. In the case of Chile, it has been a very gradual 
reform that still lacks strong control and operational manage-
ment. However, this area seems crucial because of the role that 
the armed forces themselves had during the previous regime, 
but also because the generation of intelligence is a relevant 
source of power that must be supervised democratically.
 ■ Strengthening accountability systems. Another relevant di-
mension relates to accountability systems. The high corpora-
tization of military and police institutions historically made 
it difficult to generate control mechanisms. In addition, 
the nature of the institutions means that special emphasis 
is placed on the secrecy and confidentiality of the decision-
making process. This opacity generated important gaps that 
were not addressed early on in Chile. If there is one lesson 
learned from this case, it is the need to implement control 
systems over the management of the resources of the armed 
forces and the police. This implies creating internal control 
and audit systems, establishing external control mechanisms, 
and promoting the strengthening of the control capacities of 
Congress over the institutions of Defence and Public Security.
 ■ A fourth area relates to the way in which defence and public 
security resources are managed, which are often character-
ized by their opacity. Encouraging transparency and control 
procedures is fundamental for the adaptation of the armed 
institutions to the democratic framework. But also, the discus-
sion on how much to spend forces decision makers to define 
what to spend on, which implies targeting resources to strategic 
objectives.
 ■ A  fifth area relates to human rights abuses committed by 
military institutions and the security services in the past and 
extending to the present. Chile’s experience is that it is not 
possible to restore trust between society and the armed forces 
and public order, nor is it possible to generate conditions of 
political stability, if the issue of truth, justice, reparation and 
the reconstruction of historical memory is not addressed.
G/ DIVISION OF DEFENCE AND PUBLIC SECURITY TASKS
A  fundamental question is to distinguish clearly between 
the functions of defence, as an institutions in charge of border 
protection and international projection, in matters of defence, 
and what concerns the internal security of the police. In Latin 
America, there has been a tendency to involve the armed forces 
in tasks that are not related to defence and that directly relate 
to issues of internal security, which includes disaster assistance 
roles, social programs, and control of drug trafficking, among 
others. While the involvement of the armed forces in disaster situ-
ations is relevant, it should be considered the exception rather 
than the rule.
H/ INSTITUTIONALIZATION REQUIRES 
HUMAN CAPITAL FORMATION.
Security sector reforms require institutional capacities, which im-
plies the formation of a civilian contingent capable of generating 
knowledge, systematizing information and producing relevant 
knowledge for the implementation of policies in this sector. One 
of the problems that the case of Chile has faced is the lack of con-
cern of the political elites for generating this human capital that 
is vital to give continuity to the policies that are implemented. At 
the beginning of the transition in Chile there was interest, accu-
mulated knowledge and a certain amount of human capital that 
was motivated to generate ideas and contribute to the generation 
of policies. Over time and as other issues became more relevant, 
there was a clear reduction in interest in these topics. There are 
few institutions that deal with issues associated with defence and 
public security. In the university system there is even less interest 
in developing these topics.
I/ THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
AS AN OPTION FOR REFORM
Another issue is related to the relevance that the international 
context acquires in generating standards to which the country 
aspires; the agreements signed with neighbouring countries that 
make reform options viable in the defence sector in particular; 
and the international trends that favour “importing” good prac-
tices to local contexts. In the case of Chile, for example, the coop-
eration agreements established with Argentina in the 1990s were 
very relevant, which included a series of measures of mutual trust 
between the armed forces that stimulated organizational and 
logistical changes in the forces themselves. In the 2000s, Chile 
became a member of the OECD, which stimulated the generation 
of international standards on transparency, which helped to gen-
erate state awareness of transparency. Finally, certain ideas such 
as the “white books” were replicated in Chile in the Ministries of 
Defence and Foreign Affairs, which also stimulated discussions 
and the need to specify the objectives of the defence policy that 
were reflected in such official documents.
J/ CIVIL SOCIETY AND MANAGEMENT 
CONTROL IN THE SECURITY SECTOR
Another of the lessons from the Chilean case refers to the rel-
evance of civil society proposing options and controlling the ac-
tion of armed and public security institutions. This has been 
particularly relevant in the case of the defence of human rights; 
and perhaps something more significant in terms of generating 
systems of transparency and control. The case of Chile shows 
a greater weakness of this civil society in more technical but also 
relevant issues associated with the control of military spending, 
peace initiatives and international cooperation, and policy rec-
ommendations in matters associated with the “institutionality” 
of the sector.
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ARCHIVES OF THE REGIME
María luisa ortiz, roDolFo iBarra, Daniela FuentealBa
INTRODUCTION
The image of La Moneda Palace in flames as a result of the bomb-
ing ordered by the military junta on September 11, 1973, to re-
move the constitutional president Salvador Allende, is probably 
the first document linked to human rights. It is the symbol of 
the breakdown of democracy and of a deep fracture in Chilean 
society. The beginning of a dictatorship that systematically vio-
lated human rights for 17 years.
The experience of those years has been recorded in various 
documents by those who were affected by dictatorial power, at 
different levels, such as those who protected the people, de-
nounced the events, showed solidarity and mobilized within 
Chile and around the world, to demand the end of the dictator-
ship and a return to democracy. Those records constitute what 
we call the human rights archives.
When the transition process began, these archives were cited 
as fundamental pieces for the processes of truth, justice, repara-
tion and memory. They allow the possibility to prove facts and 
victims, to contribute to the reconstruction of what happened, 
and to remember and learn from it. However, they face multi-
ple difficulties, debates and dilemmas. In addition to the lack of 
collaboration of those responsible for human rights violations, 
to make available their archives, and the legal and institutional 
weaknesses that have hindered their protection and have pre-
vented public access.
All these aspects are addressed in this chapter.
CONTENTS OF THE SECRET SERVICE ARCHIVES
In Chile, the archives of the intelligence services have been sys-
tematically denied access to. The most frequent response to que-
ries made by the truth commissions, other instances of judicial 
or extrajudicial investigations or from civil society, is that these 
archives do not exist, having been incinerated or destroyed after 
the legal period that allowed them to do so has elapsed. Regard-
ing the participation of members of the armed forces (FFAA) in 
intelligence activities, the response has been that they are legally 
prevented from providing this information.1
Despite systematic denial, in the post-dictatorship years, some 
documentary pieces or fragmented files have been found that 
account for the actions of the intelligence services. These are 
findings within the framework of a judicial investigation, or in 
an unexpected and casual way. That is how, during a judicial case, 
the lawyer of an agent prosecuted for crimes against opponents, 
delivered to the court documentation and files related to inter-
rogations of political prisoners, among them several disappeared 
detainees, seeking to obtain some benefit for his defendant and 
making this delivery look like collaboration.2 This documenta-
tion, related to disappeared political prisoners, has been incor-
porated in diverse judicial investigations, however it is not known 
where their originals are, or the totality of the documentation 
delivered at that time.
The finding of documentation in other countries of the South-
ern Cone, have revealed the action of national intelligence agen-
cies beyond the Chilean borders, in the persecution, surveillance, 
kidnapping, torture and extermination of Chileans and, espe-
cially, the coordination of intelligence between countries, known 
as Operation Condor. These archives have become evidence for 
investigations in Chilean courts and have played a relevant role 
in advancing the truth about these crimes.3
At the  end of September 2005, carrying out architectural 
recovery work in a building where the Salvador Allende Foun-
dation currently operates, at 475  República Street, a  set of 
documents were discovered that formed part of the archives of 
the National Information Centre (NIC):4 reports, a register of 
agents, telephone numbers, accounting with payments to CNI 
officials; charts (organization charts), trades and more than 
400 telexes, among others. The Investigative Police (PDI) seized 
the documentation and handed it over to the courts of justice. 
After a few years the telexes were recovered by the Salvador Al-
lende Foundation, and they are now publicly accessible in digital 
1 In its report, the National Truth and Reconciliation Commission gives an ac-
count of certain nuances among the different armed forces: the Carabineros 
and the Army are the most voiciferous in denying the existence of docu-
mentation and to a lesser extent the Air Force, the Navy and the Investigative 
Police (Report of the  National Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
CNVR, Reissue December 1996, Volume 1, Chapter 1, pages 6 to 9). The Na-
tional Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture Report also states 
that the responses given to that commission when consulting them by back-
ground, records and information were similar. (The National Commission 
on Political Imprisonment and Torture Report, CNPPT, 2005, pages 53–67, 
111 and following).
2 In the mid-1990s, lawyer Fidel Reyes, defence lawyer of the retired colonel 
of the Carabineros, Guillermo González Betancourt, prosecuted for the mur-
der of three professionals, handed Judge Dobra Lusic a bag with documen-
tation and follow-up files from the repressive body known as the Joint Com-
mand, which the defendant would have given him.
3 This has happened, for example, with the archives seized in Buenos Aires 
from the agent of the National Intelligence Directorate, DINA, Enrique 
Arancibia Clavel, and found by Chilean journalist Mónica González in 
the Buenos Aires Judicial Archive in 1986 (several years after her seizure 
by the Buenos Aires police), which were an important contribution to his 
book “Bomba en una calle de Palermo” (Bomb on a street in Palermo) about 
the assassination of General Carlos Prats and his wife Sofia Cuthbert in 
Buenos Aires in 1974 and later also to the investigations of journalist John 
Dinges for his book “Los años del Cóndor” (The Condor Years ) about intel-
ligence cooperation in the Southern Cone. They have also contributed to 
judicial investigations in Chile. Another important finding was that of 
the  so-called “Archives of Terror” in Paraguay, discovered in 1992 at 
the Lambaré police station in that country. They found evidence of the co-
ordination of intelligence services, from the call in Chile to the formal con-
stitution of this coordination, convened by the head of DINA, Manuel 
Contreras, as well as a series of documentation of criminal actions and 
transfer of prisoners between countries. Within which the  militant of 
the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR) Jorge Isaac Fuentes Alarcón is 
counted, who was detained in Paraguay, transferred to Chile to the secret 
torture compound Villa Grimaldi, without his detention ever having been 
recognized until today, remaining to date as a victim of enforced disap-
pearance.
4 The National Information Centre succeeded the DINA, which was dissolved 
in 1977, and lasted until 1990.
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format, as well as the judicial report on the finding and charac-
teristics of the documentation found.5
In 2014, Minister Jorge Zepeda, in charge of the judicial in-
vestigation into the events that took place at Colonia Dignidad 
(“Dignity Colony”)6 announced the existence of more than 45,000 
files and documentation found there in 2005 in underground 
graves.7 Several human rights organizations criticized the fact 
that it had been kept secret for almost 10 years, as it could have 
been useful for the judicial processes on disappeared detainees 
and political prisoners, and their passage through Colonia Dig-
nidad. The judge handed a copy of part of the documentation 
and files to the National Human Rights Institution (NHRI), to 
the Human Rights Program of the Ministry of the Interior and to 
some sites of memory. A television channel made an extensive 
report on the find and delivered digital copies of the files to hu-
man rights organizations, archives and the Museum of Memory 
and Human Rights (MMDH). Subsequently, the report issued by 
the Police Intelligence Leadership (JIPOL) of the Investigations 
Police of Chile (PDI) was made public, in which all the documen-
tation has been analyzed, and the London 38, Memory Space8 
has made available to the public in the framework of a campaign 
for the end of the secret archives.9 It remained in the hands of 
the JIPOL until December 2017, after which it was transferred to 
the National Archive of Chile.
Other documents related to victims of human rights viola-
tions were included as “evidence” in the memoirs10 of Manuel 
Contreras Sepúlveda, who was Director of the National Intelli-
gence Directorate (DINA). Although the fate of the documenta-
tion of the most important intelligence service of the dictator-
ship, which had the broadest powers and direct and daily contact 
with the dictator Augusto Pinochet, is unknown, the inclusion of 
a few documents to support his version regarding the detainees, 
is a demonstration that the head of intelligence did keep files in 
his possession which, however, have not yet been found.
All these findings show that the repressive measures, the per-
secution, control and registration of detainees, interrogations, 
itineraries or destinations, in short, the innumerable actions 
linked to the security services and the maintenance of a dictato-
rial state, were recorded, generating innumerable and diverse 
institutional archives, of which their existence has later been 
denied, or it has been affirmed that they were destroyed. Proce-
dures, appeals, personnel were registered and controlled, and 
in the generation, the participation of diverse institutions and 
persons, who were more or less conscience of the relevance of 
their actions, were configuring the act of archiving, ordering, 
safeguarding, gathering, conserving and generating criteria for 
the access of all the information produced.
ATTEMPTS TO DESTROY THE DOCUMENTATION 
OF THE POLITICAL POLICE OPERATION
In the judicial investigation into the death of former President 
of the Republic Eduardo Frei Montalva, important testimonies 
were obtained regarding the fact that the documentation found 
in the CNI offices was transferred to the Army Intelligence Direc-
torate (DINE), remaining in its custody until several years after 
the end of the dictatorship. A police report contains statements 
that claim to have seen these archives on microfilm in a cellar 
in the underground vaults of the DINE, in the heart of Santiago. 
Adding that it should have been incinerated from 1999 to after 
2000. However, there is no incineration certificate to verify this, 
as would have been the case.
Due to this discrepancy, the  Ministry of Defence ordered 
an  investigation, after which the  Commander in Chief of 
the Army stated that there was no proof of the existence of such 
documentation, and that it was not possible, given the  time 
that had elapsed, to bring criminal proceedings against those 
responsible.11 The matter is currently awaiting the resolution of 
the justice system to criminally prosecute those responsible for 
the destruction of the archives of the CNI, as well as the conceal-
ment of the action of destruction, corresponding to the measures 
carried out between 1980 and 1982.
USE OF ARCHIVES DURING THE TRANSITION
For the  truth commissions,12 the archives played a vital role. 
They constituted evidence to document the cases and qualify 
the victims (forced disappearance; executions outside the law, 
political imprisonment and torture). These archives were essen-
tially formed by the backgrounds, documents and testimonies 
provided by the victims themselves, their families and human 
rights organizations. Throughout the dictatorship, Chile docu-
mented human rights violations, whether through national or 
international denunciations or through appeals brought before 
the courts of justice. Most of the complaints were brought before 
the courts and, as a result, their history was preserved both in 
the courts and in the human rights bodies that brought them.13 
Complaints to United Nations bodies or to the inter-American 
human rights system, as well as to international human rights 
protection organizations, were also highly relevant sources of 
documentation. It was not the archives from intelligence agencies 
5 Judicial and police report on the discovery of documents from the Na-
tional Information Centre (CNI), Recovered secret archives, London 38, 
Memory Space, http://www.londres38.cl/1934/w3-article-97121.html
6 German enclave in southern Chile related to abuses and slavery of its in-
habitants, also with an active link to the dictatorship and its intelligence 
services. Colonia Dignidad was a place of detention, torture and extermi-
nation of political prisoners.
7 Carlos Basso Prieto, “Los secretos de las fichas de Colonia Dignidad”, in 
El Mostrador, 12. 12. 2014, https://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/ 
2014/12/12/los-secretos-de-las-fichas-de-colonia-dignidad/
8 DINA torture centre from which most of the political prisoners who passed 
through disappeared and which was recovered by civil society as a memo-
rial site.
9 Intelligence Report on Dignity Colony Archives, Recovered Secret Archives, 
London 38, Memory Space, http://www.londres38.cl/1934/w3-article- 
97390.html
10 Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda, La verdad histórica: el ejército guerrillero, 
Santiago: Ediciones Encina, 2000
11 “New Commander-in Chief of the Army signed report accrediting burning 
of CNI files”, in Radio ADN 91,7, 15. 11. 2017 http://www.adnradio.cl/
noticias/nacional/nuevo-comandante-en-jefe-del-ejercito-firmo-informe-
que-acredita-quema-de-archivos-de-la-cni/20171115/nota/3638487.aspx
12 National Truth and Reconciliation Commission; National Corporation for 
Reparation and Reconciliation; National Commission on Political Impris-
onment and Torture; Presidential Advisory Commission for the Qualifica-
tion of Disappeared Detainees, Political Executed and Victims of Political 
Imprisonment and Torture.
13 Committee for Peace in Chile; Vicariate of Solidarity; Christian Churches’ 
Social Assistance Foundation (FASIC); Corporation for the Promotion and 
Defence of Human Rights (CODEPU); Foundation for the Protection of 
Children Damaged by the State of Emergency (PIDEE); Chile’s Human 
Rights Commission. These were the main human rights bodies that col-
lected and preserved this documentation.
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or the armed forces that provided information for the investiga-
tion of these commissions.
For the National Commission on Political Imprisonment and 
Torture (CNPPT), the testimonies of the victims themselves and 
the documentation they presented were relevant for recogniz-
ing their detentions. It included detention centres, movement 
restrictions, visiting permits, correspondence with the family 
and humanitarian agencies such as the International Red Cross 
(IRC), among others.
The commissions made special mention of the archives, both 
in relation to their use and accessibility. The provisions and their 
scope have been different in each case.
In its recommendations, the National Truth and Reconcili-
ation Commission (CNVR) expressed the need for an entity to 
centralize the accumulated information in a specialized library, 
given the future interest in knowing about human rights viola-
tions of investigators and the general public, which can be ac-
cessed under conditions regulated by law.14
The law that created the National Corporation for Reparation 
and Reconciliation (CNRR)15 determined that it was appropriate to 
keep in deposit the information gathered by both instances, ensur-
ing their confidentiality, but allowing access to the courts of justice.
At present, the archives on non-survivor victims under judi-
cial investigation are in the Human Rights Program belonging 
to the Undersecretary for Human Rights of the Justice and Hu-
man Rights Ministry, which is responsible for monitoring judicial 
proceedings. The courts are the only user of this information; 
neither researchers, nor lawyers not belonging to this program, 
nor relatives of the victims have access to it.
The  CNPPT initially noted in its recommendations16 that 
the information collected was part of the nation’s cultural heri-
tage and should be subject to safeguarding measures. It recom-
mended that, at the end of its activity, the collected documentary 
heritage be handed over to the NHRI or, failing that, to the body 
entrusted by law with the conservation of the documentary her-
itage of the Chilean nation, in order to protect it against all theft 
and destruction. It pointed out that the archive consisted of all 
documents in physical and digital form: personal files containing 
the background of the victims and the documents generated by 
the commission in the framework of its activity. It recommended, 
in relation to personal files, applying a special time limit for com-
munication to the public of 30 years, in order to protect the priva-
cy and honour of individuals.17 But later, the law which approved 
the granting of reparation benefits18 determined the confidential-
ity of all the documents, testimonies and background provided by 
the victims should have a time limit of 50 years, specifying that no 
person, group of persons, authority or magistrate will have access 
to these archives. Although, it recognizes the personal right of 
the owners to make them known.19 Article 15 of this law provides 
that the documents, testimonies and background provided by 
the victims before the commission shall be secret. It adds that 
the members of the commission, as well as all the persons who 
participated in it, are obliged to maintain confidentiality with 
respect to the background and data that are of a secret nature.
The Advisory Commission on the Classification of Disappeared 
Detainees, Victims of Political Executions and Victims of Political 
Imprisonment and Torture (2010)20 was authorized by the enact-
ment of a law,21 unanimously approved by Parliament, to review 
the documents, testimonies and background of the CNPPT. Only 
two commissioners and two professionals were authorized, with 
an obligation to respect the confidentiality, for the sole purpose of 
qualifying the cases that arose, and only during the commission’s 
period of operation. All the archives, as well as the officials of this 
commission, were finally subject to the obligations of confidenti-
ality and sanctions established by Law 19.992.
Consequently, recognizing that the truth commissions, both 
in their reports and in their recommendations, gave explicit 
value to the collected archives, the need for their preservation 
was raised and reference was made to the issue of access. Not-
ing in this an unprecedented process of assessing their impact 
on society and the country. The laws subsequently passed ar-
rived at different results, especially on the issue of public access. 
The CNPPT exceeded almost twice the time limit for public ac-
cess, as recommended in the report.
Human rights archives are also a source of ongoing consul-
tation in judicial investigations. These archives, generated as 
a denunciation of violent measures, had a practical and urgent 
purpose in times when people’s rights were violated in a sys-
temic and massive way. Human rights bodies received a com-
plaint either from a victim and/or his/her family, and tried to 
obtain as much background information, witness accounts, and 
fingerprints of all kinds, as much as possible. All this informa-
tion was recorded in forms and files, following a protocol built 
from the need to cross-check information, data obtained from 
other sources, official responses, new antecedents, witnesses, etc. 
The sheer size, systematicity and frequency of the repressive acts 
made the agencies build protocols and rigorous records immedi-
ately after the events. Today they constitute proof and a unique 
record of the official version of the time.
They have also been relevant for the identification of victims, 
in the case of the findings of human remains illegally buried 
by the dictatorship in order to hide all traces of their crimes. 
As a result of errors in the identification of victims of enforced 
disappearance in 2007, there was a very strong need to gather 
the documentation dispersed in various public and private bod-
ies; documentation contained information on the pre-mortem 
antecedents of the victims, circumstances of their detention and 
final destination, judicial investigations, examinations, exper-
tise and identifying measures carried out on recovered remains. 
With the advice of experts, the forensic medical service began to 
work systematically to organize and systematize all documen-
tary sources related to the victims of enforced disappearance and 
the possibility of finding and identifying their remains.
The post-dictatorship validation of these archives, both in ex-
trajudicial mechanisms of investigation and in judicial action, as 
14 Chapter III: Other Recommendations, under the subheading Centraliza-
tion of Information Accumulated by the Commission (CNVR Report).
15 Law 19.123. February 8, 1992. At www.leychile.cl
16 Chapter IX, Proposals for reparation, basis for defining proposals for 
reparation, recommended measures, the safeguarding and confidential-
ity of the information received is included as one of the institutional repa-
ration measures (CNPPT report).
17 Assuming the time frame that has followed the world archival practice in 
this type of matters. The European Commission recommends a maximum 
period of 30 years for the maintenance of the confidentiality of records. 
This recommendation, however, is not applicable in all countries as 
the transition processes require quick access to documentation for the in-
vestigation and documentation of any type of human rights violation.
18 Law 19.992. December 24, 2004. At www.leychile.cl
19 Law 19.992. Title IV, Article 15. At www.leychile.cl
20 Contemplated in Law No. 20.405, Article 3 transitory and established by 
President Michelle Bachelet, by Decree No. 43 of February 3, 2010. At 
www.leychile.cl
21 Law 20.496. February 5, 2011. At www.leychile.cl
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well as the growing recognition that they constitute an essential 
source for the reconstruction of the recent past and the preser-
vation of memory, have been supported by the special mention 
of their role in transitional justice processes, with respect to 
the right to truth, the right to memory and the duty to remember 
in the instruments of the international human rights system.22
In 2003, the State of Chile declared that eight historical human 
rights archives23 be declared heritage of humanity in UNESCO’s 
Memory.24 This was an important recognition and an impulse for 
the generation of initiatives and special declarations by the State.
The creation of the NHRI through Law 20.405 in 2009, stipu-
lated that it should guard the background gathered by the truth 
commissions.25
The creation of the Museum of Memory and Human Rights in 
201026 is undoubtedly the most important public policy in rela-
tion to memory and archives, taking charge of society’s right to 
know what happened. This museum actively assumes the protec-
tion, preservation and dissemination of its archives. Its concep-
tual framework is based on the truth commission reports and 
from this perspective it fulfills the task of collecting, preserving 
and making accessible this invaluable cultural heritage for which, 
until then, there was no system to guarantee its physical and intel-
lectual survival in the long term.
As the main depository of the collection, generated by differ-
ent sectors of civil society that undertook actions of solidarity 
and defence of the victims of the dictatorship, the museum is 
unique in its class. Both in terms of its collections policy and 
through the means it explores ways to expand its services and 
users. It also collects documentation and archives generated by 
public entities that complement the stories for the reconstruc-
tion of the memory of the recent past. Recovering these primary 
sources, preserving them and making them accessible, is a valu-
able contribution to the country’s historical memory, as well as 
a contribution to the knowledge, reflection and research on hu-
man rights violations in Chile between 1973 and 1990, and their 
effects and consequences.
Human rights archives have documented and supported 
the declaration of historic monuments in detention facilities or 
places where people’s rights were protected and defended dur-
ing the dictatorship. In the process of validating this nomination, 
the archives have played an essential role as proof of what hap-
pened in those places and the need for their protection as sites 
of memory. From 1996 to December 2018, nearly 40 places with 
these characteristics have been declared historical monuments.27 
Among them 4 human rights archives have been protected with 
this nomination between the years 2016 and 2018. These are 
the archives of Colonia Dignidad in 2016; in 2017 the archives 
of the Vicariate of Solidarity, which includes the documentary 
collections of the Committee of Cooperation for Peace in Chile 
and in the same year the archives of the Christian Churches’ 
Social Assistance Foundation (FASIC). In 2018, the archives of 
the National Headquarters of Crimes against Human Rights and 
People of the Investigative Police was added to this list. It con-
tains a collection of documents related to clandestine detention 
centres, structures of the intelligence services, statements and 
testimonies of victims, witnesses and victimizers, photographs of 
former agents, among others, and that which was generated from 
the work supporting investigations in human rights court cases.
The first National Human Rights Plan (2018–2021)28 of the Un-
dersecretary of Human Rights,29 recognized the need to preserve 
the historical memory in the matter of massive and systematic 
violations of human rights. Within this framework, the need to 
implement a public archives policy and coordinate the creation 
of a national memory archive was raised. To date, there has been 
no progress in this area.30
The uses of these archives have expanded over time. As they 
are promoted, public debates are set up throughout the country 
by citizens, victims and their families, movements which seek to 
recover sites of memory as well as to install memorials which re-
member the victims, carrying out social action work through cul-
tural and educational measures, in which the archives are a source 
which is sought, claimed and appropriated from different spheres. 
They become means to work with the new generations, who look 
for sources and evidence to approach our recent past.
22 “Updated set of principles for the protection and promotion of human 
rights through action to combat impunity”, Commission on Human 
Rights of the  Economic and Social Council of the  United Nations, 
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G05/109/00/PDF/
G0510900.pdf? OpenElement
23 Association of Families of the Detained-Disappeared (AFDD); Corporation 
for the Promotion and Defence of Human Rights of the People (CODEPU); 
Christian Churches’ Social Assistance Foundation (FASIC); Foundation 
for the Protection of Children Damaged by the State of Emergency (PIDEE); 
Audiovisual Archives of Teleanálisis; Documentation and Archive Founda-
tion of the Vicariate of Solidarity; Chile’s Human Rights Commission; 
Corporación Justicia y Democracia (from this institution, 35 optical discs 
with information regarding the cases of victims presented to the National 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission).
24 Created in 1992, the Memory of the World Program (MoW) is a UNESCO 
initiative aimed at preserving the documentary heritage of the world, 
housed in libraries, archives and museums, as a symbol of the collective 
memory of humanity. This heritage reflects the diversity of the people, 
cultures and languages; it belongs to everyone and must be fully preserved, 
protected permanently and be easily accessible. At http://www.unesco.org/
new/es/santiago/communication-information/memory-of-the-world-
programme-preservation-of-documentary-heritage/
25 Article Three No. 6 expressly states that its functions shall include “Cus-
tody and storage of the records gathered by the National Truth and Rec-
onciliation Commission, by the National Corporation for Reparation and 
Reconciliation, the Human Rights Program, created by Supreme Decree 
No. 1005 of April 25, 1997, of the Ministry of the Interior, once their func-
tions have been completed; by the Commission on Political Imprisonment 
and Torture set up by Supreme Decree No. 1.040, 2003 of the Ministry of 
the Interior; and by the commission referred to in article 3 of the transi-
tional regulations of this law, once its functions have been completed. It 
may also request information on the functioning of reparation mecha-
nisms and promote, coordinate and disseminate cultural and symbolic 
measures designed to complement respect for human rights and to vin-
dicate victims and preserve their historical memory. Likewise, to request, 
gather and process all existing information in the possession of public or 
private entities that relates to human rights violations or political violence 
referred to in the Report of the National Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission, without prejudice to the provisions of the first paragraph” Law 
20.405, at www.leychile.cl.
26 Inaugurated on January 11, 2010 its mission is “To make known the sys-
tematic human rights violations by the Chilean State between 1973 and 
1990, so that ethical reflection on memory, solidarity and the importance 
of human rights nationally will be strengthened so that never again will 
these events that attack human dignity be repeated”.
27 Working Paper on Human Rights Heritage: Sites of Memory, Memorials, 
Archives and Objects of Memory, National Monuments Council, Decem-
ber 2018, 53–58.
28 Presented in December 2017, during the government of President Michelle 
Bachelet.
29 Law 20.885, article 8. At www.leychile.cl
30 See Reporte de seguimiento del Plan Nacional de Derechos Humanos (Fol-
low-up report on the National Human Rights Plan), March 2018, Under-
secretariat for Human Rights, Government of Chile, http://
ddhh.minjusticia.gob.cl/primer-reporte-de-seguimiento-del-plan-nacional-
de-derechos-humanos/
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From the field of art and its different forms, these archives 
nourish creativity within the theatre, cinema, literature and visual 
arts, with greater frequency. In 2011, the television series “The Ar-
chives of the Cardinal”, inspired by the work of the Vicariate of 
Solidarity, had a great impact and a massive audience, bringing 
knowledge of the experience of the dictatorship and the work 
of human rights organizations to those who did not live in that 
era, and to those who did not want to know, or did not see what 
was happening in the country. To commemorate four decades 
of the coup d’état, the series “Chile: Forbidden images, 40 years 
later”, collected stories silenced in the media, rescuing images and 
photographs banned by censorship, especially records of social 
mobilizations in the 1980s. Recently the documentary “Las Cru-
ces” supports its audiovisual story in the judicial file on missing 
detainees, forest workers of the commune of Laja. Visual artists 
have also worked with archives on their works. “La geometría de 
la conciencia”, by Alfredo Jaar at the Museum of Memory and Hu-
man Rights works from photographs, the silhouettes of victims.31 
Voluspa Jarpa has made use of the declassified archives of the CIA 
for the realization of several exhibitions, among those “La bibli-
oteca de la no-historia de Chile” (2011) and “En nuestra pequeña 
región de acá” (2017). In the theatre, the play “No tenemos que 
sacrificarnos por los que vendrán” (We don’t have to sacrifice 
ourselves for those who will come) structures its script based on 
the minutes of the military junta’s sessions, to approve the labour 
plan proposed by its labour minister, to the detriment of workers’ 
union rights. The phrase which alludes to the title of the play is 
a textual phrase of A. Pinochet in those sessions.
These are just a few examples of the numerous cultural pro-
ductions that, especially after the year 2000, have used archives 
linked to human rights violations under the dictatorship, in their 
broadest sense, as a source and inspiration.
PUBLIC CONTROL OVER ARCHIVES
A growing awareness of the value of archives in transitional jus-
tice processes has allowed human rights organizations that ex-
isted during the dictatorship to seek safeguards to protect their 
archives. However, this has not been a quick or easy process, 
especially when it comes to organizations that existed outside 
the capital, or in small and geographically remote towns. However, 
the compilation and rescue work carried out by the Museum of 
Memory and Human Rights has been an important contribution.
With respect to the State archives, there has been no govern-
ment policy to identify and safeguard these archives, despite 
the persistent demand of civil society and the recommenda-
tions of institutions such as the NHRI. In its Annual Report 2014, 
NHRI recommended to the executive branch an advancement 
in the  elaboration and execution of a  public archives policy 
that guarantees integrity and public access to the documentary 
heritage associated with massive and systematic violations of 
human rights.32
In spite of this, from the research work developed by the Mu-
seum of Memory and Human Rights in the process of its instal-
lation, it was possible to locate and rescue archives in different 
parts of the State, in order to preserve them and make them ac-
cessible to the public. At the same time, the very act of making its 
existence known has allowed its protection, or at least prevented 
its destruction. This was the case, for example, in the Library of 
Congress, where the minutes of the sessions of the military junta 
were located. Subsequently, the Library of Congress itself digi-
tized all the minutes and made them available online.33
Thus, the interest of institutions such as the MMDH, proactive 
public officials or researchers34 has made it possible to identify 
and safeguard archives in other public departments35 safeguard-
ing them from severe risk of loss. There is no doubt that the dis-
semination of its existence reduces the risk of its elimination, 
since in Chile there is no specific rule, either for its protection or 
to ensure its public access.
RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ARCHIVES
The enactment of Law No. 20.28536 on Access to Information in 
2008, during the government of President Michelle Bachelet, has 
at least established mechanisms for requesting documentation 
from public bodies that previously had no willingness to give 
this information, let alone respond to this type of request. This 
law contains the regulation related to the state administration, 
the Law on the Transparency of Public Functions and Access 
to Information, and establishes that information prepared with 
a public budget, and is in the possession of administrative bodies 
in any format and support, is public. This has resulted in citizens 
having real access to a large amount of information, that prior to 
the enactment of the law, was very difficult to obtain. The trans-
parency law creates an autonomous public-law corporation called 
the Transparency Council37 to promote transparency in the pub-
lic service, monitor compliance with regulations and guarantee 
the right of access to information. However, when it comes to 
requesting archives and information on human rights crimes, 
the refusal of parties of the requested institutions always persists.
In 2015, the Chilean Air Force (FACH) refused to provide infor-
mation on the pilots of the Hawker Hunter planes that bombed 
the Palacio de la Moneda on September 11, 1973. The Transpar-
ency Council ordered the FACH to hand over the background 
information, which this institution repeatedly refused to do.38 
31 The Geometry of Conscience, Museum of Memory and Human Rights, 
https://ww3.museodelamemoria.cl/exposiciones/la-geometria-de-la-
conciencia/
32 Annual Report 2014: Situation of Human Rights in Chile, National Institute 
of Human Rights (NHRI), http://bibliotecadigital.indh.cl/handle/ 
123456789/740
33 Diaries of Parliamentary Sessions and Interventions, Legislative Corpora-
tions and Diaries of Sessions: 1973–1990, Library of the National Congress 
of Chile, https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/corporaciones/periodos_
legislativos?periodo=1973-1990
34 Carlos Dorat Guerra, Mauricio Weibel Barahona, Asociación Ilícita. Los ar-
chivos secretos de la dictadura, Santiago de Chile: Ceibo Ediciones, 2012.
35 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in whose Historical Archive there is a variety of 
documentation that accounts for the repressive action and control of 
the  dictatorship; Ministry of Public Works, where a  file was found on 
the construction of the Dawson Island Prisoners Camp, the southernmost 
in Chile, to which the top leaders of the Popular Unity party, ministers and 
collaborators of President Salvador Allende were taken; this camp was 
the first public work of the dictatorship in 1973; Ministry of Justice, in 2017 
files of war councils against political prisoners at the beginning of the dic-
tatorship were located, of which until that date their existence was un-
known, are some examples of these rescues.
36 See https://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=276363
37 Transparency Council, https://www.consejotransparencia.cl/
38 Transparency Council basis for requesting preliminary hearing from 
the FACH Commander-in-Chief, Transparency Council, 8. 7. 2016, https://
www.consejotransparencia.cl/fundamentos-del-cplt-para-solicitar-
instruccion-de-sumario-al-comandante-en-jefe-de-la-fach/
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Faced with this situation, the Office of the Comptroller General 
of the  Republic opened an  administrative summary against 
the Commander in Chief of the Air Force, applying the provision 
to the effect established in article 49 of the same law.
DECLASSIFICATION AND OPENING
In 2015, a bill was presented to Parliament to repeal Law 18.771, 
enacted by the dictatorship in 1989, which exempted the armed 
forces from the obligation that all public agencies have to de-
posit copies of their documentation in the National Archives 
of Chile, and authorizes them to destroy their documentation 
without consulting other bodies. The norm has served to prevent 
the delivery of information on the human and material resources 
that the armed forces assigned to repression, through their own 
intelligence agencies and others specially created, such as DINA 
and NIC. This project, which had the support of the National Ar-
chive and various civil society organizations, was approved in 
the Chamber of Deputies in November 2015, but to date has not 
continued in the Senate. In other words, it has stalled.
In relation to the law that established secrecy for 50 years for 
the archives of the CNPPT, there was extensive debate regard-
ing the right to privacy of torture victims and their stories, and 
the collective right to truth and justice. Arguments were made in 
both directions. On the one hand, it was stated that those who had 
attended the commission were not asked whether they agreed 
to have their testimonies made public; on the other hand, it was 
argued that many people, who for the first time, many years after 
the events, related what they had experienced and the suffering 
to which they had been subjected, had expressed the wish that 
their testimonies should remain confidential.
In the context of this public discussion in 2014, a parliamen-
tary motion was presented,39 which ended up not being approved, 
to establish the public character of these documents. Subse-
quently, in 2016, emphasis was placed on the presentation of 
a bill to amend Law 19.992, and give access to the courts of justice. 
This bill is still in the legislative process.40
In 2015, groups of former political prisoners, together with 
a political artistic collective, began a campaign to access their tes-
timonies presented to the commission, with the slogan “memory 
is ours”. An artistically disseminated media campaign, increased 
the demand for access to these files. Appeals were also filed to 
the courts to obtain the right to this information, which were 
granted, and the plaintiffs were able to access their testimonies.41
The NHRI, the custodian of these archives by law, requested 
the Comptroller General of the Republic to make a pronounce-
ment to determine whether the agency could deliver the infor-
mation it held to the judges who requested it. The Comptroller’s 
Office determined that this documentation could reach the judg-
es investigating human rights cases.
At the end of 2015, the NHRI began to deliver only the docu-
ments contributed by each victim to the commission, to the hold-
ers that requested them, but the following year, it decided to 
deliver all the documentation contained in the personal files 
“taking care not to violate the rights of third party victims and 
of the declarants”.42 The procedure used to protect the privacy 
of third parties has consisted of crossing out all personal data in 
order to anonymize them.
Currently the request of the organizations of former politi-
cal prisoners, lawyers and other civil society organizations is to 
obtain access to the digital databases of the CNPPT, so that it 
contributes to the processes of justice.43 This request was rejected 
by the NHRI and the Transparency Council.44 The requirement 
still continues, depending on the exercise of the right to justice 
that this information would provide.
In another field, the impact of the declassification in the Unit-
ed States of the CIA and U.S. State Department archives between 
1970 and 1990 should be highlighted. Shortly after the arrest of 
A. Pinochet in London, researcher Peter Kornbluh45 promoted, 
together with the National Security Archive,46 a campaign for 
the  declassification of more than 24,000 documents before 
the Clinton administration. Shortly afterwards, part of the docu-
mentation was handed over to the government of Chile and de-
posited in the National Library of Chile. Almost all these archives 
were crossed out, and in some cases almost all the documents 
were covered. Despite this, they revealed the role that the United 
States had played in the coup d’état, financing, responsibility, 
and complicity with sectors in Chile, such as the business sec-
tor, the press and the armed forces. Subsequently, new groups of 
documents were declassified and were valuable in clarifying, for 
example, the link between A. Pinochet and the crime of former 
embassy official Orlando Letelier in Washington, in September 
1976, among others.
The request for the opening of the archives is permanent. In 
2013, London 38, Memory Space, called for a public campaign 
“No more secret archives”, affirming that secrecy is anti-demo-
cratic, hinders the truth and justice processes, and perpetuates 
impunity for the guilty. It claimed that “the State has the obliga-
tion to provide all available information, and cannot rely solely on 
the assertion of the non-existence of the documents requested, or 
on restrictions to access, such as the privacy of individuals or na-
tional security” which are common grounds for denying access.
CURRENT STATUS
The current levels of recognition and need for the protection of 
archives are closely related to the increased awareness of their 
value for truth, justice and reparation in transitional justice pro-
cesses; as well as in the approach to the reconstruction of the his-
torical memory of the recent past and its pedagogical value.
Communities are increasingly interested in gathering and 
compiling their archives, reconstructing the history of their strug-
gles in different periods, especially those who focused on social 
39 Newsletter No. 9598-17
40 Newsletter No. 10883-17
41 Desclasificación Popular has a website on which those who voluntarily so 
determined may publish their complete files or part of them. See https://
desclasificacionpopular.cl/
42 Information Valech Commission, National Institute of Human Rights, 
https://www.indh.cl/destacados-2/comision-valech/
43 Rodrigo Fuentes, “Organizaciones de DDHH intentan desbloquear 
datos de Comisión Valech”, in Diario Uchile, 4.  5. 2017, https://
radio.uchile.cl/2017/05/04/organizaciones-de-ddhh-intentan-
desbloquear-datos-de-comision-valech/
44 Decisión Amparo Rol C3065-16, Transparency Council, https://
extranet.consejotransparencia.cl/Web_SCW/Archivos/C3065-16/
DecisionWeb_C3065-16.pdf
45 Kornbluh has published several books on these documents, among them: 
Peter Kornbluh, Pinochet: Los Archivos Secretos, Barcelona: Editorial Crit-
ica, 2004.
46 About Chile Documentation Project, National Security Archive, https://
nsarchive.gwu.edu/about-chile-documentation-project
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and political transformations in the country, and then the strug-
gle for freedom and democracy under the dictatorship. There is 
a significant development of lines of historical research through 
oral proceedings, and a growing awareness of the urgency of res-
cuing and recording sources. Thus, strong archival work has been 
developed in student federations, contextualizing the social and 
political process of which they were a part: in the rescue of union 
histories, agrarian reform and in diverse communities of memory 
in different parts of the country, the formation of local archives, 
neighbourhoods, and social organizations. There is an increasing 
movement that not only places great value in it as an irreplace-
able heritage for the reconstruction of historical memory, but 
also in its value for the strengthening of democracy.
Collaborative work gave birth, in 2011, to the Memory and 
Human Rights Archives Network RAMDH.47 Initially made up of 
11 institutions or organizations,48 it develops various activities to 
make visible and promote the use of its archives.
Regarding the State, at the end of 2017, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs made available to the public, through its website, with 
the purpose of contributing to the knowledge of the historical 
truth, a sample of documents guarded by its General Historical 
Archive (ARCHIGRAL). The account is on exchanges between 
the  Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the  Ministry of Defence, 
the armed forces, police, and intelligence services between 1973 
and 1990.49 After this first publication, the documentary exhibi-
tion has not been enlarged.
The National Archive of Chile, in charge of the custody of 
the Colonia Dignidad Archive, provided for public access, ac-
cording to its consultation protocols, after having carried out 
a work of conservation and description.50 It also began work 
aimed at identifying and proposing ways of dealing with docu-
mentation related to human rights placed in this institution.
For some years now, the judiciary has been developing a digi-
tal platform called Historical Memory, which includes the ex-
ecutory sentences of judicial cases of human rights violations 
that occurred during the dictatorship.51 The development of this 
resource undoubtedly marks some progress in the right to truth 
and information for all citizens.
However, it should be noted, that while there has been interest 
in preserving and making publicly accessible these archives in 
some state administration bodies, the reality is that these isolated 
and fragmented efforts are not enough. It takes political will and 
determination, and the investment of resources to catch up on 
this issue. There is still a great debt to the state archives linked to 
human rights violations, as well as in laws that protect them and 
ensure their public access.
LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The documentation of events, by human rights institutions and 
victims’ groups at the times when they occur, and the awareness 
of safeguarding these archives, protecting them from the risks 
of destruction during the dictatorship, have proved essential as 
evidence in transitional justice processes. However, it was not as 
clear in the final days of the dictatorship, to demand the protec-
tion of the archives of the intelligence services, in order to prevent 
their possible destruction or concealment. This request was not 
among the urgent matters at the end of the dictatorship, as it 
was in other parts of the world, in which citizens took action to 
request that they not be destroyed.52
As a result of the Chilean experience and the debates regard-
ing the truth commissions archives, it is necessary that these 
commissions establish from the beginning, and in an informed 
manner, everything related to the documentation that they col-
lect, compile and produce, both in relation to its subsequent des-
tination, and the access that it will have, having as a support, 
the right to truth, justice and reparation.
Undoubtedly, the existence of the Museum of Memory and 
Human Rights, the sites of memory and civil society archives53 
are very relevant. There is a need for strong archival institu-
tions, which can promptly take charge of locating, identifying, 
protecting and making publicly accessible, the documentation 
existing at the different levels of the state administration, which 
account for the repressive system and its actions. Having this 
institutionalization, resources and trained professionals will 
help prevent the risk of the disappearance of this documenta-
tion. Identifying, safeguarding and preserving it are permanent 
challenges.
There is an urgent need for specific laws on human rights ar-
chives that, on the one hand, protect them from possible destruc-
tion and, on the other, allow their access for the purposes of jus-
tice, research, historical memory, pedagogy or general interest. 
Safeguarding the dignity of persons and observing the protection 
of personal data, establishing terms and conditions for the re-
sponsible use of them, is critical. Chilean law has not established 
considerations regarding the right to historical truth, the right of 
access to public information, or the preservation of archives. This 
shortcoming should be remedied.
Finally, the  appreciation of these archives as a  source of 
knowledge, reflection, research and pedagogical value on the se-
rious violations of human rights that occurred during the dic-
tatorship, as well as their need for preservation and public ac-
cess, should be understood as an element of the consolidation 
of democracy.
47 See https://ramdh.cl
48 University of Chile Students Federation Archive (AFECH); Archive of 
Graphic and Audiovisual Documentation of the University of Santiago de 
Chile (ArchivoDGA); Chilean Human Rights Commission (CCHDH); 
Parque por la Paz Villa Grimaldi Corporation; Christian Churches’ Social 
Assistance Foundation (FASIC); Foundation for the Protection of Children 
Damaged by the State of Emergency (PIDEE); Salvador Allende Foundation 
(FSA); Documentation and Archival Foundation of the Vicariate of Solidar-
ity (FUNVISOL); London 38 Memory Space; Museum of Memory and Hu-
man Rights (MMDH); Víctor Jara Foundation. In 2019, a representative of 
the National Archive of the Administration, dependent on the National 
Archive of Chile, was added.
49 Documentary of human rights. (1973–1990), Historical Archive of 
the Chancellery, Ministry of Foreign Affairs., https://minrel.gob.cl/muestra-
documental/minrel/2018-09-10/185924.html
50 Colonia Dignidad collection: The  value of documentary testimony, 
National Archive of Chile, https://www.archivonacional.gob.cl/sitio/
Contenido/Noticias/89605:Fondo-Colonia-Dignidad-el-valor-del-
testimonio-documental
51 Human rights sentencing system, Digital Historical Memory, http://
mhd.pjud.cl/ddhh/index.php
52 As happened, for example, in 1989 in the former GDR, with the Stasi.
53 They retain their historical archives and continue to operate autonomous-
ly: Chilean Commission on Human Rights (CCHDH); Christian Churches’ 
Social Assistance Foundation (FASIC) and Documentation and Archival 
Foundation of the Vicariate of Solidarity (FUNVISOL); groups of relatives 
of disappeared detainees and groups of relatives of political prisoners. 
Other institutions transferred their historical archives to the MMDH and 
assume current human rights issues in development in their archives; 
other institutions, their civil society organizations begin to develop and 
collect archives recently.
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LUSTRATION
Cath Collins
INTRODUCTION
Neither lustration – understood as “cleaning up” the civil ser-
vice and other public institutions – nor vetting – understood as 
performing background checks to prevent “unsuitable” people 
being hired, promoted or elected – were carried out in Chile af-
ter the 1973–1990 Pinochet dictatorship. On the contrary, one 
remarkable feature of the transition from 1990 was precisely how 
little change there was to constitutional, administrative, eco-
nomic, security, or judicial arrangements. There are two main, 
connected, explanations for this absence of real change. First, 
even though the military regime exited, it did not fall. This was 
a pacted transition, which happened according to the rules that 
the outgoing dictatorship had set down in its own, authoritar-
ian Constitution, imposed in 1980. Newly democratic Chile did 
not replace that Constitution, unlike most Latin American states 
emerging from military rule at that time. Secondly, the authori-
tarian regime and its representatives remained popular and po-
litically strong, buoyed up by a persistent though not entirely 
deserved reputation for economic success.1 Even in the 1988 
plebiscite that led eventually to the end of the regime, there had 
been a strong minority vote (44 %) in favour of keeping Pinochet 
in power. The two right wing political parties, made up of ardent 
supporters of the regime and backed by the business interests 
who had benefited from it, had enough representation in the new 
democratic legislature to block real change. They were certainly 
able to avoid any strong measures being taken to prosecute or 
investigate past regime crimes (see Collins, chapter on Inves-
tigation and Prosecution of the Crimes of the Regime). Many 
discussions of lustration take it for granted that transitional set-
tings have new constitutional arrangements and strong social 
repudiation of the past order. Chile had neither.
CHANGING TO STAY THE SAME
Far from being banned from public life, senior figures who had 
been civil servants, judges, army officers, police chiefs, diplo-
mats etc. under the old regime almost all kept their jobs, their 
influence, and even their prestige after 1990. Very little stigma 
or shame attached to having been part of the dictatorship, which 
moreover was never described by this term (“military regime” or 
“military government” were usually preferred). Indeed, changes 
that Pinochet had put in place in his last year as de facto ruler 
kept many of his loyal followers in their posts. These changes 
were contained in so-called “mooring” laws (leyes de amarre). 
The objective, as Pinochet himself said, was to “leave the country 
tied up, and well tied up”.2 The laws prevented the incoming gov-
ernment from removing Supreme Court justices, and other senior 
officials. Because the regime had been so long (17 years), these 
officials, like almost anyone in a senior public position, had been 
appointed by the regime, or had proved themselves loyal to it.
The terms of the Constitution meanwhile contained deliber-
ately antidemocratic provisions, cemented in by making major 
changes subject to a large, almost unattainable, supermajority 
in the legislature. These provisions included the concession of 
operational and financial autonomy and discretion to the armed 
forces and security services (see chapter by Claudio Fuentes, Dis-
mantling the State Security Apparatus); plus, the establishment 
of nonelected lifetime seats in the Senate for some former com-
manders in chief and, eventually, for Pinochet himself. The Con-
stitution had also explicitly consolidated a highly neoliberal eco-
nomic model: health, education and pensions were deregulated 
and privatized.3
The model enshrined in that Constitution proved remark-
ably resilient throughout four consecutive periods of centre-left 
government after 1990, even though each was led by figures as-
sociated with opposition to the dictatorship, or even directly 
victimized by it.4 As Claudio Fuentes describes in the chapter 
on security sector reform, authoritarian enclaves, common 
throughout the apparatus of state, were particularly pronounced 
and visible in the armed forces, police, and intelligence services. 
A law brought in just before transition, and still in force, exempt-
ed these services from sending records to the National Archive.5 
They were allowed instead to destroy old documents, giving them 
carte blanche to remove records that could be considered incrimi-
nating. Some of those who were closely involved in often tense 
negotiations between the incoming elected administration and 
the outgoing regime described outgoing officials as clearly con-
cerned to prevent any kind of future investigation or scrutiny of 
Pinochet, his family or his inner circle.6 Any sign of such intention 
was met with sabre-rattling and open threats of authoritarian re-
gression. Pinochet used shows of strength to intimidate the new 
administration – on two occasions in its first years, troops were 
called to battle stations or sent out onto the streets in uniform.
Intelligence work was not significantly re-structured or 
brought under civilian control after transition. One figure-
head from the notorious DINA secret police that had overseen 
the most brutal early repression was eventually tried and jailed. 
However, the CNI (Centro Nacional de Inteligencia), a less le-
thal but nonetheless feared replacement for the DINA that had 
operated through the 1980s, underwent only cosmetic changes. 
A substantial proportion of its agents were simply transferred into 
the official military after 1990. Prosecutions for dictatorship-era 
human rights violations that gathered pace after 1998 eventually 
1 Alan Angell, Democracy After Pinochet: Politics, Parties, and Elections, Lon-
don: Institute for the Study of the Americas, 2007.
2 Pinochet was echoing a phrase used by his hero, General Franco, about 
Spain.
3 The country’s entire water resources had already been virtually privatised 
by the Water Code, introduced by the dictatorship in 1981. The Code defines 
water as a commodity, allowing the state to sell off water rights, many of 
which are today concentrated in the hands of a few extremely rich busi-
nesses or individuals. This state of affairs, almost unique in the world, was 
one factor in the social and economic discontent that spilled over into wide-
spread unrest in late 2019.
4 Including subsequent presidents Ricardo Lagos (2000–2006) and Michelle 
Bachelet (2006–2010 and 2014–2018).
5 Law 18.771, of 1988.
6 Rafael Otano, Nueva crónica de la transición. Santiago, LOM: 2006.
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declared both the DINA and the CNI to have been “criminal as-
sociations”. Nonetheless, as late as 2018, the Army successfully 
defended itself against an Access to Information request that 
would have forced it to reveal the names of all former DINA or 
CNI agents who had been allowed to continue in service, and 
eventually promoted to the rank of General or above. In a similar 
case in the same year, the National Security Council was also 
allowed to keep secret minutes of its meetings in the early transi-
tion period. These included its highly critical and insubordinate 
responses to the Chile’s first Truth Commission, the Rettig Com-
mission (carried out in 1990–91).7
In the year 2000, a decade after transition, a Roundtable Dia-
logue was set up between the government and the Armed Forc-
es, under the chairmanship of the Catholic Church. The stated 
purpose was to discover the whereabouts of over 1,000 regime 
victims still missing (the “detained-disappeared”, desaparecidos). 
The fact that the initiative happened at all was due to the weak-
ened position of the Armed Forces after former dictator General 
Pinochet was arrested in the UK in 1998 on an international ar-
rest warrant issued in Spain.8 The Armed Forces were persuaded 
that a gesture of good faith was necessary, given uncomfortable 
international publicity focused on Chile’s human rights legacy. 
Even so, the dynamics of the Roundtable were very conciliatory 
towards the Armed Forces. They were allowed to persist in their 
widely disbelieved position that they held no institutional re-
cords about repression, because they were not institutionally 
responsible for it.9 Relatives of the disappeared did not accept 
the Roundtable or its meagre results, and still campaign against 
what they call a “pact of silence” that still prevails among former 
military, ex conscripts, and other regime agents.
In 2004 the Army released a much-publicised open letter sup-
posedly acknowledging (for the first time) their involvement in 
past violations, and promising a definitive change of culture and 
outlook.10 The letter – which echoed the popular sentiment “Nun-
ca Más”, Never Again, used as a slogan by many Latin American 
truth commissions and human rights groups – nonetheless was 
not borne out by later actions. From 2010 onwards, former and 
serving commanders in chief made it their business to directly 
and indirectly criticize trials that sent former agents to prison 
for human rights crimes. Although a practice was introduced 
whereby officials charged with such crimes were sent into retire-
ment – which could be seen as a weak form of vetting – it was soon 
revealed that various officials had been immediately re-hired as 
civilian consultants. Even former secret police agents now serving 
dozens of accumulated sentences for torture and crimes against 
humanity, still retain full military rank and generous pensions. 
A group of retired senior military officers formed an association 
for legal and public defence of their former comrades, describing 
them as “political prisoners”. Each year, on the coup anniversary, 
the association takes out a full-page advert in Chile’s main con-
servative newspaper. The ad defends the coup as a patriotic act 
that saved the country from Marxism, and denies or downplays 
killings, torture and disappearances by the regime.
The judiciary, a largely conservative body that was also never 
purged or significantly reformed in the immediate transition 
period, did finally undergo a gradual process of generational re-
placement, modernization, and code and system change.11 A lim-
ited increased openness to international law, the demonstration 
effect of the “Pinochet case” in Spain, and the gradual rise to sen-
iority of those few honourable judges who had in the past tried to 
rein in the dictatorship’s crimes, began to produce new openings 
for relatives, survivors and human rights lawyers who continued 
to insist that past atrocities could not be amnestied and should 
be investigated. Although this opening up of the judiciary was 
cautious, slow and never fully consensual, by the mid-2000s it 
began to gather momentum. By 2019 over 1,000 criminal cases 
were open, with around 500 more concluded. Over 1,000 regime 
agents of all levels had been investigated and/or sentenced, with 
over 150 sent to prison.12
In recent years, prosecutions have begun to reach people 
who were close to the dictatorship, yet continued to be powerful 
and respected, at least on the political right. In December 2018, 
Juan Emilio Cheyre, the Army Commander in Chief responsi-
ble for the 2004 open letter that supposedly marked a defini-
tive break with the Pinochet legacy, was found guilty of having 
covered up crimes of torture as a junior officer in 1973. Cristian 
Labbé, a former bodyguard of Pinochet’s who continued to vo-
cally support Pinochet and his legacy, was four times elected 
mayor of a major district of the country’s capital after transition. 
In October 2019, he was sentenced to three years in prison for 
having tortured a political prisoner in the 1970s. Both Labbé 
and Cheyre had been given academic posts by universities well 
aware of their past histories. Cheyre was even the president of 
the country’s electoral service, Servel, when the first criminal 
allegations against him surfaced in 2013. He initially defended 
himself by stating that, since he had been questioned but not 
(at that time) charged, he should be treated as fully innocent 
of all blame or responsibility. His attitude basically dismissed 
questions of political or moral responsibility, insinuating that 
only those with a proven court case against them could be con-
sidered worthy of blame.13 This legalistic attitude is still preva-
lent in Chile. Together with the continued electoral and social 
popularity of right wing and authoritarian views, it helps explain 
why there was never a stronger drive for any kind of lustration 
or vetting process.
The worst excesses of the dictatorship were briefly given re-
newed attention in the mid-2000s, when a second Truth Com-
mission, focused on torture and political imprisonment, remind-
ed Chilean society of the most depraved practices of the regime, 
such as the  training of dogs to sexually assault defenceless 
7 Observatorio de Justicia Transicional, “Negacionismo en la Era de la Post-
Verdad: Verdad, Justicia y Memoria en Chile, a dos décadas del ‘Caso Pi-
nochet’ ”, in Informe Anual DDHH en Chile 2018, Santiago: Universidad 
Diego Portales, 2018, 17–106. http://www.derechoshumanos.udp.cl/
derechoshumanos/images/InformeAnual/2018/Collins-Negacionismo.pdf
8 Sebastian Brett, “The Pinochet Effect Ten Years On from London 1998”, 
Santiago, Universidad Diego Portales https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2628432
9 Cath Collins, “Human Rights Policy under the Concertación”, in Siavelis 
and Sehnbruch (eds) Democratic Chile: The Politics and Policies of a His-
toric Coalition, 1990–2010 Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner, 143–172.
10 “Ejército de Chile: el fin de una visión”, published as an opinion column 
under the byline “Juan Emilio Cheyre, Army Commander in Chief”, in 
the newspaper La Tercera, 5 November 2004.
11 Paul Drake and Iván Jaksic, El modelo chileno: Democracia y desarrollo en 
los noventa. Santiago: LOM 1999; or Lisa Hilbink, Judges beyond Politics in 
Democracy and Dictatorship: Lessons from Chile, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007.
12 Figures produced by the Observatorio de Justicia Transicional of the Uni-
versidad Diego Portales, based on judicial sources.
13 Collins, Cath “Truth Justice and Memory, 40 years after the Chilean Coup”, 
Transitional Justice Institute Research Paper No. 14-05, Transitional Justice 
Institute, Ulster University. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2628430
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prisoners.14 Around this time, the political Right again began to 
distance themselves from the regime. It began to be seen as a li-
ability, rather than a badge of honour, to have served under Pi-
nochet. Allegations of economic corruption were however more 
effective than human rights violations in creating repudiation: 
the personal reputation and popularity of Pinochet suffered most 
when, in the year 2004, it was revealed that he had millions of dol-
lars in secret bank accounts in the US Riggs Bank. Pinochet died 
in December 2006. Although the Army gave him a funeral with 
full military honours, he was not given a state funeral. Serving 
President Michelle Bachelet did not attend, nor declare national 
mourning.15
Four years later, in 2010, Chile elected its first civilian right-
wing administration for fifty years, when Sebastian Piñera won 
the presidential election. At first, Piñera tried to occupy the centre 
ground, declaring that he had voted against Pinochet in the 1988 
plebiscite. In 2013, on the 40th anniversary of the coup, he gave 
a public speech strongly denouncing the regime’s human rights 
crimes and its “civilian accomplices”. These included many of 
the country’s still-powerful economic elites, including Piñera’s 
own business associates. The moderate tone of Piñera’s first gov-
ernment however changed from 2018, when he was re-elected 
to a (non-consecutive) second term. A harder line was appar-
ent from the very beginning, and he made various controversial 
ministerial choices, selecting people who had been very close to 
the dictatorship. As politics in South America in general swung 
toward the right, the Piñera government began to shed its earlier 
embarrassment about ties to the dictatorial past. Although rheto-
ric about democracy and the rule of law was still used, hardline 
law and order and anti-immigration policies were adopted. A far-
right presidential candidate emerged, with a vocal and visible 
national following.
Throughout the whole post-transitional period Chile contin-
ued to be largely prosperous on a macroeconomic level, joining 
the OECD in 2010 and moving into the World Bank’s classifica-
tion of an upper-middle-income country. However, inequality, 
lack of cultural diversity, and the preservation of dictatorship-era 
neoliberalism, authoritarian police culture, and constitutional 
arrangements finally came to the surface in late 2019. A series of 
scandals also exposed widespread corruption in political cam-
paign finance, big business, and the higher ranks of the armed 
forces and police. Many of these practices featured individuals 
from all sides of the political spectrum and in the case of the army 
and police, it became clear that a dictatorship-era culture of il-
licit enrichment had never been rooted out. Years of simmering 
discontent among secondary school pupils, students, Mapuche 
indigenous activists and others left behind by the  country’s 
extractive economy and extremely regressive private pension, 
health and education system, exploded onto the streets in mid-
October. The reaction of a visibly rattled president was to declare 
a state of exception and send tanks onto the streets, producing 
scenes reminiscent of the 1970s. The military and police brutality 
which followed left a significant number of people blinded, with 
police misusing supposedly dissuasive “plastic” bullets as attack 
weapons. Footage of apparently indiscriminate and senseless po-
lice violence, including credible allegations of torture and sexual 
assault against young women, exploded the carefully cultivated 
myth of Chile as the “perfect transition” that had evolved into 
a successful democracy. Protests were amorphous, acephalous 
and enduring. Efforts by the political opposition to broker an end 
to them by – finally – acknowledging that constitutional change 
was needed were met, at least initially, with skepticism and rejec-
tion. Disillusion with the entire “political class” finally seemed 
to expose a failed social contract behind the self-proclaimed 
Chilean success story.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
It is impossible to say for certain that a  lack of lustration or 
vetting contributed to Chile’s late 2019 social and political 
upheaval. Nonetheless it is evident that incoming democratic 
forces in 1990 failed to install a clear and lasting break with 
dictatorship-era legacies and culture, particularly in polic-
ing, but also in public administration, educational practices, 
and economic and social policy. Compromises that may have 
seemed prudent in 1990, given real transition constraints, fast 
became a self-limiting and eventually self-defeating preference 
for maintaining the status quo. Chile became a byword for neo-
liberal experimentation under Pinochet, and continued to be 
so, less explicably, after he was long gone. At time of writing it 
is impossible to know what the outcome of the late 2019 pro-
tests will be, although a new Constitution has – finally – been 
promised. However, the episode certainly suggests that exces-
sive post-transitional caution, consensus and elite bargaining 
can create anti-systemic forces.
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INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION 
OF THE CRIMES OF THE REGIME
Cath Collins
INTRODUCTION
Chile’s 11 September 1973 military coup led to 17 years of right-
wing military rule under General Augusto Pinochet, who created 
an authoritarian police state. Grave human rights violations oc-
curred throughout the 1973–1990 period, although most acknowl-
edged disappearances and extrajudicial executions happened 
between 1973 and 1978. Many were carried out by a secretive in-
telligence agency, the DINA, which reported directly to Pinochet. 
The DINA ran dozens of clandestine torture and detention centres 
in Chile, and hunted down officials from the previous socialist 
government: left wing political party activists, student leaders and 
anyone else deemed a threat. It also instigated the conspiracy 
known as “Operation Condor”, in which South American military 
regimes collaborated to target dissidents and exiles.
Violations carried out by the regime included the suspen-
sion of civil and political liberties (including press censorship, 
curfews, and the banning of all political parties), massive social 
welfare cuts, and regressive privatisation of health, education 
and pensions. Over 3,200 people were forcibly disappeared or 
extra-judicially executed. Some violations were given spurious 
justification, using military tribunals to try civilians for imagi-
nary crimes against the state. Others were denied, or attributed 
in regime propaganda to supposed armed left-wing guerrilla 
groups. At least 39,000 people survived torture and political im-
prisonment, and around 100,000 were forced into exile. In 1976, 
the DINA assassinated former Chilean foreign minister Orlando 
Letelier in Washington DC, creating a backlash from the previous-
ly supportive US government and leading to superficial reform. 
The DINA was replaced by a new agency, the CNI. Clandestine 
burial sites were dug up, and the bodies of the disappeared were 
removed and hidden elsewhere. An amnesty law was passed, for 
“politically motivated crimes committed between 11 September 
1973 and 10 March 1978”. It was used solely to the benefit regime 
agents. A highly deferential court system invoked the amnesty to 
pre-emptively close or suspend investigations against members of 
the security services or police, none of whom were ever success-
fully prosecuted, even for atrocities which fell outside the amnesty 
law. In 1980, a new Constitution imposed by the regime passed 
many of its authoritarian innovations into law. Protests triggered 
by a 1983 economic crisis produced renewed repression, but 
eventually paved the way toward a return of elected democracy. 
A 1988 plebiscite, narrowly lost by Pinochet, led to democratic 
elections in 1989 and a controlled handover of power to a centre-
left coalition, the Concertación, in 1990.
LEGAL RESPONSES DURING 
THE DICTATORSHIP PERIOD
Legally framed defence of human rights was attempted almost 
immediately, spearheaded by the Catholic Church. The specially 
created Vicariate of Solidarity, Vicaría, which provided social, 
medical and legal assistance to victims and relatives, empha-
sising legal responses in order to maintain an apolitical stance. 
Habeas corpus writs (recursos de amparo) were submitted to 
the courts in almost every known case of disappearance or de-
tention, and the Vicaría carefully amassed documentation al-
lowing it to denounce violations abroad. Although the Vicaría 
closed its doors shortly after transition, the human rights lawyers 
who had worked under its auspices, and its extensive archive of 
testimonies, and court documents, were key to the later revival 
of efforts at justice.
TRANSITION AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
Most centre and left wing political parties – except the Com-
munist Party – had agreed to accept the legal and constitutional 
framework laid down by the outgoing regime. So although the in-
coming government had a clear opposition identity, it had limited 
freedom to act. Pinochet, who continued as Army Commander 
in Chief, famously threatened that “the day they touch any of my 
men, the rule of law is over”. Early revelations such as the discov-
ery of mass graves therefore made headlines, but did not lead to 
prosecutions. Efforts to investigate financial fraud involving Pino-
chet’s son meanwhile produced a virtual military rebellion. Newly 
elected president Patricio Aylwin dropped a campaign promise to 
repeal the Amnesty Law, declaring instead that justice would be 
pursued only “insofar as is possible” (en la medida de lo posible).
Instead of prosecutions, an official truth commission was 
held, and some financial reparations were offered to relatives of 
the dead and disappeared. Although human rights lawyers and 
relatives continued to demand justice, judges were unwilling. 
Aylwin’s plea that amnesty should only be applied after investi-
gations did, however, see some limited reopening of cases. One 
breakthrough came with the 1993 conviction of former secret po-
lice chief Manuel Contreras over the 1976 Letelier assassination. 
Military authorities, however, refused to hand Contreras over un-
til a specially built military prison was provided. It was widely 
rumoured that the armed forces had also obtained guarantees 
that there would be no more prosecutions. The human rights is-
sue was not given social or political priority. The new government 
and the public seemed preoccupied with other matters, while 
the military and the political right vigorously opposed the oc-
casional efforts to revive prosecutions. Relatives’ organisations 
grew steadily more disillusioned by the ruling coalition’s refusal 
to act more strongly against the impunity. The courts, the civil 
service, the police and the military were not purged, and many 
former regime figures or supporters continued to hold political, 
social and economic power.
1998 was a pivotal year for transitional justice in Chile. Pino-
chet was due to retire from the Army in February 1998, and be 
made a lifetime “honorary Senator”. Disgust at this possibility led 
[ 29 ]MEMORY OF NATIONS: DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION GUIDE – ThE ChIlEAN ExpERIENCE
to the first full criminal complaint ever lodged directly against 
Pinochet. It was brought by the president of the Communist Party 
(in her capacity as a relative of a victim of disappearance). In Sep-
tember that year, in a separate case, domestic courts upheld law-
yers’ long-standing argument that disappearance was an ongo-
ing crime not fully covered by amnesty. On 16 October, Pinochet 
was arrested in the UK for human rights violations committed in 
Chile, against victims of Spanish nationality. The case was later 
expanded, invoking universal jurisdiction principles. It became 
a test case for the enforceability of international human rights 
law. The Chilean government invoked sovereignty and pressed 
for Pinochet’s immediate return, offering veiled assurances that 
he would face justice at home.
Released by the British Home Secretary on medical grounds 
in March 2000, Pinochet flew home to a triumphant military re-
ception. During his absence, however, victims and relatives had 
made hundreds of new or renewed criminal complaints against 
him, and human rights lawyers began to formally request his im-
peachment and indictment. In August 2000 the Supreme Court 
ruled that Pinochet could be charged in at least one case. In 2004, 
a US money laundering investigation revealed that Pinochet had 
secret million-dollar accounts in the US Riggs Bank. He was being 
investigated for financial crimes and tax evasion, as well as hu-
man rights crimes, at the time of his death, age 91, in December 
2006. In conservative circles, the allegation of corruption was 
more damaging to Pinochet’s prestige than accusations of torture 
and repression had ever been. He was not granted a state funeral, 
though he was afforded full military honours.
In the interim, the courts had finally been prodded into taking 
more decisive action. In 2001, a group of special investigative 
magistrates was appointed to oversee an ever-expanding case 
universe, involving not only Pinochet, but dozens of other former 
regime officials, some still in active military service. Renewed 
campaigning by survivors led to the holding of a second truth 
commission to document political imprisonment and torture. 
In the same year, 2004, the Supreme Court upheld for the first 
time, the argument that disappearance constituted both an on-
going crime and a crime against humanity, which could not be 
amnestied. By December 2006, this interpretation was extended 
to cases of extrajudicial execution. These majority (though not 
unanimous) progressive interpretations of international law 
were encouraged in September 2006 by the Almonacid verdict 
of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The Court ruled 
that Chile’s 1978 self-amnesty contravened its international treaty 
commitments.
The part of the ruling requiring Chile to change the law was 
never complied with, but judicial interpretation continued, on 
balance, to favour the view that dictatorship-era violations can 
be investigated, and their perpetrators punished, if they con-
stitute crimes against humanity, or war crimes. By September 
2019 a total of 365 criminal cases involving such crimes had been 
resolved. The vast majority (322) were for victims of execution 
or disappearance, although cases are increasingly also brought 
by torture survivors.1 Official data on the number of former re-
gime agents charged, sentenced or imprisoned is not available, 
but by late 2019 over 150 individuals had served or were serving 
prison sentences. Around 300 more had been found guilty, but 
given lenient, non-custodial sentences, and approximately 1,000 
had cases still ongoing or sentences pending appeal. Almost all 
were former intelligence service operatives with backgrounds in 
the armed forces or police.
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 
AND INVESTIGATIVE AUTHORITIES
Chile is a civil law tradition country. Until the year 2000, its crimi-
nal justice system was written and inquisitorial. Cases were con-
ducted by investigative magistrates, with almost no role for state 
prosecutors. This system was reformed and replaced after 2000, 
but the old system is still used for dictatorship-era crimes. This 
system allows victims of crime to petition judges directly and to 
participate actively in subsequent investigations. It also allows 
a wide array of documentation and past witness statements, in-
cluding the Vicaría archives, and first truth commission files, to 
be admitted as potential evidence. In these ways, the old system 
has been useful for prosecuting past crimes. However, authoritar-
ian continuity, past judicial collusion, political pressure and lack 
of institutional replacement, or reform, impeded justice progress 
at and after transition.
From 1998, a mix of judicial reform, international attention, 
and renewed civil society justice activism, has produced gradual 
improvements. Removal of old cases from military court jurisdic-
tion, and the designation of special magistrates for human rights 
cases, also helped, although case progress has been far too slow, 
with many cases taking decades. Cases also use criminal law 
prevailing at the time of the offence, i.e. during the dictatorship. 
This is often insufficient, leading to low sentences. Judges inves-
tigating human rights cases are assisted by specialized detec-
tive police and the state forensic service, Servicio Medico Legal. 
The higher courts, police and SML, have improved their treat-
ment of witnesses and understanding of human rights principles 
through the investigation of these cases. This has been positive 
for rights progress and democratization in general.
IDENTIFICATION OF THE CRIMINALS 
OF THE AUTHORITARIAN REGIME
Almost all perpetrators identified and convicted by post-tran-
sitional prosecutions were former military or security service 
(secret police) operatives. As of end 2019, only one civilian has 
been sentenced to a prison term, His crimes were committed 
in collusion with the police. Identification and prosecution of 
perpetrators has been done with little or no cooperation from 
the Armed Forces. Although they supposedly acknowledged, 
in 2004, their part in past repression, their position has been 
ambivalent, with many subsequent public statements and ac-
tions showing support and sympathy for perpetrators currently 
in prison. A roundtable effort convened in 2000, supposedly to 
help find the remaining disappeared, foundered when the in-
formation proved meagre and inaccurate. Military installations 
and training facilities still render tribute to Pinochet and other 
notorious human rights abusers. Right wing political parties also 
often defend the dictatorship and deny or downplay its crimes. 
Present-day policing of protests shows that the uniformed police 
also suffer from persistent authoritarian legacies. Evidence and 
testimonies for prosecuting dictatorship-era crimes have mostly 
come from survivors and civil society human rights organisations. 
Human rights lawyers acting for families, relatives’ associations 
or survivors have been the main protagonists of justice progress.
1 According to the Supreme Court, 1,459 criminal cases were ongoing at 
30 April 2019.
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Only after 2009 did the state begin to generate new cases ex 
officio; most current cases were instead begun by civil society 
petitions – querellas. A state Human Rights Programme does act 
on behalf of the state in prosecuting new and pre-existing cases. 
However, Programme lawyers only act in criminal cases for death 
or disappearance; they are not authorized to act in cases involving 
survivors. The archives of the first truth commission are fully avail-
able to the courts and the Programme, but those of the second 
commission (“Valech Commission”) are not. Moreover, state law-
yers from another official institution, the Consejo de Defensa del 
Estado, “defend” the state against civil suits for damages brought 
by relatives or survivors. They argue that the state does not have 
liability, that the statute of limitations has lapsed, or that admin-
istrative reparations are sufficient. At present (2019) the courts do 
not accept these arguments and often award damages.
THE RULE OF LAW AND THE PRESENT-DAY 
INVESTIGATION OF DICTATORSHIP-ERA CRIMES
Rule of law reforms in Chile gradually overcame some dictator-
ship-era legacies and allowed past impunity to begin to be dis-
mantled. Subsequent prosecutions have been slow and uneven, 
depending on judicial discretion and interpretation instead of 
the active and thorough replacement of dictatorship-era laws 
and personnel. The long delays have led to “biological impunity” 
whereby elderly perpetrators and/or survivors are unfit to testify, 
or die before cases can be concluded. Early sentences were also 
very lenient. Recent sentences are more proportional to the grav-
ity of the crimes committed, but guilty parties use delaying tactics, 
appeals to the Constitutional Court, or alleged illness to escape 
justice. They also serve sentences in privileged conditions in spe-
cial prisons, and apply continually for sentence reductions or 
early release on parole. Changes in the composition of the higher 
courts also affect prevailing interpretations of international law, 
and therefore change case outcomes, sometimes favouring ac-
countability, sometimes favouring impunity. These dynamics, 
plus the secondary role played by the state in pressing for pros-
ecutions, have muted the social impact of atrocity crime prosecu-
tions. On the positive side, this gradual approach has led to Chile 
becoming a world leader in using domestic courts to successfully 
try international human rights crimes. The fact that verdicts are so 
conservative, careful to respect existing legality and perpetrators’ 
due process rights, makes them less susceptible than in other 
countries, including Argentina, to accusations of political bias.
LESSONS LEARNT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Chile’s cautious approach to transition and reform allowed au-
thoritarian legacies, including impunity for past state crimes, to 
persist for too long. Although the gradual approach has allowed 
later change to be largely consensual or at least tolerated, jus-
tice has been too little, too late, for many victims and families. 
A more vigorous initial approach might also have helped change 
authoritarian institutions, including the Armed Forces and ju-
diciary, more quickly, although reaction would also have been 
stronger. Emphasis on general democratization, and on genera-
tional replacement and technical improvements in the justice 
system, forensic medical service and detective police, helped to 
create a situation where continued impunity became indefen-
sible. These emphases, combined with persistent civil society 
activism, also helped produce needed changes in institutional 
culture and behaviour, although these changes are still absent, 
and overdue, in some institutional and political sectors.
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REHABILITATION OF VICTIMS
María luisa ortiz, roDolFo iBarra, Daniela FuentealBa
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we will describe the rehabilitation, or repara-
tion of victims and how the Chilean State has been able to take 
measures, during the transitional process, to carry out the pro-
cess in the face of the diverse consequences of the dictatorial 
period, through public policies, between September 11, 1973 and 
March 11, 1990.
Related concepts will be explained, from the point of view 
of various actors and/or victim care bodies, in order to explain 
the context that leads to the promotion of public policies after 
the recovery of democracy, their progress in society, and the im-
pact at the state level of the strategies suggested by the different 
truth commissions.
To conclude, we will look at the role played by civil society, 
and organizations of surviving family members and victims, in 
the development of compensation policies and the lessons they 
have learned during the democratic process, observing whether 
or not they fulfill their objective.
WHAT IS REPAIR AND REHABILITATION?
In Chile, the concept of repair, to a greater extent, has been used; 
with respect to rehabilitation, since it has been understood that 
this second term is contained in the first, it implies a broader 
level of action. According to Alejandro Guajardo,1 occupational 
therapist at the Centre for Mental Health and Human Rights 
CINTRAS: “Rehabilitation refers to a concept that comes from 
medical practice in health and, in particular, from a specific level 
of care (tertiary). Tertiary care is understood to be the processes 
through which people whose performance has been affected by 
some morbid process are assisted. The aim is for the subject to func-
tion in the best possible way, deploying to the maximum his/her 
operational capacities, both in terms of cognitive functions and in 
emotional and interpersonal relationships, thus allowing the re-
construction of a life project that favours the capacity of the subject 
to be an active and productive being.” Whereas, the same author 
defines reparation, as the following: “It seems to be a broader 
concept, which escapes the scope of the actions of the health sec-
tor and positions the subject in a more encompassing field. […] It 
implies the possibility of amending, correcting the damage caused, 
making reparations, satisfying, compensating and indemnifying 
the affected subject or group. In this sense, we could understand 
that reparation entails not only medical, psychological and social 
aspects, but also value, moral, cultural, political and material as-
pects that require much broader action than that of a specialized 
medical team.”
Both concepts are necessary to develop in this chapter, since 
they focus on the same objective from different levels, and as 
these measures have been translated into reparation laws, they 
have historically been demanded by groups of victims’ family 
members and organizations of surviving victims.
On the other hand, with the intention of referring more specifi-
cally to the field of reparation policies in Chile, it is useful to review 
the definition recognized by the United Nations, which indicates 
that reparation for human rights violations: “are all those actions 
that are the result of recommendations, social policies, measures 
and laws aimed at restitution, compensation, rehabilitation and 
satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition to family members 
and survivors”.2 The areas of reparation, according to this body, 
could be grouped into two fronts, the material and the symbolic. 
In the Chilean case, reparation policies have been carried out at 
both levels, on the one hand those that seek to improve the sur-
vival conditions of the families of those affected, as can be seen 
in the case of pensions, scholarships or other initiatives, and on 
the other hand the symbolic dimension referring to subjective 
aspects such as the recognition and awareness of the damage 
caused to family members, direct victims and society as a whole.
POLITICAL CONTEXT
The coup d’état of September 11, 1973 marked the beginning of 
the military dictatorship in Chile, and of the systematic viola-
tions of human rights, which compromised state responsibility 
for crimes against the population by torturing, exiling, executing 
and making people disappear.3 After the recovery of democracy 
and the discovery of mass graves, plus the pressure exerted by 
human rights organizations and the families of victims; initiatives 
were necessary to investigate and demonstrate these crimes that 
would lead to reports emanating from the truth commissions: 
The National Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1990–1991), 
the  National Corporation for Reparation and Reconciliation 
(1992–1996), the National Commission on Political Imprison-
ment and Torture (2003–2005) and the Advisory Commission for 
the Qualification of Disappeared Detainees, Executed for Politi-
cal Reasons and Victims of Political Imprisonment and Torture 
(2010–2011). As a result, these commissions officially established 
recognized numbers of victims,4 to which was added a review of 
the social and political situation of the time, in addition to this, 
cataloguing the types of human rights violations that occurred, 
1 Member of the CINTRAS-Tarapacá team. Paper on Rehabilitation and Re-
integration presented at the International Conference “Consequences of 
Torture on the Health of the Chilean Population: Challenges of the Present” 
held by the Ministry of Health on 21 and 22 June 2001 in Santiago de Chile
2 Yuri Cristian Gahona Muñoz in his thesis “Reparation for human rights 
violations”, thesis for his master’s degree in Psychology, mention in Com-
munity Psychology, University of Chile, 2009, http://repositorio.uchile.cl/
handle/2250/105763. He mentions Theo van Boven’s document. Study on 
the right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of gross 
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The document was 
submitted to the United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commis-
sion on Human Rights, 45 sessions: 64
3 The  texts of the  truth commissions can be reviewed at: http://
www.cedocmuseodelamemoria.cl/otros-recursos/
4 This number is used as a reference, since not all the families of victims tes-
tified and not all the surviving victims wanted to attend the call of the com-
missions to give an account of their cases. However, thanks to the archives 
of the human rights organizations that existed during the dictatorship and 
provided assistance to those whose rights were being violated, it is believed 
that the figures presented in the reports are reliable.
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along with defining the  different types of victims. These re-
ports also establish a series of recommendations, addressed to 
the Chilean State, regarding material and symbolic reparations.
Some of these will be expressed in various initiatives, focused 
on policies that seek to recognize and mitigate the effects of re-
pression, especially on victims and their immediate families.
The recommendations for material and symbolic reparation, 
addressed to family members of the disappeared, or executed, 
and victims of political imprisonment and torture, were added 
to others specifically designed for Chileans in exile: for farm-
ers expelled from the land and for workers expelled for political 
reasons.5
SCOPE AND TYPE OF REPAIR
Reparation can take various forms, since its scope is necessarily 
broad, in order to achieve its objective, and progress in the re-
habilitation of those who have been harmed by human rights 
violations during the military dictatorship. What, how, who and 
for what? These are questions that the various transitional repara-
tion policies have sought to answer on a permanent basis over 
time, and motivated both by the particular will of governments, 
and by pressure from civil society organizations that maintain 
current demands to this day.
The reparation proposals of the truth commissions establish 
the political and social responsibility of the State. In this way, it 
is pointed out that reparation is a task that must be intervened 
in a conscious and deliberate manner, and a series of measures6 
are proposed and implemented, aimed at victims qualified by 
the commissions and their family group:
 ■ Reparation pension for family members of recognized victims 
(spouse, mother of children, children, mother of victim, father 
of victim, only if victim’s mother waives the pension or dies).
 ■ Scholarship for the  children of victims recognized by 
the commissions.
 ■ Exemption from compulsory military service includes grand-
children and nephews of victims.
 ■ Health benefit through the Reparation and Health Care Pro-
gram PRAIS, implemented by the Ministry of Health of Chile.
 ■ A one-time bonus of US$ 13,850 for the children of non-survi-
vor victims who did not receive a reparation pension (because 
they were of legal age) and for those who stopped receiving it 
(because they reached the legal age), the difference was grant-
ed until the aforementioned amount was completed. This is 
done through the Social Security Institute.
 ■ Scholarship for the surviving victim of political imprisonment 
and torture, or the possibility of transferring it to a child or 
grandchild.
 ■ Elimination of entries in the records of surviving victims of 
political imprisonment and torture.
Symbolic and collective reparation
 ■ Creation of memorials and memorial sites for victims of hu-
man rights violations and political violence.
 ■ Protection and safeguarding, declaring the main torture cen-
tres as national monuments.
 ■ The creation of the Museum of Memory and Human Rights 
inaugurated on 11 January 2010, to raise awareness of the sys-
tematic violations of human rights by the State of Chile be-
tween 1973 and 1990, and to safeguard the archives of memory.
Reparation from justice
 ■ Creation of the  Human Rights Program of the  Ministry of 
the Interior.
 ■ Forensic Identification Policy, in charge of the forensic medi-
cal service.
 ■ Creation of the  Undersecretariat of Human Rights, under 
the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights of Chile.
Institutionality in the area of Human Rights
 ■ Creation of the National Institute of Human Rights NHRI, Law 
20.405 as an independent body of the government.7
 ■ Principles, rules and legal mechanisms for the protection of 
the rights of individuals.
Among the recommendations of the truth commissions are con-
sidered measures that guarantee the non-repetition of human 
rights violations, through modifications to national legislation, 
and the incorporation of rules of international human rights law. 
The aim is to establish legal guarantees that refer to the situa-
tions described in the reports, as well as any other type of crime 
against humanity.
Through different initiatives, the necessary institutional frame-
work was established to gradually implement the suggested repa-
rations. To date, a series of reparation laws8 have been enacted 
focusing on the relatives of disappeared detainees, the relatives 
of executed politicians, returnees and exonerated persons. In ad-
dition, other reparation measures have been provided through 
administrative channels, such as Law 18.979, enacted in May 
1990, which restored Orlando Letelier del Solar’s nationality. To 
date, no other similar actions have been taken for other Chileans 
who lost their nationality after September 11, 1973.9
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR REPARATION
In 1990, a few months after Patricio Aylwin Azocar was demo-
cratically elected,10 he created the National Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission (CNVR).11 This commission conducted 
a 11 month investigation into the arrest, forced disappearance, 
post-arrest execution and torture resulting in death, committed 
by State agents or civilians in their service. It also investigated 
abductions and attacks carried out for political reasons, with 
similar consequences for people.
This commission had to gather antecedents that would allow 
for the identifying of its victims and determine their wherea-
bouts. The  investigation period covered by this investigation 
5 Op.cit. Yuri Cristian Gahona Muñoz, thesis “Reparación por violaciones 
de derechos humanos”, 2009
6 Several other remedial provisions had already been generated since 1990 
for other areas. Exile, former political prisoners; exonerated persons, res-
titution of property, among others. Volume 2 Report of the National Truth 
and Reparation Commission, part IV, chapter I, p. 823
7 See https://bibliotecadigital.indh.cl/bitstream/handle/123456789/75/
ley20405.pdf?sequence=1
8 Law 19.123 and others. At www.leychile.cl
9 See Supreme Decree of the  Ministry of the  Interior No.  588, 1976 At 
www.leychile.cl
10 President of Chile between March 11, 1990 and March 11, 1994. He died 
in 2016
11 Led by the radical politician Raul Rettig, who had also been an ambassador 
of the Popular Unity government in Brazil and in his capacity as such had 
known about situations of human rights violations in this country
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was from September 11, 1973 to March 10, 1990. Once its work 
was concluded, it prepared a report that included 2,296 victims 
recognized by the State, which are categorized as follows:
Reparation measures were suggested, and the information 
gathered was sent to the courts of justice.12 It was also recom-
mended that all necessary measures be taken to prevent new 
episodes similar to those that had occurred.
The National Corporation for Reparation and Reconciliation, 
which operated for 4 years, was created accordingly. Its objective 
was to comply with the recommendations contained in the re-
port of the CNVR, regarding the need for a state body to qualify 
the possible condition of victims of those for whom it was not 
possible to form an opinion, or whose cases it was unable to ex-
amine, due to a lack of sufficient information, and to implement 
reparation measures for the families of the victims.13
This second body recognized 899 victims of human rights 
violations and political violence, leaving a total of 3,195 victims 
recognized by the State.
Between August 1999 and July 2000, President Eduardo Frei14 
called for a “Human Rights Dialogue Table”15 to make progress 
in the clarification of the final fate of the disappeared detainees. 
The proposed objective was to obtain from the high authorities 
of the country, civil, military, religious and ethical institutions, 
information to establish the whereabouts and fate of the disap-
peared detainees. During this instance Law No. 19.68716 was ap-
proved that guarantees the obligation for confidentiality of those 
who received the contents issued by this body.
As a result, in 2001, the armed forces provided information on 
the whereabouts of approximately 200 disappeared detainees, 
180 of them were identified, the rest were named N.N. The re-
port acknowledges the illegal detentions, deaths, burials and 
exhumations, and details that most of these victims had been 
thrown into the sea, rivers, lakes, or would be in mass graves. To 
verify the information, the Supreme Court appointed judges with 
exclusive dedication, and the related cases were accumulated.
The results delivered by the armed forces and the Carabineros 
were rejected by the groups of family members of the victims and 
some human rights lawyers, due to the insufficiency of the infor-
mation provided, it has not been possible to verify some of these 
antecedents, and in cases of disappeared detainees, errors have 
been detected.
In 2003, President Ricardo Lagos created the National Com-
mission on Political Imprisonment and Torture (CNPPT), which 
functioned until May 2005. Its objective was to advance in the pro-
cess of healing wounds produced by human rights violations, aim-
ing to qualify, according to the antecedents they present, persons 
who suffered deprivation of liberty and torture, by the acts of State 
agents or civilians in their service, for political reasons.
The investigation covered the same period as the CNVR, and 
based on its results the National Commission on Political Prison-
ers and Torture Report (CNPPT) was prepared. This report includes 
28,459 people recognized as surviving victims. It is fundamental to 
emphasize at this point that this commission determined by law,17 
the protection of the archives that conform it, for 50 years, which 
does not allow the dissemination of the knowledge of the testimo-
nies and antecedents compiled during the investigation, until that 
term has expired. This situation is still widely questioned today, 
especially by organizations of the civil society, since it contradicts 
the principle of the search for justice.18
From this work it was possible to compile various testimonies 
of people who were arrested and tortured. Those who testified did 
so, not only in reference to the suffering of physical and psycho-
logical torture, but also expressed themselves about the rupture 
of their life projects.
During the investigation carried out by the CNPPT, more than 
a thousand detention and torture facilities throughout the coun-
try were searched. Reparation policies were proposed at insti-
tutional, collective, individual and legal levels. There were also 
a series of proposals related to the prevention of human rights 
violations, through the incorporation of rules of international 
law. These laws aspire to guarantee that these events do not hap-
pen again: measures of diffusion, education in human rights, and 
the creation of a public law foundation in charge of reflecting 
and promoting initiatives that aim at a respectful coexistence of 
people’s rights, as well as to continuing the work aimed at dis-
covering the truth about past violations and obtaining justice 
with respect to them.
During 2010, and until August 2011, the Advisory Commission 
for the qualification of disappeared detainees, politically execut-
ed and victims of political imprisonment and torture (colloquially 
known as the Valech II Commission) was reopened, recogniz-
ing 9,795 new victims of political imprisonment and torture, and 
30 new cases of political executions and disappeared detainees.
As a result of the work of these four commissions, developed 
at different stages of the post-dictatorial period, a total of 3,21619 
disappeared or executed victims were qualified, as well as 38,254 
victims of political imprisonment and torture. A summary table 
of truth commissions by year is presented below:
Truth and Reconciliation Commission20 (1990–1991)
 ■ Victims of serious human rights violations: 2,130
 ■ Victims of political violence: 168
National corporation for reparation and reconciliation 
(1992–1994)
 ■ Victims of serious human rights violations: 644
 ■ Victims of political violence: 255
12 The CNVR handed over 221 cases to the courts of justice for investigation 
(most of these corresponded to the period covered by the self-amnesty 
law; that is, they were cases that were reopened but promptly amnestied). 
The records were sent without even, in most cases, personally notifying 
the families, who mostly found out when a court summons arrived, reviv-
ing their fears and insecurities.
13 The corporation became a party to the judicial proceedings investigating 
the forced disappearance of persons and to the trials resulting from the dis-
covery of human remains. It was subsequently replaced by the Human 
Rights Program of the Ministry of the Interior, which exists to date, whose 
function is expressed in article 6 of Law No.19,123: “the localization of 
disappeared detained persons and of the bodies of executed persons as well 
as the clarification of the circumstances of the disappearance or death con-
stitute an inalienable right of the relatives of the victims and of Chilean 
society”.
14 President of Chile from March 11, 1994 to March 11, 2000
15 It continued working during the  mandate of Ricardo Lagos, who was 
president of the country from March 11, 2000 to March 11, 2006.
16 See Law No.  19.687, http://pdh.minjusticia.gob.cl/wp-content/
uploads/2015/12/Ley_19687_Del_Secreto.pdf
17 Law 19.992, Title IV of the secret, article 15, promulgated in December 
2004. At www.leychile.cl
18 For more information see chapter Archives of the regime
19 Between 2007 and 2009, a correction was made for qualification errors, 
reducing the total to 3,186 non-survivor victims. Reparation measures in 
Chile since 1990, Human Rights Observatory, Centre for Human Rights
20 Roblero Walter, “Número de víctimas calificadas por las Comisiones de 
Verdad en Chile”, Internal Working Document June 2019
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Dialogue Table (1999)
 ■ Identified disappeared or executed detainees
Commission on political imprisonment and torture (2003)
 ■ Victims of political imprisonment: 28,459
 ■ 94 % victims of torture
Presidential Advisory Commission for the qualification 
of the detained, disappeared, executed for political 
reasons and victims of political imprisonment and torture 
(2010–2011)
 ■ Victims of political imprisonment and torture: 9,795, 
totaling 38,254
 ■ 30 cases of new non-survivor victims (executed or 
disappeared detainees), totaling 3,216
EXPELLED POLITICIANS
One of the forms of repression was the dismissal of workers in public 
administration and from some companies intervened by the State 
during the government of popular unity, which were accused of 
being members or supporters of the Salvador Allende government.
Expulsion took various forms, whether through forced signa-
tures of resignations, settlements or dismissal records, the elimi-
nation of charges, or the prohibition of entry to workplaces, in 
addition, detention and non-attendance were reasons for layoffs. 
The difficulty of finding stable jobs, or prolonged unemployment 
due to political persecution, meant years of unemployment, and 
jobs without welfare, so that the conditions for retirement were 
very precarious for the expelled.
According to the figures in Lira and Loveman’s book21 for 2003, 
the number of people who benefited in 1993 by Law 19.234 was 
14,508, and those covered by Law 19.582 of 1998, were 59,444 peo-
ple, according to a report by the Undersecretary of Social Welfare. 
In the presidential human rights proposal “No hay mañana sin 
ayer”22 (There’s no tomorrow without yesterday), between 1993 
and 2003, 86,208 people were recognized as politically expelled.
It should be noted that those who qualify in more than one 
category of victim, for example as a survivor of political imprison-
ment and torture; and at the same time as expelled; the law states 
that they must opt for one of the economic benefits.
HERITAGE DESIGNATION OF SITES OF MEMORY
By heritage designation we mean the official recognition of values 
of various types attributed to a cultural good, and the application 
to it of specific procedures, protocols, modes of visibility and access 
included in its valorization, and which include a series of processes 
and interventions, including identification, registration, conservation 
and dissemination. (CNCA.UMDDHH, 2017:13; CNCA, 2017: 6)23
Sites of memory are places that have managed to remain over 
time, and that have a history linked to human rights violations 
under a dictatorship. Broadly speaking, most of them were de-
tention centres, both official and clandestine, as well as places 
where victims were found, such as mass graves.
It has been mainly civil society organizations that have main-
tained a constant demand for the protection and recognition of 
these sites, necessary to keep the memory alive, as spaces of re-
cord of our recent history,.
In this sense, one of the first steps taken was by Sola Sierra 
and Viviana Díaz, who belonged to a group of family members 
of disappeared detainees. They had warned about the Lonquén 
Furnaces24 situation, which had already been damaged in previ-
ous years. The site was going to be sold to create a new landfill in 
Santiago. Under this context, the alternative of legal protection 
is stipulated by exemption decree No. 24.25 The Furnace was later 
declared a monument.
From this first declaration, a registry of significant sites related 
to human rights violations entailed the identification of 21 monu-
ments, which was carried out until 2016. This has made it possible 
to set up projects for sites of memory, organizing various activities 
to remember the victims.
According to Garretón, González and Laufan,26 there is a re-
cord of 31 public policies, of line of heritage designation sites 
made between 1990 and 2009. It is also clear that 2006 marks 
the greatest number of initiatives registered under the first year 
of Michelle Bachelet’s27 presidential term.
Currently, they have been identified as sites of memory, 
spaces that made possible the social and political resistance to 
the dictatorial regime, which broadened the vision of a site of 
memory, and has allowed for the inclusion of new discourses. To 
date, there is no cataloguing of heritage, but civil society claims 
its protection and official valuation.
Sites of memory have been designated heritage sites through-
out the country, which does not always imply the existence of 
resources for their maintenance and dissemination.
Public policies of memory have the purpose, not only to promote 
the memory and honour of the victims, but also to install a message 
of rejection of crimes that repudiate the conscience of humanity. 
At the same time, some sectors have argued that memory divides, 
that the memory of human rights violations during the 1973–1990 
military dictatorship cannot be exposed without understanding 
the causes of the institutional breakdown. It must be recognized 
that Chilean society is divided, and that on certain commemorative 
dates, or in spaces that promote memory, there are confrontations 
relating to different positions and readings of the recent past.
LAW ON PRESUMED DEATH
The disappearance of hundreds of people did not only have ef-
fects on human rights issues; along with the pain, the family 
21 Elizabeth Lira, Brian Loveman, Políticas de Reparación Chile 1990–2004, 
Santiago: Editorial Lom, 2005
22 See https://bibliotecadigital.indh.cl/bitstream/handle/123456789/183/
no-hay-manana.pdf?sequence=1
23 Gloria Elgueta, “Institucionalización y patrimonialización de sitios de me-
moria en Chile. Una lectura desde la experiencia de Londres 38”, in Aletheia, 
volume  8, No.  16, June 2018, http://www.londres38.cl/1934/articles- 
101160_recurso_1.pdf
24 Lonquén Furnaces is a place where the remains of people who disappeared 
in Chile were found on November 30, 1978. These people had been ar-
rested in the town of Isla de Maipo on October 7, 1973. After this discovery, 
the place that belonged to a private person, was put up for sale to transform 
it into a landfill. A situation that was stopped by a group of family members, 
opening the debate and demanding the safeguarding of sites like this one 
all over the country
25 Council of National Monuments “Heritage of human rights in Chile 
1996–2016”
26 Francisca Garretón, Marianne González, Silvana Lauzán, “Politicas Pub-
licas de Verdad y Memoria en 7 países de América Latina (Arg, Bol , Br, Ch, 
Per, Par y Uru)”, Human Rights and Democracy programs, Centro de Dere-
chos Humanos, Universidad de Chile Law School, Santiago, March 2011
27 President of Chile between March 11, 2006 and March 11, 2010 and then 
a second term between March 11, 2014 and March 11, 2018.
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members also had to deal with legal, patrimonial and private 
issues.
After the end of the dictatorship, the only way to give legal 
status to the rights of family members over the property of a dis-
appeared detainee was to acknowledge their natural or presumed 
death. Many refused to do so, since it was neither possible nor 
acceptable for them to acknowledge the death of their family 
members, without clarifying the circumstances and those re-
sponsible. They also pointed out that the use of this concept could 
also weaken the demand for truth and justice.
For this reason, in June 2008 the Executive proposed a bill 
establishing a new legal concept to regulate these issues: forced 
disappearance, a concept that was not recognized in national 
law, as defined in the international field of human rights.
Thus, Law 20.377, published in August 2009, defines enforced 
disappearance as “the arrest, detention, abduction or any other 
form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or 
groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acqui-
escence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the dep-
rivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of 
the disappeared person, which occurred between 11 September 
1973 and 10 March 1990”.28
The law establishes that the spouse or children of the disap-
peared person may request a declaration of absence due to en-
forced disappearance, and if they do not exist, the descendants 
or their ancestors may request it, and in the absence of these, 
their collateral relatives.
With the accreditation of this application by means of the cor-
responding certificates issued by the Civil Registry and Identifica-
tion Service, or by services of a similar nature of foreign states, 
the  judge will decide on the admissibility of the application, 
within a maximum of 30 days.
Sufficient proof of enforced disappearance shall be the inclu-
sion of a person in the report of the CNVR, or in the National 
Corporation for Reparation and Reconciliation report , as well 
as in reports of commissions of the same nature that may be 
created, either as a disappeared detainee or as having been ex-
ecuted, in the case in which a corresponding death certificate 
does not exist.29
SOCIAL SATISFACTION
The idea of creating a Human Rights Institute was first born in 
a project presented by parliamentarians, and then by an executive 
proposal in 2005. This carried out part of the recommendations 
made by the CNPPT and sought to strengthen the institutionality 
of human rights, given the recent dictatorial experience in Chile. 
The purpose of this body is to deal with education, prevention, 
promotion and protection of human rights in the country. Law 
No. 20.405 created the National Institute of Human Rights, pub-
lished in the Official Gazette on December 10, 2009.
EDUCATION PROGRAMS
The National Human Rights Program PNDH stipulates the cre-
ation of the Undersecretary of Human Rights through Law 
No. 20.885. This law has the mission of proposing to the Min-
istry of Justice and Human Rights the definition and execu-
tion of the policies that are guaranteed in the promotion and 
protection of human rights. The  law contemplates aspects 
such as: “guidelines on objectives and targets, identification of 
those responsible, financial resources available, and mecha-
nisms for monitoring and evaluating results, in order to identify 
difficulties and take appropriate corrective or complementary 
actions”.30
The  PNDH will carry out the  guidelines emanating from 
the NHRI and international organizations. Among the funda-
mental aspects we can emphasize the points aimed at the de-
velopment of investigation, punishment and redress of crimes 
of the dictatorship (1973–1990), conservation and defence of 
the historical memory around the violations of human rights, 
education and formation in this matter, at the levels of kinder-
garten, primary, secondary and higher education. In addition 
to this, the training, formation and improvement programs of 
the authorities and officials of State bodies and armed forces, 
Carabineros, Investigations Police and Chilean Gendarmerie.
REHABILITATION STATUS
There are no official figures. When consulting the NHRI, it was 
indicated that the  responsible bodies should be notified, to 
gain more information on the use of the benefits of each one 
of the recommendations of the truth commissions indicated in 
the previous points. This is mainly due to the fact that the insti-
tutionality has concentrated on implementing the measures, and 
there have not yet been any analyse that officially define their 
level of impact.
The systematization of information on the use of repara-
tion policies is a debt maintained by the agencies in charge of 
supervising their execution and implementation. Official in-
formation from the Transparency Council indicates that there 
are 613,460 users of the Reparation and Health Care Program 
PRAIS, while the body indicates that there are 784,300 benefi-
ciaries, the difference of 170,840, is due to the prior registration 
of users, in the computer system of the National Health Fund 
FONASA.31
FORMER VICTIMS’ ORGANIZATIONS
Groups, both of families of the detained-disappeared AFDD, 
and of executed politicians of AFEP formed in the first days of 
the dictatorship, in order to respond and help those who were 
having their basic rights violated. Those who were looking for 
their family members found themselves in the small spaces of 
welcome that existed, first under the protection of the church-
es, and later over the years, thanks to the creation of different 
human rights organizations that were founded. The national 
dimension of the demand for truth and justice, carried out by 
28 At www.leychile.cl
29 “Law regulates property and family matters of missing detainees”. Chilean 
Chamber of Deputies, February 2010, https://www.camara.cl/prensa/
noticias_detalle.aspx?prmid=
30 First National Human Rights Plan, https://planderechoshumanos.gob.cl/
files/plan.pdf
31 Boris, Yaikin, “Las cifras ocultas del PRAIS: El programa de salud para 
víctimas de la dictadura con fecha de vencimiento”, in El Desconcierto, 22. 8. 
2016, https://www.eldesconcierto.cl/2016/08/22/las-cifras-ocultas-del-
prais-el-programa-de-salud-para-victimas-de-la-dictadura-con-fecha-de-
vencimiento/
[ 36 ] MEMORY OF NATIONS: DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION GUIDE – ThE ChIlEAN ExpERIENCE
the families of victims, grew stronger and stronger, and the body 
was formally established, with a central directive and regional 
representatives. This structure was maintained after the end 
of the dictatorship, and even managed to further consolidate, 
as many of these groups were establishing dynamics of in-
creasingly systematic work, keeping to this day the demand 
for truth, justice and memory, as alive as in the early years of 
the dictatorship.
At the same time, during the 1980s, Groups of Families of Po-
litical Prisoners began to emerge, which organized themselves 
to take legal action, to raise funds to improve the quality of life 
of those in prison, and to help each other, especially those in 
the most vulnerable economic situations.
Part of the common work of these types of civil organizations, 
which had their origins during the dictatorship, some of which 
were maintained after the recovery of democracy, was the report-
ing of human rights violations that were experienced in Chile, 
and that the world should know about in order to support and 
apply pressure to end the dictatorship.
Subsequently, groups of former political prisoners, along with 
family members, and part of the community aware of the issue, 
began work to recover the historical memory of the various de-
tention centres. According to the report of the CNPPT, there were 
1,132 detention centres,32 places that were intended for disap-
pearance or simply demolition, as was the case of the barracks 
Terranova, better known as Villa Grimaldi.33
It should also be mentioned that the work of the truth com-
missions also motivated many former political prisoners to group 
together and present their demands for reparation to the State, 
jointly, in order to strengthen their resources and mutually sup-
port each other after the difficult process of reliving what they 
had experienced.
Currently, the majority of these groups work in different ways, 
but there are commemorative dates and places that bring them 
together in a transversal way. The struggle for truth, justice and 
memory is a common task, which is projected from different 
sides, especially aimed at educating about human rights, and 
increasing awareness among new generations.
LESSONS LEARNED – EXPERIENCE GAINED
It is necessary to recognize that the greatest value of the truth 
commissions is the act of reparation. The fact that the State is in 
charge of recognizing the crimes and publicly reporting the facts, 
dignifying the victims and proposing reparation measures, has in 
itself a value and impact on society, and especially on the victims 
and their families.
The acceptance of monetary compensation by families was 
not easy. At the  beginning there was resistance, since it was 
thought that it could be interpreted as a renunciation of justice. 
It has been recognized as a right of the victims and their families, 
and a responsibility of the State in the face of the damage caused.
JUSTICE PROCESSES
Based on the truth reports of the commissions, judicial lawsuits 
were initiated on the particular decision of the  family mem-
bers and human rights organizations. In most cases, it has been 
the persistence of the family members that has allowed the pro-
cesses to be carried out and the justice to be advanced.
The jurisprudence of the Chilean courts has developed pro-
gressively; first, by applying the amnesty law and not by process-
ing the complaints of the families of executed and disappeared 
detainees; second, by applying the so-called “Aylwin doctrine”: 
that investigated the facts, and once established, the participa-
tion of persons applied for amnesty; third, it received complaints 
for the disappeared, understanding that the crime was of per-
manent execution, and therefore not covered by the amnesty of 
1978; finally, after Pinochet’s arrest in London in 1998, judgments 
were issued that applied principles of international law; the most 
serious crimes were not considered to be subject to amnesty or 
the statute of limitations.
Convictions generally do not exceed 5 years, and those found 
guilty have easy access to prison benefits such as probation or 
house arrest. In this respect, civil society exercises control and 
denounces these irregularities.
There is a great annoyance expressed in demonstrations of 
repudiation rejecting the privileged locations that have been 
created in prisons for the criminals of human rights violations. 
Until September 2013, one of the prison facilities was located 
inside an army barracks. This was closed by President Sebastián 
Piñera,34 due to the context of the 40 years of the coup d’état, 
and the condemned were sent to an exclusive facility for those 
accused of crimes against humanity.
REPARATION MEASURES
The perception of reparation is diverse for the beneficiaries. For 
most of them, having been received, listened to, and recognized 
by the State that had previously acted against their dignity, and so 
severely and dramatically affected their lives, as well as receiving 
the reports of the truth commissions with their names or those of 
their families and the public recognition of the authorities, had 
a high significance, but at the same time regarding the issue; a criti-
cal stance is known. “The reparation measures adopted by the Chil-
ean government and parliament for people particularly qualified 
about political imprisonment and torture are flanks of permanent 
criticism by the victims, who find them insufficient, unsuitable and 
partial. This criticism may be seeming worthy of consideration, but it 
is not a fault that can be attributed to the commissions themselves”.35
The reparation implemented attempts to compensate, in some 
way, these serious crimes. However, the challenge is to further 
integrate the victims, and create conditions that allow them to 
feel more and more part of the society that once excluded them. 
It is necessary to do so in the area of truth, justice and reparation.
ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES OF THE STATE
It is necessary that the persons in charge of the administrative 
management granting reparation benefits to the victims know 
and assume the meaning of their role. Although it is a right, it is 
always painful for the victims and their families to face the for-
malities they must carry out. It is linked to trauma, pain, loss and 
therefore must be treated with respect and dignity.
32 The number increases as the years go by
33 See http://villagrimaldi.cl/historia/
34 President of Chile between March 2010 and March 11, 2014. He is cur-
rently serving his second term as president-elect.
35 Presentation Maria Luisa Ortiz Seminar on Truth Commissions, Brazil 
2014
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EDUCATION AND PRESERVATION 
OF SITES OF CONSCIENCE
oMar sagreDo Mazuela
INTRODUCTION
This chapter analyzes the general course followed by the social 
and political process of the preservation of sites of conscience and 
memory1 in Chile between 1990 and 2018, emphasizing three as-
pects: the redefinition of the former repressive centres of the civil-
military dictatorship (1973–1990); the role and main characteristics 
of the diversity of existing places of memory; and the development 
of educational proposals arising from both the State and the sites 
of conscience for the teaching of the recent past.
To address these issues, the paper describes three areas. First, 
the actions of civil society in terms of the creation of memori-
als and the recovery and repurposing of former detention and 
torture centres, under the demands for truth, justice and repara-
tion. Second, the political-institutional provisions deployed by 
the State of Chile to address the protection of material memory 
from dictatorial repression. Finally, according to the Chilean 
experience, some lessons and recommendations are presented 
in the field of the heritage designation of memory, highlighting 
the main strengths and threats that exist in Chile with respect to 
the future of the various sites and their pedagogical proposals.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
During the civil-military dictatorship, the State of Chile deployed 
a massive and transversal repressive policy, seeking to discipline 
society as a whole ideologically, articulating the application of re-
pression with the introduction of its political project.2 In order to 
meet that objective, it relied on the measures implemented by se-
curity agencies specializing in political persecution and torture: 
The National Intelligence Directorate (DINA) and the National 
Information Centre (CNI).
In 2004, the National Commission on Political Imprisonment 
and Torture Report addressed the existence of kidnapping, torture 
and extermination centres,3 determining that during the years of 
the authoritarian government, a systematic policy of torture of oppo-
nents was pursued, identifying the existence of 1,132 centres (official 
and clandestine) used for these criminal practices. The fate of these 
places, during and after the dictatorship, has been diverse. Since 
the beginning of the transition to democracy, the recovery and pub-
lic opening of these sites as sites of conscience and memory has been 
one of the main objectives of the human rights movement in Chile.
TRANSITIONAL CONTEXT AND SITES OF MEMORY
During the dictatorship, and especially during the last years of 
government, the de facto authorities destroyed or covered up 
the centres used for kidnapping, torture and murder, through var-
ious mechanisms: intentional demolition, alteration of addresses 
of public office buildings, barred access through geographical 
barriers (in sites located on islands in the south of the country), 
avoiding admitting their existence mainly due to the absence of 
surviving prisoners, the centres belonging to agents, mostly mili-
tary, who are opposed to facilitating their access or the transfer of 
property to civil actors, who directly or indirectly prevent public 
actions on the site and overlapping efforts that attempt to annul 
the identity of the centres.4
Once the transition to democracy had begun, the recovery 
of the former repressive centres was not part of the measures 
proposed by the  government of President Patricio Aylwin 
(1990–1994). The opening of the only memorial officially built 
in that period (the monument to the detained, disappeared and 
politically executed at Santiago’s general cemetery), did not have 
official recognization of the government. During the presiden-
cy of Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994–2000), for the first time, 
a historic site related to human rights violations was declared 
a  National Monument: Hornos de Lonquén.5 However, this 
measure did not respond to a State policy on the recovery of 
historic centres associated with the humiliations of the recent 
past, but was an initiative of the National Monuments Council6 
1 In conceptual terms, “sites of memory” means “any significant entity, wheth-
er material or non-material in nature, which by dint of human will or 
the passing of time has become a symbolic element of the memorial heritage 
of any community”. Pierre Nora, Les lieux de mémoire, Paris: Gallimard, 1997, 
17. As for the notion of “sites of memory”: “physical spaces where serious 
human rights violations were committed, or where these violations were 
resisted or confronted, or that for some reason the victims, their families or 
communities associate with these events, and that are used to recover, re-
think and transmit traumatic processes, and/or to pay tribute and reparation 
to the victims”. Fundamental Principles of Public Policies on Memory Sites, 
The MERCOSUR Institute of Public Policies on Human Rights (IPPDH), 
Buenos Aires: Ediciones IPPDH, 2012, 12. Finally, regarding the definition 
of “sites of conscience”: those in which history is reinterpreted through 
the relationship with spaces and materials; audiences engage in programs 
that foster dialogue on pressing social issues; opportunities are provided 
for collective participation in issues raised at the site; and democratic and 
humanitarian values are promoted as a fundamental objective. Interna-
tional Interpretation of Sites of Memory, Coalition of Sites of Conscience, 
online, 2018, 14–15.
2 In order to delve deeper into the political-institutional characteristics of 
Pinochet’s regime, it is recommended reviewing the chapters “Dismantling 
the state security apparatus” by Claudio Fuentes and “Transformation of 
the political system” by Mireya Dávila, corresponding to this dossier.
3 National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture Report, Na-
tional Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture, Ministry of 
the Interior, Government of Chile, 2004, 261.
4 Macarena Silva, Fernanda Rojas, “El manejo urbano-arquitectónico de la me-
moria urbana traumatizada”, in Carolina Aguilera, Carolina Cárcamo, Ciu-
dad y Memorias. Desarrollo de Sitios de Conciencia en el Chile Actual, San-
tiago: Ediciones de la Corporación Parque por la Paz Villa Grimaldi, 2011, 
78–84.
5 An old facility located on the outskirts of the city of Santiago, in which, in 
1978, the remains of detainees murdered by the dictatorship were found.
6 Public institution, under the Ministry of Culture, Arts and Heritage, which 
aims to protect and teach about the cultural and natural heritage of a mon-
umental character. See https://www.monumentos.gob.cl/acerca/quienes-
somos
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and the Directorate of Libraries, Archives and Museums (DI-
BAM), which received a request from the Group of Families of 
Detained-Disappeared and the Group of Families of Political 
Prisoners Executed.7
In official terms, the 1991 National Commission on Political 
Imprisonment and Torture Report recommended publicly, refer-
ring to the good name of the victims and remembering what had 
happened, entrusting the State with the task of committing acts 
and creating symbols to give national meaning to reparation.8 
The National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture 
Report proposed the “[d]eclaration of the main torture centres 
as national monuments and the creation of memorials and me-
morial sites for victims of human rights violations and political 
violence”.9 However, these approaches were not translated into 
specific regulations or public policies.
During the  government of President Ricardo Lagos 
(2000–2006), in the framework of the second line of action (“Im-
proving social reparation measures for victims”) of the policy 
entitled “No hay mañana, sin ayer” (There is no tomorrow with-
out yesterday), an agreement was reached in 2003 between civil 
society human rights organizations and the Executive Branch to 
promote the construction of memorials. However, civil society 
has criticized this policy, since it did not involve the develop-
ment of places that could be projected as sites of conscience. 
For the first time since the end of the dictatorship, the second 
term of President Michelle Bachelet (2014–2018) proposed in her 
government program, a plan of “recovery of all sites of historical 
memory where human rights were violated, ensuring their basic 
and permanent maintenance”.10 However, there were no concrete 
measures that achieved that objective.
THE NEED TO PRESERVE SITES OF MEMORY: 
CIVIL SOCIETY AND PUBLIC HERITAGE POLICIES
In the absence of an adequate law for the recovery of former de-
tention centres and the opening of sites of memory, the protec-
tion of sites through existing regulations for historic monuments 
has been the main mechanism provided by the State to resolve 
civil society demands. In this regard. The most important task has 
been developed by the National Monuments Council,11 through 
the implementation of Law No. 17.288 on national monuments, 
a regulation promulgated in 1970, which does not include ref-
erences to historical sites associated with human rights viola-
tions.12 The former repressive centres that have been recognized 
as national monuments, as historic monuments through this law, 
have followed an application process beginning with the entry of 
the application to the National Monuments Council by civil so-
ciety organizations. The request is evaluated and if it is accepted, 
a resolution is issued that identifies delimitations and attributes 
of the site. Finally, the declaration must be ratified by the Ministry 
of Culture, Arts and Heritage.
After the first declaration issued (Lonquén furnaces in 1996), 
during the government of President Lagos, in 2002 and 2003, 
respectively, similar declarations were issued about the  José 
Domingo Cañas and Estadio Nacional sites; two former deten-
tion, torture and extermination centres of the dictatorship. Both 
declarations were based on citizen movements composed mainly 
of survivors and their families, who put pressure on the State 
to protect and guarantee the sustainability of these sites.13 In 
2004, Parque por la Paz Villa Grimaldi was declared a national 
monument, being the first place to receive this recognition when 
it was already a site of memory open to the community.14
In continuity with these experiences, subsequent national 
monument declarations have replicated the social and institu-
tional procedures described above (i.e. through civil society de-
nunciation campaigns, submitting the request for a declaration 
to the National Monuments Council and giving new meanings 
to the sites). Thus, more than 30 civil society organizations have 
been formed at the national level with the aim of recovering cer-
tain centres or installing memorials. These groups are character-
ized by being related: a) to repressive experiences (direct victims 
and/or families of victims); b) to some emblematic repression 
place (survivors and neighbours of the centre); c) to political mili-
tancy (militants who seek to value the memory of fellow party 
members who were victims); and d) to the promotion of human 
rights (extending the work of memory to more general issues such 
as justice and truth).15
7 Ángel Cabeza, “Introducción al Patrimonio de los Derechos Humanos en 
Chile”, in Ángel Cabeza et al., Patrimonio de la Memoria de los Derechos 
Humanos en Chile. Sitios de Memoria protegidos como Monumentos Na-
cionales 1996–2016, Santiago: Consejo de Monumentos Nacionales, 
2016, 15.
8 National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture Report, Na-
tional Corporation for Reparation and Reconciliation, Vol. 1, Vol. 1, San-
tiago: 1996, 824.
9 National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture Report, Na-
tional Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture, Ministry of 
the Interior, Government of Chile, 2004, 528.
10 Michelle Bachelet’s Government Program 2014–2018, 165, http://
www.subdere.gov.cl/sites/default/files/noticias/archivos/programamb_ 
1_0.pdf
11 According to this law, what can be recognized as “Historical Monuments” 
are “those movable and immovable properties such as ruins, constructions 
and objects – among others – of government, municipal or private prop-
erty, which for their historical or artistic value or for their antiquity must 
be conserved for the knowledge and enjoyment of present and future gen-
erations”. Law 17288, November 3, 2017, https://www.leychile.cl/Navegar? 
idNorma=28892.
12 At the time of preparation of this paper a bill sent by President Sebastián 
Piñera in May 2019 is under parliamentary discussion, which seeks to up-
date these regulations. The objective of the bill is to modernize the insti-
tutional framework that regulates national monuments, update the catego-
ries and provide effective protection to the  cultural heritage in Chile 
through its identification, preservation, enhancement, management and 
promotion. Sites of memory are defined as “goods of cultural interest”, 
meaning: “all places where serious violations of human rights have been 
committed, or where such violations have been resisted or confronted, or 
which for any reason the victims, their family or the community associate 
with such acts, declared such in order to provide symbolic reparation to 
the victims and their families, to stimulate knowledge and reflection on 
what has happened and to avoid its repetition; or which make it possible 
to promote processes for the construction of linked memories, such as hu-
man rights education” (see https://www.camara.cl/pley/pley_detalle.aspx? 
prmID=13243&prmBoletin=12712-24).
13 Cabeza, op. cit., 59–73.
14 Villa Grimaldi, one of the most important repressive centres of the dictator-
ship, was recovered by a citizens’ movement. In 1994, by coordinating 
public denunciation actions and institutional dialogues with representa-
tives of the Parliament and the Municipality of Peñalolén, it was possible 
for the State to expropriate the site and give it to a civil association com-
posed mainly of survivors of the site. After a process of symbolic redefini-
tion, in 1997 the site was inaugurated with the title of Parque por la Paz 
Villa Grimaldi. Corporación Parque por la Paz Villa Grimaldi, 20 Años Sitio 
de Memoria. Villa Grimaldi Parque por la Paz, Santiago: Corporación 
Parque por la Paz Villa Grimaldi, Consejo de la Cultura y las Artes, 2017, 
69–75.
15 Evelyn Hevia, Las organizaciones, los lugares y sus usos, in Isabel Piper, 
Evelyn Hevia, Espacio y recuerdo, Santiago: Ocho Libros, 2012, 32.
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Until 2014, the reactive state provision regarding the protec-
tion of the sites was clearly observed, achieving under this scheme 
the declaration of twelve monuments. These places correspond 
to centres linked to the repression in the period immediately fol-
lowing the coup d’état and during the operation of the DINA. Of 
the twelve, ten are in the city of Santiago. In the period between 
2015 and 2018, the situation has shown some changes. The Na-
tional Monuments Council has implemented a  participative 
methodology, through which it has worked with family members, 
groups and state agencies in order to generate a representative 
scheme at the national level of the different repressive periods.16 
Under this criterion, twenty-seven historical monuments relating 
to human rights violations have been declared; fourteen are in 
Santiago and thirteen in other regions and rural areas. Progress 
was also made in recognizing archives and centres that are still 
used by the armed forces as national monuments.
In addition to the National Monuments Council, two public 
bodies have contributed to the development of sites of memory. 
First, the Human Rights Program of the Justice and Human Rights 
Ministry,17 which, especially through their projects, memorials 
and institutional management area, has generated funding for 
the preparation of memorials, testimonial archives, research 
and other initiatives to which sites of memory must have access 
through public procurement. Second, the Culture, Memory and 
Human Rights Unit of the Ministry of Culture, Arts and Heritage, 
a body that has developed extension and training opportuni-
ties for workers and site representatives, mainly in the cultural 
management area, with a special focus on direct dialogue with 
organizations.
Of the  thirty-nine sites declared as national monuments, 
only seventeen have been recovered as sites of memory, after 
the Ministry of National Assets, through expropriations, swaps 
or purchases, acquired the properties to then deliver them in 
concessions or free loans to civil society organizations that have 
mobilized for their rescue. Among the latter, only thirteen sites 
are open to the public, with the development of commemorative 
and educational activities, in addition to other initiatives such as 
publications, archives and museum displays. The management 
of these sites of memory is carried out by non-profit private law 
organizations, which can access funding through two channels: 
collaboration agreements (signed with the former DIBAM, cur-
rently the National Heritage Service of the Ministry of Culture, 
Arts and Heritage)18 and competitive funds (particularly through 
resources competed for by the  Human Rights Program and 
the Heritage Fund of the Ministry of Culture, Arts and Heritage). 
The organizations that do not own the sites to which they appeal, 
in addition to not being able to access the centres, do not have 
concession contracts that allow them to obtain resources.
In 2018, during the  second administration of President 
Bachelet, the National Human Rights Plan was designed and 
promulgated under Law No. 20.885, within which, with respect 
to the safeguarding of memory, the following goal was set: “To 
preserve the historical memory of massive and systematic viola-
tions of human rights, ensuring the safeguarding of historical 
heritage in this matter, and the articulation of public institutions 
dedicated to the rescue, conservation and dissemination of this 
heritage.”19 Within this objective, to date, five measures have 
been launched concerning the strengthening of the “Memory 
Routes”,20 the publication of texts on sites declared as National 
Monuments, the protection of heritage and the financing of new 
sites, and the transfer of some properties associated with human 
rights violations owned by the Army to the Ministry of National 
Assets. On the other hand, five other committed measures have 
not yet been carried out, the most relevant being the bill that 
identifies and guarantees preservation and defines the manage-
ment of sites of memory.
TYPES OF SITES OF MEMORY AND NATIONAL 
AND INTERNATIONAL NETWORKS
Thanks to the  conceptualizations proposed by the  National 
Monuments Council, the patrimonialization of sites of memory 
in Chile has been generated from the notion of “human rights 
heritage”, understanding places as “cultural heritage that corre-
sponds to archaeological and systemic or contemporary sites, to 
movable and immovable property that are material and symbolic 
testimony of various processes related to human rights, civil and 
political from the point of view of their violation, defence and 
promotion in general terms”.21 In specific terms, the National 
Monuments Council has created a typology of Chilean sites of 
memory, based on the role they played during the dictatorship. 
This scheme is made up of five types of heritage: a) sites linked 
to intelligence and counterintelligence actions (barracks, bri-
gades and intelligence schools); b) sites where repression was 
carried out (clandestine detention, torture and execution cen-
tres, burial/exhumation graves, prison camps, public prisons, 
military regiments and bases, stadiums, gymnasiums and public 
infrastructure); c) places where human rights violations were re-
sisted (union and social headquarters, human rights NGOs); d) 
archives of repression and human rights memory; e) memorials 
and marks (informative plaques and memorials, sculptures and 
memorial sites).22
Most of these sites share the characteristic of being “site muse-
ums”, i.e. spaces designed and organized to protect a cultural her-
itage, movable and immovable, preserved in its place of origin.23 
16 Annual report on Human Rights in Chile 2018, Human Rights Centre, San-
tiago: Universidad Diego Portales, 2018, 100.
17 The Human Rights Program is an official body created to continue the work 
of the National Corporation for Reparation and Reconciliation, providing 
legal and social assistance to the families of disappeared detainees and 
political prisoners who have been described as victims of human rights 
violations, promoting, disseminating and supporting symbolic cultural 
and educational reparation actions. See: http://pdh.minjusticia.gob.cl/
verdad-y-justicia/
18 This funding is discussed annually in the National Congress. Between 2010 
and 2017, these resources were granted to the sites through the Directorate 
of Libraries, Archives and Museums (DIBAM). After the  creation of 
the Ministry of Culture, Arts and Heritage, these funds were relocated to 
the National Service for Cultural Heritage, the successor to DIBAM.
19 National Human Rights Plan, https://planderechoshumanos.gob.cl/plan-
nacional-de-derechos-humanos
20 The Memory Heritage Routes are schemes proposed by the Ministry of 
National Assets to know and visit various places of memory in the city of 
Santiago. Ruta de la Memoria. Santiago 1973–1989, Ministry of National 
Assets, Santiago: Government of Chile, n/f., 16.
21 Working Document on Human Rights Heritage. Sites of memory, memo-
rials, archives and objects of memory, National Monuments Council, San-
tiago: Cultural Heritage Service, Ministry of Culture, Arts and Heritage, 
Government of Chile, 2018, 28.
22 Ibíd., 44–45.
23 The full definition of “site museum” proposed by the International Coun-
cil of Museums is “Museum designed and organized to protect a natural 
and cultural heritage, movable and immovable, conserved in the place 
where this heritage has been created or discovered”.
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However, the definition of “museum” is a complex issue, some 
sites of memory reject the association of this term with memo-
rialization work.24 Although some sites have chosen to approach 
the definition of “museums”, only the Parque por la Paz Villa Gri-
maldi has developed museological management and organiza-
tional tools, being the only place of memory in Chile that has 
a conservation area. This definition has allowed this site to link 
with international networks through the International Council of 
Museums (ICOM), being part of this global conglomerate since 
2010 and participating, in addition to the headquarters of ICOM-
Chile, in two thematic bodies that have national representation: 
the Committee for Education and Cultural Action (CECA) and 
the International Committee for Memorial Museums in Remem-
brance of the Victims of Public Crimes (ICMEMO). In the same 
sense, not all sites of memory have decided to be called “sites of 
conscience”. Currently, in Chile there are only six sites affiliated 
to the International Coalition of Sites of Conscience.
In terms of collective organization, in Chile there is a network 
of sites of memory that brings together representatives of sites 
(recovered or not), and whose main lines of action are the recov-
ery of former detention centres and the acquirement of guaran-
tees for the survival of the recovered spaces, through stable state 
funding.25 At a regional level, the Latin American and Caribbean 
Network of Sites of Memory (RESLAC) operates, a conglomerate 
in which most Chilean sites of memory participate.
ROLE OF SITES OF MEMORY
In general, sites of memory in Chile highlight three key elements 
in their functioning. First, the representation not only of histori-
cal values associated with the recent past, but also the evocation 
of the cause for a public memory of respect for human rights 
in the present. With regard to the materialization of the right 
to the truth, certain sites have carried out public campaigns to 
gain access to the archives of former repressive bodies (as part 
of the demand for the opening of all sources of information on 
human rights violations held by the State),26 the prosecution of 
all repressors who have not been convicted and the demand for 
the definitive clarification of the whereabouts of the disappeared 
detainees.27 Another action to highlight in this sense, is devel-
oped by some collectives of activists and survivors who manage 
or participate in certain sites of memory, who have organized 
groups of “human rights observers”, with the aim of monitoring 
and reporting possible police abuses during the development of 
public demonstrations.28
Second, in terms of symbolic repair, commemorative actions 
and the development of audiovisual archives stand out. All Chile-
an sites have calendars to commemorate both emblematic events 
of their own history (for example, the date of its opening as a site 
of memory or certain repressive events that occurred while oper-
ating as detention centres), and to commemorate some victims 
who were killed or disappeared in their facilities during the dic-
tatorship. Currently, all sites commemorate the day of the coup 
d’état with different activities, and many of them have joined 
the  celebration of Cultural Heritage Day,29 the  International 
Day of the Disappeared Detainee and the International Human 
Rights Day. Recognizing that the main substance of the content 
at the sites is the testimony of the survivors and the families 
of the victims, several collections that tell the stories of these 
subjects have been put together by the management teams of 
the sites of memory. These testimonial archives are often consti-
tuted to recreate the history of the sites, to identify the practices of 
resistance and solidarity of the detainees and, are being created 
on a biographical basis, to address the phenomenon of militan-
cy, and the social and political activism of the actors who have 
fought to recover the sites. Currently, there is a conglomerate that 
brings together these initiatives: The Oral History Network and 
Oral Archives.30
Finally, in Chile there are two aspects of the role of sites that 
have not been addressed adequately. First, their function as ju-
dicial evidence of human rights violations. Recently, several in-
vestigations in the field of archaeology have been developed that 
have generated proposals on the preservation of remnants and 
the recovery of diverse materials, from a historical perspective 
(even, a specific section of this subject was created in the College 
of Archaeologists).31 Second, the eventual contribution of nation-
al reconciliation has not yet been addressed. Although the sites 
have not yet stated that their objectives include the contribution 
to “reconciliation” (considered, in some cases, to be contrary to 
this idea),32 their aims relating to the promotion of a “democratic 
and human rights culture”,33 indicate an intention to influence 
the ethical-political future of Chilean society. However, there is 
not enough evidence to determine the extent to which sites are 
appreciated by society as spaces that work on a divided memory 
of the recent past.34 Anyway, in practice, it is clear that sites of 
memory represent the  public struggle between oblivion and 
the commemorative and pedagogical meaning of memory. Proof 
of this controversial situation is found in the attacks on the sites 
24 In the discussion about its projection, the institution Londres 38 stated: 
“[…] a site of memory should not be a museum, understood as a place 
where there is an exhibition of objects and little interaction between visi-
tors and these objects […]”. Gloria Ochoa, Carolina Maillard, La persisten-
cia de la memoria: Londres 38, un espacio de memorias en construcción, 
Santiago: Edición de Londres 38, 2011, 104–105.
25 Mariana Zegers, “Sitios de Memoria en Chile”, in El Desconcierto, 12. 14. 
2017, https://www.eldesconcierto.cl/2017/12/14/sitios-de-memoria-en-
chile/
26 “No more secret files. Interview with Gloria Elgueta”, in Revista de Gestión 
Pública, Vol. III, No. 1, Santiago, 2014, 199–206.
27 Cath Collins, Katherine Hite, Fragmentos de memoriales, silencios monu-
mentales y despertares en el Chile del siglo XXI, in Cath Collins, Katherine 
Hite, Alfredo Joignant, eds., Las políticas de la memoria en Chile: desde 
Pinochet a Bachelet, Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Diego Portales, 2013, 
178.
28 Human Rights Observers in Chile, http://www.observadoresddhh.org/
29 Official body inviting civil society to visit historical monuments, museums 
and public and private heritage zones or buildings. It is held annually, 
during the last weekend of May.
30 Oral History Network and Oral Archives, https://rhoao.wordpress.com/
31 Adriana Goñi et al., Sitios de Memorias, Arqueología y Conservación Pro-
puesta conceptual de orientación y directrices de trabajo, Santiago: Na-
tional Conservation and Restoration Centre, 2017.
32 The site of memory Londres 38 is the main exponent of the criticism of 
the politics of reconciliation that would have developed the State of Chile. 
Ver http://www.londres38.cl/1937/w3-article-93690.html
33 This objective is mentioned in the mission and vision of several memorial 
sites, such as the Parque por la Paz Villa Grimaldi, Paine Memorial, Ex 
Clínica Santa Lucía and Estadio Nacional-Memoria Nacional.
34 A pioneering study in this field was carried out in 2017 taking as a sample 
the Museum of Memory and Human Rights. Although it is not an investi-
gation of a site of memory, the results of the study are relevant, pointing 
out that this museum moves visitors to less confrontational attitudes, be-
yond their ideological positions. Elsa Voytas, Laia Balcells, Valeria Palanza, 
“Do Museums Promote Reconciliation? A Field Experiment on Transi-
tional Justice”, in Empirical Studies of Conflict Project (ESOC) Working 
Papers 10, 2018, online.
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and memorials by individuals and groups who exalt the dicta-
torial government and criticize the use of public resources for 
the development of these initiatives. In 2018, the National Insti-
tute for Human Rights counted at least eight instances of attacks 
and vandalism on memorials and sites declared National Monu-
ments in different cities of the country.35
SITES OF MEMORY AND EDUCATION
The  National Truth and Reconciliation Commission report 
recommended strengthening human rights education at all 
educational levels, as well as in the training of the armed forces 
and internal security forces, as a mechanism for contributing to 
the generation of a culture of peace, respect and tolerance.36 This 
approach implied, in practice, reforming the Organic Constitu-
tional Law on Education (LOCE), inherited from the dictatorial 
regime. This regulation established that the Ministry of Educa-
tion (MINEDUC) could not prepare national programs and plans, 
and that the curricular framework (made up of transverse fun-
damental objectives (OFT) and mandatory minimum contents 
(CMO)) would be determined by the Higher Education Council 
(CSE), an autonomous body headed by the Ministry of Education, 
and made up of representatives of the armed forces, the Catho-
lic Church and the Supreme Court, as well as academics and 
scientists.37
Particularly with respect to the teaching of the recent past, in 
1999, as a result of the work of the Technical Advisory Commit-
tee for the National Dialogue on the Modernization of Chilean 
Education (a body created by presidential decree), an adjust-
ment to the transverse fundamental objectives, and mandatory 
minimum contents of the History and Social Sciences courses 
was approved, determining the approach to the dictatorship in 
the sixth year of basic education, and the second year of high 
school education, in two units, respectively: “Democratic crisis 
and military regime: new political constitution and new eco-
nomic model”, “The transition and the recovery of democracy” 
and “The twentieth century: The pursuit of economic develop-
ment and social justice”.38 The mandatory minimum content for 
the study of the recent past in the second year of high school in-
dicated that the revision of the period of the dictatorship was not 
mandatory. Proposing instead, in case teachers deciding to work 
on the historical stage, the thesis of the report of the National 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, about the polarization 
prior to the coup d’état, should be used. Regarding the contents 
of the sixth year of basic education, the approach to human rights 
violations, the operation of repressive bodies and the action of 
bodies for the defence of fundamental rights were approved.
This last situation generated intense polarization between 
the College of Professors, which defended the reform, and con-
servative sectors of the Chilean right, who objected to it. Faced 
with the demands of the Jaime Guzmán Foundation and the re-
jection of the application of historical content by various munici-
palities governed by right-wing mayors, in 2000, the Ministry of 
Education decided to replace the text for the sixth grade of basic 
education.39 Despite this, between 2004 and 2007, new adjust-
ments were introduced, and promoted in response to the mas-
sive student mobilizations that were generated in that period for 
the demand of better conditions for access to public education.40
In 2009, during the first administration of President Bachelet, 
the replacement of the Organic Constitutional Law on Education 
by the General Education Law (LGE) was enacted. By means of 
these regulations, the Ministry of Education incorporated into 
formal education, at the basic and intermediate levels, a series 
of fundamental transverse objectives regarding the approach to 
human rights and the recent past. The training plans directly ori-
ented to these courses are presented in the third and fourth years 
of high school education.41 In response to these important re-
forms, in 2011, at the request of the Executive Branch, the Nation-
al Education Council (the successor body to the Higher Educa-
tion Council) approved a conceptual modification to the History 
texts that replaced the term “dictatorship” with “military regime”. 
The situation generated intense controversy both in society and in 
government, against which the Ministry of Education promoted 
the possibility of the texts mentioning the period 1973–1990 in 
both forms.
The National Institute for Human Rights has periodically is-
sued criticisms of the State’s educational policy on human rights 
and recent history. Specifically, the primacy of these contents 
in the History course has been highlighted with concern (with 
the approach to human rights violations committed by the dic-
tatorship on issues such as economic, social and cultural rights 
predominating) and the weak introduction of human rights in 
higher education, and in the training of the armed forces and 
internal security forces.42
However, regarding sites of memory, most declare that ed-
ucation is one of their main tasks.43 The sites, in general, have 
adopted the definition of human rights education proposed by 
UNESCO.44 However, the use of the concept of “memory peda-
gogy” has been consolidated among the educators of the sites, to 
refer to an “educational proposal that uses the memory of trau-
matic events for the teaching and promotion of peace and human 
rights, “focused” on the development of values and, therefore, 
with a strong component sustained in emotiveness, making it 
possible “that from the perspective of learning there is the need to 
35 Annual Report. Human rights situation in Chile 2018, National Institute 
for Human Rights, Santiago: Ediciones del Instituto Nacional de Derechos 
Humanos, 2018, 91–92.
36 National Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report, op. cit., 1263–1264.
37 National Education Council, https://www.cned.cl/quienes-somos
38 Leonora Reyes, “A 40 años del Golpe de Estado: el debate curricular in-
acabado”, in Docencia, No. 50, 2013, 36.
39 Ibíd., 42–43.
40 These reforms to curricular frameworks were not limited to the History 
course, but also incorporated the Language and Communication, Orienta-
tion and Philosophy sectors, adding qualitative elements of learning, such 
as tolerance and skills for the exercise of rights. Enrique Azua, “Educación 
en Derechos Humanos en el currículum chileno”, in VVAA, Pedagogía de 
la memoria. Desafío para la Educación en Derechos Humanos, Santiago: 
Heinrich Böll Stiftung Cono Sur, 2010, 121–123.
41 In the first case, fundamental objective 4 of the History, Geography and 
Social Sciences course reviews humanity’s efforts to build a world of peace, 
following the horrors of world wars, genocides and totalitarianism. While 
in the second, in the framework of fundamental objectives 1, 3, 4 and 5 of 
the same course, learning about the rule of law is addressed as the legal 
framework that protects the exercise of human rights. Human Rights Re-
port for Students, National Institute for Human Rights, Santiago: Ediciones 
del Instituto Nacional de Derechos Humanos, 2014.
42 Human Rights Annual Report 2012, National Institute for Human Rights, 
Santiago: Ediciones del Instituto Nacional de Derechos Humanos, 2012, 
308–310.
43 According to a 2018 survey of sites conducted by the National Institute of 
Human Rights, 82 % of the sites recovered and open to the community put 
on tours for students.
44 UNESCO and human rights education, UNESCO, Digital Libarry UNES-
DOC, https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000131836_spa
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build knowledge from the memory of the subjects”.45 Particularly, 
in the Parque por la Paz Villa Grimaldi, this proposal has evolved, 
complementing itself with thematic activities for students of 
different educational levels, now called “pedagogy of place of 
memory”.46 Similarly, Memorial Paine has developed areas of 
reflection around memory and human rights, conducting site 
tours and art workshops with mosaics, exploring with students 
the current state of human rights.47 From the emergence of these 
and other educational programs at various sites, a collaborative 
work of teams and educational areas has been generated, which 
has materialized in the creation and management of the network 
of educational areas of Sites of Memory and Conscience.48
At the time of writing of this document, three issues are seen as 
relevant to the development of human rights education in Chile. 
First, its inclusion in the National Human Rights Plan, through 
the introduction of the citizen training plan, as a complement to 
the existing contents of the History course. Second, a proposal 
by opposition deputies for the incorporation of a compulsory 
course on human rights and historical memory in formal educa-
tion is under discussion at the National Congress. Finally, there 
is a growing preference of students for a dictatorial regime over 
a democratic one.49
LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In Chile, the development of sites of memory and the educational 
proposals associated with them on education of the recent past, 
and human rights has followed a complex process, relatively dis-
sociated from the democratizing progress of the political transi-
tion. In this sense, the main lesson of the Chilean experience is 
the lack of a uniform and long-term public policy regarding both 
the recovery of the old detention, torture and extermination cen-
tres, and the opening and maintenance of sites and memorials. It 
is possible to affirm that sites of memory have developed in a con-
text of “post-transitional justice”,50 that is, under a socio-political 
scheme in which memory initiatives are articulated not only by 
the State, but also in dialogue with civil society (and often under 
its leadership), through transversal organizations of activists, vic-
tims and family members, overcoming the political-institutional 
limitations and official reconciliation logics of the first stage of 
the transition.
This situation has generated at least two scenarios. On the one 
hand, that the process of rescuing material memory, its redefini-
tion and opening as public historic spaces, is primarily a mat-
ter for civil society. Therefore, the work of “memory entrepre-
neurs” has been vital.51 On the other hand, the official heritage 
designation of memory is a reactive policy, reducing itself to 
the application of the Law on National Monuments, decreeing 
expropriations, financing limited spaces and generating public 
procurements in which the sites must compete for resources.
Both situations have generated three determining conse-
quences for the development of sites of memory in post-author-
itarian Chile. First, a tense relationship between sites of memory 
and the State, characterized by the questioning by some repre-
sentatives of the sites, and how they express the heritage designa-
tion process, considering it a demobilizing body of the political 
cause for human rights,52 and an ineffective measure for concrete 
redefinition,53 since the declaration as a National Monument 
does not guarantee access to space, nor does it guarantee per-
manent resources. Second, it has reinforced the differentiation 
between sites of memory recovered and open to the public, and 
those that have only been declared as sites but whose access is 
not allowed. This makes evident the necessary participation of 
permanent actors in the management of the sites, so that they 
can operate as public spaces of historical redefinition and educa-
tion in human rights. This last criticism also extends to the dif-
ferentiation between recovered sites and memorials. Finally, due 
to the absence of effective punishment for those who damage 
national monuments, it has caused sites and memorials to be 
prone to political attacks.
However, the sites also face challenges, related to the impact of 
their messages and educational proposals. Some recent research 
has indicated that there would be difficulties for sites to activate 
memory and learning processes in people who are not victims or 
family members, and who did not live through the dictatorship 
or the first stage of the transition.54 In this sense, it is important 
that sites constantly adjust their teaching strategies, trying to in-
corporate methodologies that strengthen the link between past 
and present, emphasizing the approach to current humiliating 
situations, and promoting open discussions on the socio-polit-
ical divisions that exist about the understanding of the recent 
national past.
In summary, the Chilean experience in this field reveals: a) 
the need for an active role for both the State and civil society, with 
respect to the consolidation of protected and projected sites of 
memory; b) the dynamic reality of places of memory, associated 
both with the quality of heritage policies and with generational 
differences; c) the need for a Sites of Memory Law that guarantees 
the safeguarding of sites and considers civil society organizations 
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in terms of site management and; d) the importance of the sites 
for human rights education, as a complement to official educa-
tional programs and a deepening of the approach to the past, 
through the testimony of the victims and their own dynamic 
strategies. The value of sites of memory lies in the realization of 
citizens’ efforts towards non-repetition and the promotion of hu-
man rights; therefore, their protection and enhancement should 
be a fundamental objective for any transitional government that 
seeks to ensure that its population values democracy over any 
form of authoritarianism.
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TIMELINE OF THE MAJOR EVENTS
Boris hau
September 1970 Socialist Party candidate Salvador Allende wins the presidential election, heading the Popular Unity 
coalition
September 11, 1973 A violent coup deposes President Allende, initiating right-wing dictatorship by a military junta, 
headed by General Augusto Pinochet
June 4, 1974 Creation of the DINA secret police, headed by General Manuel Contreras, to repress, torture, disap-
pear and eliminate left-wing activists and other regime opponents
January 1, 1976 Creation by the Catholic Church of the emblematic human rights defence organisation the “Vicaría 
de la Solidaridad”.
August 13, 1977 The DINA is replaced by a new organisation, the CNI. Disappearances and politically motivated 
executions become less frequent, though repression continues
April 19, 1978 Decree Law 2.191 extends amnesty to perpetrators of politically motivated crimes committed be-
tween September 1973 and March 1978. A clause excluding people currently under charges makes 
the law a self-amnesty, designed to protect regime agents while excluding opponents.
September 11, 1980 A new, authoritarian, Constitution is “ratified” by a fraudulent plebiscite
January 22, 1982 Christian Democrat politician and former president Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964–70) died in 
hospital. A later judicial investigation concluded, in 2019, that he had been poisoned by regime 
agents
May 1983 A wave of social protest and civil unrest in opposition to the regime began with a national strike 
day, called by the copper workers’ union
September 7, 1986 Assassination attempt on Augusto Pinochet by a left-wing armed opposition movement. Five of his 
bodyguards were killed, but Pinochet survived.
October 5, 1988 A second plebiscite narrowly rejects conceding eight more years in power to Pinochet, meaning 
open elections would be held.
March 11, 1990 After Chile’s first free elections in 17 years, centrist Christian Democrat candidate Patricio Aylwin 
became president, representing a 17-party centre left coalition known as the “Concertación”.
April 25, 1990 Presidential Decree No. 355 creates Chile’s first Truth Commission, the National Commission on 
Truth and Reconciliation (“Rettig Commission”), to document grave human rights violations and 
acts of political violence committed during the dictatorship. The “Rettig report” was published 
on March 4, 1991. Victims of extrajudicial execution or disappearance were individually named. 
Totals, updated in 1996, came to stand at 3,195 individuals: 2,008 people executed; 1,183 detained-
disappeared, and 4 unborn children killed or disappeared along with their mothers.
February 8, 1992 Law 19.123, the first of various reparations laws, set out some entitlements for relatives, returning 
exiles, and others. It also created a National Corporation for Reparation and Reconciliation, which 
operated until 1996 to complete victim registers and administer reparations.
1990, 1993 Two sets of military manoeuvres were ordered by Pinochet, still the Army Commander of Chief, 
to express military disquiet over truth and justice efforts and to intimidate the new democratic 
authorities.
May 30, 1995 The first significant criminal conviction for dictatorship-era violations: former secret police chief 
Manuel Contreras and his second in command were jailed over the 1976 car bomb assassination, 
in Washington DC, of former Chilean foreign minister Orlando Letelier and a colleague.
December 5, 1995 For the first time, the Supreme Court upheld a guilty verdict that classified disappearance as an on-
going crime, to which the 1978 Amnesty Decree Law could not apply.
March 1997 Inauguration of the Villa Grimaldi Peace Park, the first former clandestine detention centre in 
the Americas to be recovered by survivors and opened to the public as a site of memory.
1997–1998 Judicial reforms dilute the power of Pinochet-era appointees in the Supreme Court
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January 1998 Criminal complaints naming Pinochet directly are admitted, for the first time, to the investigation 
stage. The two cases were brought by the Communist Party president, and by relatives of victims of 
the so-called “Caravan of Death” killings of 1973.
March 1998 Under the terms of the 1980 Constitution, still in force, Pinochet retires as Commander in Chief of 
the Army and becomes an honorary Senator.
September 9, 1998 The Supreme Court for the first time orders the reopening of a case previously amnestied by military 
courts: it rules that amnesty can only be applied after a full investigation, and that international 
human rights law requires that war crimes be punished.
October 16, 1998 Augusto Pinochet is detained in London, under the terms of an international arrest warrant re-
quested by Spanish judge Baltazar Garzón. The request is for his extradition to Spain to stand trial 
for crimes against humanity, committed against Spanish citizens and others, during the Chilean 
dictatorship.
August 21, 1999 The Chilean government instigates a “Roundtable Dialogue” with the Armed Forces, the Catholic 
Church, and some human rights lawyers, supposedly to find the disappeared. Relatives’ associa-
tions refused to take part. The outcome was a list stating that dozens of victims had been “thrown 
into the sea”. Some of the information was later proven to be false.
March 3, 2000 After 503 days of house arrest in London, Pinochet was allowed to return to Chile for “humanitarian 
reasons” even though the UK’s highest court, the House of Lords, had approved his extradition to 
Spain
December 1, 2000 Pinochet was charged for the first time, by Chilean courts, for his part in the disappearance or ex-
ecution of 74 victims of the Caravan of Death. The Supreme Court later named special investigative 
magistrates to investigate all open or reopened cases for dictatorship-era human rights violations, 
nationwide.
August 2003 In the run-up to the 30th anniversary of the military coup, Socialist President Ricardo Lagos pro-
posed a second truth commission and expanded existing reparations programmes.
November 2004 The Army made its first ever explicit public recognition of involvement in “criminal and morally 
unacceptable acts” during the dictatorship
November 17, 2004 Investigative magistrate Alejandro Solis passed the first verdict explicitly recognising unresolved 
dictatorship-era “kidnappings” as enforced disappearance, which under international law cannot 
be subject to amnesty or statutes of limitation.
November 28, 2004 Chile’s second truth commission, the National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture, 
“Valech Commission”, published its report. Almost 29,000 individuals were named as survivors 
of political imprisonment and torture during the dictatorship. A new law, Law 19,992, provided 
reparations but set a controversial 50-year embargo preventing public or judicial access to the com-
mission’s records.
March 11, 2006 Socialist Party candidate Michelle Bachelet, daughter of an Air Force General who died after being 
tortured by the regime, became Chile’s first woman president.
September 26, 2006 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights condemned Chile’s application of amnesty to the 1973 
extrajudicial execution of Luis Almonacid. President Bachelet promised legislation to “bring the am-
nesty law into line with” Chile’s international obligations, but did not keep her promise.
December 10, 2006 Augusto Pinochet died, at the age of 91, under charges in 3 cases of crimes against humanity, and 
one case of tax fraud and money laundering (the Riggs Bank case).
December 10, 2009 Ley 20.405 created Chile’s first state National Human Rights Institute, and a new repetition of the Va-
lech Commission (officially called the “Presidential Advisory Commission for the Qualification of 
Victims of Extrajudicial Execution, Disappearance, Political Imprisonment and Torture”, known as 
“Valech II”).
January 11, 2010 Inauguration of Chile’s national Museum for Memory and Human Rights
March 11, 2010 Sebastián Piñera became President of the first democratically-elected right wing administration 
in Chile for 50 years
August 18, 2011 The “Valech II” report added almost 10,000 names to the “Valech list”, and 30 victims to the “Rettig 
lists”. The final total became 38,254 acknowledged survivors of political imprisonment and torture, 
plus 3,216 acknowledged victims of disappearance and execution.
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August 28, 2013 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled, in the García Lucero case, that investigation of 
torture is a state obligation that should be done ex officio, without waiting for survivors to bring 
criminal complaints
September 2013 On the 40th anniversary of the military coup, Chile’s Supreme Court issued its first ever mea culpa 
for its “actions and omissions” over human rights during the dictatorship.
March 11, 2014 Political alternation: Michelle Bachelet became President for the second time, heading a centre-left 
coalition which, for the first time, included the Communist Party.
December 2014 The Supreme Court decided to unify criteria in civil claims, declaring statutes of limitation inap-
plicable even in civil cases and awarding damages even if other reparations had been received.
March 11, 2018 Political alternation: Sebastián Piñera became President for the second time, heading a right-wing 
coalition.
July and August 2018 The “Supremazo”: Chile’s Supreme Court controversially conceded early release or parole to six 
former agents in prison for crimes against humanity.
August 10-13, 2018 Mauricio Rojas, who had previously accused the Museum of Memory and Human Rights of falsify-
ing history, was named Minister of Culture and the Arts but had to resign after only three days, due 
to protests.
October, 2019 Major social unrest, met with disproportionate police violence, threatened Chile’s carefully culti-
vated image of success and stability. Political elites grudgingly conceded the need for a new Con-
stitution, to replace the authoritarian-era one still in force.
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